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ABSTRACT
This study aims to demonstrate how the interaction between the plan-
ning and political processes, given their different perceptions of spatial
equity and efficiency objectives, influences the formulation and implemen-
tation of regional policies in the Philippines. It examines a number of
past and current policies, with particular emphasis on those related to the
regional dispersal of industries, and evaluates the outcome or identifies
the possible consequences resulting from the frequent conflicts between
these two processes. In addition, the complementarity of these various
sectoral policies is analyzed in order to design an overall strategy for
spatial equity. Finally the study presents some policy recommendations
intended to strenghten the institutional machinery for regional development
planning and to reduce the tensions between the planning and political
processes.
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PART I
In Part I the basic thesis and purpose of this study are defined.
Subsequently the various theoretical and practical considerations that jus-
tify the formulation or regional development policies aimed at spatial
equity are presented from both the planning and political viewpoints. State-
ments of Philippine regional policy are then reviewed in order to determine
the underlying motivations behind policy initiatives and to identify the
relevant policy issues which need to be addressed in this study. Finally a
short summary of major findings and conclusions is outlined.
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I. Issues in Regional Development Policy : The Philippine Case.
A. Basic Thesis of the Study.
Every policy has its own set of technical and political elements,
which emanates from the interaction between the planning and political pro-
cesses. Due to differences in objectives, these two processes attempt to
influence in opposite directions the resolution of spatial equity and ef-
ficiency issues pertaining to the development of regional policy. The plan-
ning process considers decentralization from the Metropolitan Manila Area
(MMA) as crucial to any regional development effort because 1) the domi-
nance of the NMA is the main source of regional income inequality and 2) the
MMA is apparently exhibiting signs of external diseconomies. While cogni-
zant of such a development imperative, it proposes a more selective and
discriminating method of decentralization in order to attain efficiency in
growth as well as in resource allocation. On the other hand, the political
process is concerned more with the impact of decentralization policies on
equity'as it effects the balance of power among the regions. Thus it advo-
cates full budgetary equity through a broader participation of regions in
programs for decentralization. As a result of these varying perceptions of
decentralization and its objectives, the interplay between the planning and
political processes largely determines the relative importance given to
equity and efficiency goals in the formulation and implementation of regio-
nal policy. While it may be desirable to emphasize the technical element
of policy for efficiency reasons, the political process subjects the policy
making process to a series of adhoc revisions and pragmatic adjustments to
particular pressures which reflect the constellation 6f factions and inte-
l/
rest groups operating at various levels of the political system.- The
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final outcome for policy depends on which of the two processes and, cor-
respondingly, which of the two elements will prevail and what compromises
regarding equity and efficiency objectives can be reached.
In recognition of the technical and political elements of policy, the
present regional planning set-up in the Philippines seeks to combine the
technocracy and the political leadership in the region. However politics
has traditionally been a dominant factor in national policy making and has
often undermined the effectiveness of enunciated policies. With the advent
of regional planning, another level of interaction between the planning
and political processes has been added. While conflicts can occur at every
level of policy making, potential conflict appears more imminent at the
regional level because of interregional and intraregional pressures acting
on decision-makers. When the planning process yields unnecessarily to these
pressures during the formulation and implementation of regional policy, the
success of decentralization efforts is greatly jeopardized.
B. Purpose and Scope of the Study.
This study aims to demonstrate how the planning and political proces-
ses, given their different perceptions of equity and efficiency, interact
in policy making and to identify the consequences of such an interaction.
A selected mix of regional policies and national policies with strong spa-
tial impact will be evaluated in order to determine which of the two objec-
tives - efficiency or equity - is accorded priority in each policy and to
trace the factors that bear upon the resolution of the conflict between
them. In addition, some trade-offs may be justified in order to improve the
effectiveness and/or political acceptability of a particular policy. The
evaluation exercise will attempt to highlight the instances where these
trade'7offs are made,
While there are various regional policies, this study focuses on the
strategy for the regional dispersal of industries because this particular
policy, while being directed towards spatial equity and decentralization
objectives, has strict efficiency requirements. Hence it provides a useful
tool for demonstrating the conflict between the planning and political pro-
cesses. Emphasis is laid on the assessment of the implications of policies
on interregional disparities since industrial dispersal and decentralizar-
tion policies are presently geared more towards this component of the spa-
tial equity problem. Nevertheless, to the extent that available information
permits, some general observations on the consequences of policies on intra-
regional disparities will be presented.
In addition to examining the influences of the planning and political
processes on policy making, the evaluation exercise will assess the various
types of policies individually as a means of pinpointing their basic weak-
nesses or strengths which could be the basis for future policy reformula-
tion. Subsequently the relationship of these policies to one another will
be studied in order to verify whether they could serve as complementary schemes
to the industrial dispersal policy in forming an overall strategy for spa-
tial equity.
C, Rationale for the Development of Policies Aimed at Spatial Equity.
1, Theoretical Foundations for the Emergence of Spatial Disparities and
Eventual Convergence.
Spatial equity as an objective of government policy is in itself a
controversial and unsettled issue. It is argued that intervention strate-
gies aimed at spatial equity are unnecessary since regional disparities
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are a normal consequence of the whole process of economic development and
are bound to disappear via market adjustments as development proceeds. The
emergence of disparities is seen as inevitable because growth does not oc-
cur simultaneously and equally throughout a country but only in a few
.2/
points.- One plausible explanation in this regard is based on location
theory which holds that economic activities first arise in areas with some
initial advantages, either in market potential, natural rsource endowments,
or transport, just to name a few possibilities. It is further theorized
that the ensuing stages of polarization often lead to wider disparities
until a certain point in time when growth diffuses more evenly and incomes
converge. Eventual convergence in regional incomes is predicted on the as-
sumption of perfect mobility of factors of production, whereby interregio-
nal movements will take place in response to varying factor prices in dif-
ferent locations and continue until an equilibrium point of equal returns
in all areas is reached. Alternatively interregional trade can work as a
substitute for interregional factor movements when the equalization of fac-
tor prices is achieved by the specialization of each region in commodities
that require the greater amount of the factor that the region has.-
2. Market Failure.
Although in theory spatial inequities are viewed as temporary economic
4/
features which can only persist via lags in dynamic adjustment,- the expe-
rience of many countries casts doubt on this contention and appears to -
prove that regional convergence does not automatically occur in the course
of development. Interregional adjustment, even when set in motion, is at
best only partial since: 1) there are obstacles and costs to the free move-
=ents of labor and capital, 2) people are not governed purely by economic
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motives and, even when they are, perfect information is not always avai-
lable, and 3) market forces do not react efficiently enough to permit easy
adjustment. Furthermore, due to the extreme selectivity of labor migration
and the high risk, lack of entrepreneurial ability and inefficient capital
mahkets in underdeveloped areas, regional disparities are likely to diverge
even more, perhaps to some socially or politically unacceptable degree.
In recognition of the failure of the market mechanism to bring about
regional convergence, government policies aimed at spatial equity are neces-
sary to accelerate its occurrence and to mitigate the costs associated with
regional disparities. Admittedly spatial equity or the attainment of regio-
nal balance cannot and does not mean a precise equality of economic and
social conditions across the country. Basic differences in natural resource
endowments as well as peculiar socio-cultural characteristics, just to name
a few major factors, simply preclude such a possibility. The issue is what
constitutes a proper regional balance or socially defensible degree of ine-
quality, but this is unresolvable. The answer will be certainly subjective
and political, highly dependent on how government views redistribution vis-
a-vis its other social welfare functions.
3. Economic, Social and Political Justifications for Regional Policy.
a. From the planning viewpoint.
Essentially the planning process sees the development of regional
policy, especially the regional dispersal of industries, as an attempt at
economic efficiency, both in the short and long-run, with all the regions
making a substantial contribution to overall national growth on the basis
of their comparative advantages at different stages of their development.
There are regions in a country with ample natural resources whose exploita-
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tion can significantly contribute to overall growth objectives. Histori-
cally resource mobilization in these regions has proceeded slowly due to
lack of investment or entreprenuerial interest. Development strategies
geared towards exploiting these resource potentials are capable of raising
regional incomes, reducing disparities without unduly hindering national
growth since investment returns in these regions are considered to be high-
er. Subsequently, as incomes rise, domestic markets that are necessary to
achieve a level of demand sufficient enough to sustain an efficient scale
of operation of industries will be built up.
The aim of economic efficiency further supports the development of
peripheral regions. In many developing countries, there is usually a marked
concentration of all types of activities in a primate city which dominates
the entire country. Although concentration of economic activities engenders
efficiency, a point is reached when external diseconomies begin (or at
least believed) to outweigh the external economies arising from agglomera-
tion. then the development of other regions through decentralization mea-
sures is initiated. Industrial dispersal strategies are pursued for this
reason even though the theoretical basis surrounding the issue of the so-
called "optimal city size" has not been fully established.-
In addition to economic factors, social reasons further reinforce the
need for altering regional structures. A skewed distribution of income,
both interregional and intraregional, impedes a growth in local demand that
could stimulate the emergence of secondary activities. In some regions of
the country, there are heavy concentrations of poor people; their incomes
are so low that the enjoyment of a decent quality of life is not attainable.
Conditions in these areas are exacerbated when a depletion of the prime
-12-
labor force occurs as a result of migration to the big cities, eventually
6/
depressing agricultural productivities.- A substantial portion of the
population does not gain access to resources nor basic human needs crucial
to their personal development, which ultimately leads to a worsening of
income distribution. Likewise this happens in the big cities. Despite high
average incomes, unemployment and widespread poverty exist, inasmuch as
the urban economy is incapable of fully absorbing migrants. In both the
rural and urban areas, development efforts have not really benefitted those
who most need help, with growth failing to trickle down to the poor masses.
Within any region, interpersonal differences in income, earning capa-
city and quality of life are always present. Due to these differences, a
sizeable number of people is excluded from participating and sharing in
the benefits of development since economic gains are usually monopolized
by a powerful minority.- Therefore regional development should encompass
not only income and productivity changes but should also aim, in the long-
run, ai basic structural changes in social class relations so that every-
body shares equitably in progress.
Any attempt at reducing interregional disparities must ensure for so-
cial reasons that the benefits of the intervention strategy filter down to
the majority of the people within the region. Very often the urban-indus-
trial bias of government policies and programs has left the preponderant
rural sector in a perennial state of underdevelopment and neglect. The re--
sult is a dualistic situation within the region that represents s micro-
cosmic version of the dichotomy in the national economy. Standards of li-
ving vary within the region, creating tendencies for rural to urban migra-
tion. Massive migratory movements render the integration of the incoming
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population into the urban social order highly impossible.
b. From the political viewpoint.
A major motivating factor for reducing regional disparities is the
promotion of national integration and preservation of unity. The streng-
thening of the body politic poses a legitimate concern in any development
strategy. Where the political climate is unstable and vulnerable to inter-
nal as well as external forces, central governments are more inclined to
react positively to regional pressures even if such pressures are motivated
by purely self-interests. At times the pressure of special groups or inte-
rests may be more effective than the resistance based on.a less well-de-
8/fined interest.- It is not uncommon in many developing countries that some
political, religious or racial factions are discontented with the perfor-
mance of the government and clamor for its ouster. Threats of secession or
outbreak of civil disturbances place heavy stress on the incumbent politi-
cal leadership. It may succumb to pressures from regional groups and will
try to-show, even if by mere official pronouncements, that the government
is giving more attention by initiating some regionally-oriented programs.
Governments may also attempt to manifest sincere concern through budgetary
appropriations for areas where tensions originate.
Fully aware of the critical importance of development policies in
swaying the balance of power among and within regions, the political prorL
cess strives to take advantage of any national or regional policy that it
could use for solidifying its present power base. Within an interregional
context, the regional group that is most effective in asserting its pre-
sence in the policy making process is likely to gain the most from
regional policy.
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Regional programs offer opportunities for extracting resources from
the national government which could be utilized to finance projects that
enhance the political image of the sponsoring elective officials. Thus
regions try to capitalize on these opportunities by competing for centrally-
allocated resources. Very often however, due to the diversity of needs and
interests at the local level, an efficient allocation of resources is dif-
ficult to attain especially when political pressures are brought to bear
heavily on decision-makers.
Finally, intraregional or personal income inequities may also create
social and political tensions which could foment widespread dissatisfaction
with the status quo. Discontent among the masses could ignite attempts to
overthrow the present socio-political system and replace it with a new pro-
letariat-based society.
4. Conflict between Spatial Equity and Efficiency.
The frequent contradiction in interests between the political and plan-
ning processes inevitably leads to conflict between the spatial equity and
efficiency objectives of policy. The question as to whether these two ob-
jectives can be attained at the same time has been a major issue in regio-
9,
nal policy.- From the planning perspective, economic considerations favor
concentration, or at least limited decentralization, of population, indus-
tties and capital resources to attain increasing returns to scale and ex-
ternal economies which in turn improves the productivity of capital. Diver-
sion of resources to undeveloped areas takes place only when clear prospects
of higher factor productivity are perceived there. In contrast, social and
political factors advocate dispersion of human and capital resources large-
ly for equity reasons. There may be a commonality of interests between
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economic and political motivations if the decentralization of population,
economic activities and supporting facilities results in the formation of
more extensive markets which would provide additional growth opportunities.
However such a decentralization often materializes only after a long lag
time wherein inefficiencies are bound to crop up.
The conflict between equity and efficiency emanates from divergent
expectations regarding the marginal productivity of capital in different
areas, In general, higher returns are anticipated from more economically
developed regions while, in depressed regions, opportunities for the pro-
ductive use of capital are limited. Perhaps only a massive infusion of
capital in these latter areas, i.e., investments in various complementary
sectors analogous to the balanced growth strategy, can improve the outlook
for capital productivity. Moreover, it is often argued that, in view of the
scarcity of capital in developing nations, a wider geographical distribu-
tion of this resource unavoidably results in dilution, ultimately depres-
sing the returns to capital or gains in national growth. Hence growth center
or concentrated dispersal approaches have been designed to minimize probable
efficiency losses. Unfortunately the effectivity of these approaches is
still unconfirmed. Therefore, due to the need for maximizing national out-
put, concentration of resources in a few areas with better potential for
high returns is encouraged. But in so doing, spatial disparities usually
follow unless spread effects are substantial. In many cases, therefore,
spatial equity and efficiency are considered to be mutually-exclusive
goals. Row government attempts to resolve this dilemma is a matter of poli-
tical rather than technical judgment.
Meanwhile the political process' conception of capital productivity
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is greatly influenced by its relatively short tine horizon. For the natio-
nal government, for instance, it is more concerned with immediately quel-
ling regionally-based opposition or threats to its continued stay in power
by granting frequent budgetary appropriations to certain critical areas.
Similarly this occurs at the local level where the impact of resources
mobilized is easily seen and identified with political figures. Essentially
therefore efficiency considerations are relegated to an oblivious position
once political motivations dominate in resource allocation.
The controversy regarding spatial equity and efficiency is highlighted
in the regional dispersal of industries, a strategy that -has been adopted
in many countries, both developed and less developed. Basically the pursuit
of spatial equity through this approach entails certain costs in economic
10/
efficiency and personal equity during the course of its implementation.-
Government policies aimed at reducing disparities through investment sub-
sidies and provision of infrastructure to lagging regions probably lead to
an inefficient allocation of resources since alternative use in other re-
gions is deemed to have higher marginal productivity. Especially in the
early stages of economic growth, concentration may be preferable to dis-
persal in order to attain the advantages of scale and agglomeration econo-
mies. Moreover a substantial amount of subsidy is required to induce private
investments into certain underdeveloped locations, particularly when such
locations virtually do not possess any comparative advantage. Similarly
most policies found to be effective for industrial decentralization tend
to militate against a better personal income distribution because they
often favor capitalists and encourage greater capital use. As industria-
lization proceeds, income inequality is expected to increase, at least
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initially, as the income share of property or capital rises or as the rate
of profit rises faster relative to real wages. This partially explains why
the location of industries - the urban areas - show greater income ine-
quality.
D. Philippine Regional Policy and Issues.
The Philippines first formalized its intention of promoting spatial
equity with the inclusion of regional development and industrialization as
one of the six major national development objectives in the Four-Year Na-
*
tional Development Plan FY 1974-77. ('Prior to this, there have been frag-
mented efforts at developing specific areas as in the creation of the re-
gional development authorities.) Since the early 1970s efforts have been
vigorously pursued and the spatial implications of government policies are
being evaluated in sectoral planning and policy formulation. More recently,
in the Five-Year National Development Plan, the government reiterates its
commitment to regional development.
1. Economic, Social and Political Justifications.
From relevant excerpts from national plans (See Appendix 1), we can
note that economic, social and political considerations lie behind the po-
licy on regional development and industrialization. The dominance of the
MMA and the resource potentials of other regions serve as the economic
basis for decentralization. It is contended in the plans that the negative
externalities of spatial concentration in the MMA should be avoided by
shifting the balance of public and private investments to other areas whose
development could be aco&erated with the mobilization of indigenous resources.
* Actually in the FY 1972-75 Plan, mention was already made of regionali-
zation as it relates to the government reorganization program.
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For example, the river basins in the poor regions of the Cagayan Valley,
Bicol and Mindanao offer tremendous possibilities for intensive resource
exploitation. With lagging regions growing relatively faster, a wider dis-
tribution of income will ensue and reduce the primacy of the MMA. Hence
it is emphasized that a redirection of policy thrusts must be effected in
order to encourage location of economic activities in depressed regions
depending on resource availability and market potential.
As an integral part of regional development efforts, basic services
especially for the rural populace are essential in providing complementary
schemes to productive activities. It has been noted that'the agrarian unrest
in the rural areas of Central Luzon had spawned communist insurgency acti-
vities in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally special attention is given to the
development of the Muslim areas where separatist movements and unsettled
peace and order conditions have persisted. In essence, the basic aim of
regional development in the Philippines is to create the spatial framework
within which the claims of investment efficiency and socio-economic equity
11/
can be substantiated and unified.-- Hence, given the underlying economic,
political and social bases for regional growth policy, we see an attempt
at pursuing spatial equity and efficiency simultaneously.
2. Levels of Interaction between the Planning and Political Processes.
The theoretical and practical arguments surrounding the issue of spa-
tial equity and efficiency have been discussed in the preceding section.
What appears to be more important at this stage is to examine how the plan-
ning and political processes determine the degree to which each objective
is reflected and subsequently realized in each policy and the trade-offs
that are necessary in order to increase its effectiveness as well as
-19-
political acceptability.
In the Philippines the influence of politics in public decision-making
has been extraordinarily strong. The political process enters at different
levels of the policy making system. Firstly, when the central government
tnitiates a nationwide sectoral policy or program, e.g., the industrial
estate program, all regions aspire to gain access to it. Ideally regional
priorities should be established via the planning process because 1) in
most cases, the potential contribution to the targets of the program varies
widely among the regions, i.e., there are regions where present conditions
are not suited to the program's requirements, and 2) scarcity of resources
dictates that resources be allocated to regions where expected returns are
highest. Notwithstanding these reasons, political pressures will be made
to bear on national or regional decision-makers to include all regions in
the program. This reaction is to be anticipated inasmuch as each policy or
program is planned in isolation and, therefore, every region wants to capi-
talize on this present opportunity. Even when other programs are forthco-
ming, a region cannot afford to wait because it is uncertain whether it can
benefit or participate in these future programs. When the planning process
yields excessively to political pressures and fails to establish priorities,
equity may be attained but losses in efficiency are the likely consequence.
It may therefore seem appropriate to plan various programs simulta-
nUeously as a package of proposals in an attempt to avoid excessive compe-
tition in each individual program. It can be claimed that this approach
reduces uncertainty inasmuch as every region will be aware of available
programs. As the array of choices is laid out before all of them, regions
can decide which programs they prefer. To a certain extent, the present
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comprehensive (multisectoral) regional planning process aims to achieve this
simultaneous discussion of proposals. However the regional planning approach
is basically patterned after national sectoral lines, thus the tendency for
equal participation is still there. It is also doubtful whether the array
of choices is wide enough for selection. Moreover there is no assurance
that, once a region decides to confine itself to programs where it has some
comparative advantage (can specialize) and foregoes participation in other
programs, it will be given priority in the implementation of its preferred
programs since final decisions on resource allocation still rests with the
national government. For most regions, the devoldtion of decision-making is
still limited, thereby constraining the ability to influence resource allo-
cation. Within the regional planning set-up, conflicts in interests between
political and technical proponents may militate against sound decision-ma-
king. Meanwhile, a few regions are favored in terms of greater delegation
of substantive powers and the allocation of more resources. Hence the ba-
lance df power is very unequal among the regions, which in turn determines
the degree of influence each region has on national decision-making. There-
fore it is understandable that all regions aspire for inclusion in almost
all programs even at the expense of an inefficient allocation of resources,
both at the national and regional level.
Even assuming that reasonable regional plans, based on a compromise
pet of equity and efficiency objectives, are prepared, the succeeding imple-
.mentation stage will be subject to political influence, probably even more.
The national government is faced with competing demands from the regions
for resources for plan implementation. Since the financial requirements of
plans are usually very much in excess of available resources, priorities
111  P''f l I P II~J
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will have to be set. Inasmuch as the balance of power among regions is
unequal, favored regions with considerable access to central government may
establish a prior claim on resources to the detriment of the other regions.
In this particular stage of implementation, the political process works
only for a few privileged regions.
3. The Regional Dispersal of Industries.
The interaction and conflict between the planning and political pro-
cesses is best seen in the industrial dispersal program. The technical com-
ponent espoused by the planning process will stress efficiency criteria in
setting regional priorities since it recognizes the present limits to de-
centralization. Industrialization is essentially a long-term strategy requi-
ring basic structural changes, therefore, industrial dispersal policies
should be selective and their implementation well-phased in the sense that
they do not indiscriminately call for a simultaneous industrialization of
all regions at the same pace. Neither can regions share equally in future
industrial expansion inasmuch as regional differences in natural resource
endowments and comparative advantage for industrial location must be taken
into account. In addition there is a need to establish a competitive magni-
tude of agglomeration and scale economies in a few areas that would be ca-
pable of counteracting, or at least lessening, the continued convergence
12/
of industries into the MMA and its environs.-- Therefore policy formulation
and implementation must be realistic in terms of the financial, physical,
and institutional resources available to pursue decentralization. Constraints
related to the indivisibility of capital, inadequate infrastructure support
and complementary institutional reforms will determine the scale and timing
of the intervention in the industrialization process.
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In view of the long-term nature of the strategy of industrial decen-
tralization and the constraints facing it, the planning process may opt for
phasing the implementation of the strategy into different time horizons and
subsequently defining the acceptable mix of equity and efficiency objectives
sought in each phase. A prioritization scheme can be adopted to determine
the degree of regional participation at each phase of implementation. This
will necessarily exclude, or at least relegate to a minor position, some
regions for which other strategies will have to be identified as a means of
averting a further deterioration in spatial disparities.
In contrast to the setting of regional priorities, the political pro-
cess will call for a broader participation of the regions. With the decen-
tralization of planning to the regional level, political pressures demanding
the inclusion each region in the industrial dispersal program will be expe-
rienced. The planning process may yield to such pressures as a means of
gaining acceptability for its program. If equal treatment of all regions is
given,-political pressures will ultimately complicate and dilute the effec-
13/
tiveness of development policies.-- Alternatively when the time comes for
.making resource allocation decisions to substantiate policy, we will be
forced to reckon with the issue as to which of the two elements - technical
or political - and which objectives - equity or efficiency - is finally
going to dominate and therefore should be emphasized. Initial priorities
may be changed accordingly. In short, government may find it convenient to
talk in one way and act in another. It is easier politically to advocate
dispersal and then allocate resources otherwise.
E. Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions.
While decentralization from the MMA is recognized by both the planning
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and political processes as instrumental to regional development, the perva-
sive influence of the political element in Philippine policy making mili-
tates against the formulation and implementation of regional policies that
could effect real decentralization and, at the same time, combine and har-
monize spatial equity and efficiency objectives. Attempts to reduce or re-
solve the conflict and mutual exclusivity between these two objectives
through the design of an appropriate policy mix,that takes explicit account
of present obstacles to decentralization, encounter difficulties caused by
demands for equal regional participation in programs initiated by the na-
tional government. Centrally generated programs are more.vulnerable to pres-
sures originating from the regions unless the national government firmly
specifies and follows critetia for regional involvement in these programs.
Usually program or policy guidelines are so broadly defined to the point
that regions can almost always try to justify their inclusion or oppose
their exclusion. Hence policy making strives to give more emphasis to equi-
ty, the primary concern of the political process, through equal treatment
of regions. However, even assuming that equity is achieved, the adverse
consequence will likely be a considerable loss in efficiency in growth and
in resource allocation. This phenomenon has been noted in past as well as
;n present regional development efforts, such as. in the cases of the regio-
nal development authorities and the nationwide industrial estate program.
The planning process, in a bid to gain political acceptability for its pro-
posals during the policy formulation stage, makes concessions or succumbs
to pressure calling for equal treatment for regions in centrally generated
programs. However a dilution in financial, human and institutional resources
often results, thereby hampering the effective implementation of policies
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and programs.
When national objectives clearly override regional goals, pressure
coming from the regions can be conveniently ignored. Strict efficiency re-
quirements of policies are followed, notwithstanding the possibility of
further regional income divergence. Among the dominant national objectives
in the past are: rapid industrial growth to spur national economic develop-
ment and the goal of national food self-sufficiency. These objectives neces-
sitate a certain degree of concentration of public investments in a few
areas with the best potential for growth in productivity. However such
concentration unavoidably leadsto spatial disparities. On an intraregional
basis, most of the current subnational policies and programs aim for effi-
ciency as a means of accelerating overall regional growth. Resources are
usually concentrated on the more productive elements in the urban areas
and the modernized component of the agricultural sector. On the other hand,
the regions* poor population, whose interests are unrepresented by either
the planning and political processes, does not benefit from development
programs.
In contrast to the frequent conflict between equity and efficiency
objectives, the Integrated Rural Development Projects provide the exception.
They are likely to attain these two objectives simultaneously. This has
been made possible through the organization of an efficient and powerful
planning mechanism that is capable, not only of identifying real needs and
establishing investment priorities, but also of surmounting political intru-
sion. Continuous national government support has been a pivotal element to
the operation of such a planning machinery. This commitment is manifested
also in the budgetary process wherein proposed massive multisectoral
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investments have been adequately backed up by the national government.
The interaction between the planning and political processes is further
complicated by problems related to institutional development. Varying de-
grees of institutional decentralization among the regions coupled with the
preferential treatment accorded to a few regions have led to an uneven dis-
tribution of power which is inimical to the design of meaningful regional
policy. These confound the political picture and increase the tendency for
excessive competition among the regions, especially the disadvantaged ones,
for scarce financial resources in centrally generated programs. Even in
sectors or program areas where regions do not have any clear advantage,
they still aspire for inclusion inasmuch as participation in any program
is not at all certain. Ultimately the potential for regional specialization
is not realized.
Very often the favored regions appear to receive utmost priority in
resource allocation, notwithstanding the valid claims of the other regions.
In addition the limited authority of most regional bodies exposes the plan-
ning process to extreme political pressures against which it is inadequately
equipped to resist. On an interregional scale, their bargaining power vis-
a-vis the favored regions becomes even weaker. Accordingly the provision
of additional substantive and executive powers to the regional bodies and
a build-up in their technical capability commensurate with their enlarged
responsibilities are essential in promoting economic and institutional
decentralization. These would make the distribution of power less lopsided
and improve the prospects for better resource allocation decisions at the
regional level that would be consistent with priorities established through
the planning process.
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In the pursuit of decentralization through a strategy that harmonizes
spatial equity and efficiency objectives, the industrial dispersal policy
shall assume the leading role, with the Integrated Rural Development Pro-
jects providing a complementary regional development scheme. Due to the
undiminished dominance of the MMA and the existing constraints to decentra-
lization, the phasing of the implementation of the industrial dispersal
policy is recommended such that, in the short term, it is used not so much
as a strategy for accelerating the growth of the lagging regions, but as
a strategy for controlling the growth of the MKA. Accordingly short term
priorities should favor the existing industrializing regions which are, at
present, the best alternative industrial locations and are most suitable
for promotion into countermagnets to the MMA. Furthermore these areas are
also faced with restricted possibilities for agricultural expansion. Mean-
while the non-priority regions should be given preference in the choice of
the sites for Integrated Rural Development Projects. Preferential treatment
for these latter regions in non-industrial programs may reduce the opposi-
tion arising from the recommended phasing and regional prioritization pro-
cedure in the industrial dispersal strategy. Moreover these programs will
lay the groundwork for future industrialization efforts. It is anticipated
that a lower degree of regional income inequality can be attained in this
approach to the implementation of the industrial dispersal policy, while
at the same time efficiency requirements for industrial location are being
met.
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PART II
Chapter II presents an overview of interregional and intraregional
disparities in the Philippines. It is intended to provide a concise intro-
duction to the problem of spatial inequity which has persisted for a number
of decades now. In particular, the primacy of the Metropolitan Manila Area
CMMA) is stressed because this sets the central argument for the initiation
of decentralization policy.
Chapter III attempts to partially explain the origins of present gla-
ring spatial disparities through an analysis of the historical pattern of
industrial location in the country. This is aimed at justifying the choice
of the regional dispersal of industries as the focus of the overall stra-
tegy for spatial equity. Furthermore we expect to extract from this ana-
lysis the important factors which led to the present geographical distri-
bution of industrial activities. These factors can be subsequently used
as criieria for evaluating the potential effectiveness of current indus-
trial dispersal measures.
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II. Reg ional'Disparities- A Description of th- Patterns.
In Williamson's famous work "Regional Income Inequality and the Pro-
cess of National Development," the Philippines disrupts the neat pattern
relating spatial disparities to the level of a country's economic develop-
ment. Inspite of its relatively low level of development, the Philippines
exhibits a high degree of inequality in regional incomes, contrary to what
was expected of countries falling within its income range. This section
provides an overview of spatial (interregional and intraregional) dispa-
rities in the country on the basis of selected economic, social and physi-
*
cal indicators.
The Philippine national output per capita amounted to P1618 in 1975.
Only three out of thirteen regions, namely, the MMA, Southern Mindanao and
Western Visayas, enjoy levels of regional output per capita higher than
the national average. (Table 1). What is especially conspicuous is the fact
that the MMA's regional output per capita is almost three times as much as
the national average and about six times that of the poorest regions,
*Three measures of income inequality will be used in this section, with
values reflecting more inequality. These are:
1. Coefficient of variation - is a summary measure of interregional inequa-
lity which basically compares the deviation of the regional figures from
the national average. It can be weighted or unweighted. Williamson used
the population shares of each region as weights.
2. Mean/median ratio - is a measure of intraregional inequality. The median
income divides the number of families into two equal groups. If the mean is
very high relative to the median, this indicates that the proportion of
families falling below the mean is much greater than the proportion lying
above the mean, i.e., there is a small number of families with very high
incomes which raises the mean to a level much above the median.
3. Gini coefficient - is a measure of the inequality in the size distri-
bution of income within a certain geographical area. It is equal to the
area enclosed by the line of perfect income equality in a Lorenz curve and
the line describing the prevailing income distribution. Interregional com-
parisons simply show that the personal income distribution in one region
is better or worse than another region's.
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Eastern Visayas and Bicol. In addition the premier region generates more
than one-third of national output while it has only less than one-eight of
total population and one per cent of the country's land area. Its neighbo-
ring regions, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog, further contribute about
twenty per cent to national output.
In terms of average and median family incomes, the superiority of the
IMA still stands out prominently. (Table 2). The region registered in 1975
an average family income of about P10,400 which is almost twice the national
average. On the other hand, slight changes in the lower positions of the
regional income ladder are noticeable, with Northern Mindanao becoming the
poorest region, followed by Eastern Visayas and Bicol. Due to its high ave-
rage incomes, the MA has the smallest share of poor families (bottom 40
per cent) while having the largest concentration of upper income families
*
Cupper 20 per cent). (Table 3). Low income families are found in large
numbers in Eastern Visayas, Southern Mindanao and Bicol. Meanwhile rich
families, other than those in the MMA, are living mostly in Central Luzon
and Southern Tagalog.
Within the regions, marked disparities in income exist between the
rural and urban areas, with the former having only a little more than half
the urban income in some regions. (Table 4). It is in the predominantly
agricultural regions like Eastern Visayas and Cagayan Valley that the rural-
urban gap is narrowest. On the basis of Gini and mean/median ratios, the
distribution of income is most skewed in the MMA. In general, income inequa-
lity is more serious in urban areas than rural areas. (Table 5). In a study
*These comparisons, however, do not take into account interregional dif-
ferences in standards of living.
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on income inequality, it was found that an overwhelming portion of the ine-
quality between regions is due to the inequality between the MMA and the
rest of the regions.- Moreover the inequality between the MMA and other
urban areas is much smaller than that between the MMA and rural areas. Thus
the study concludes that the main source of inequality is between the dis-
tribution of income in the MMA and the distribution of income in the rural
sectors of the regions.
Among and within regions, the dominance of the MMA appears to be the
main source of spatial income inequality. In fact, if it is excluded from
interregional comparisons, the most developed region has 'only twice the
per capita product of the least developed region and the unweighted Gini
coefficient drops drastically from 0.63 to 0.34. When the average family
income data is used as a basis, the ratio between the richest and the most
depressed region is about 1.5, while the Gini coefficient is reduced from
0,26 to 0.15. In addition, as the Gini and mean/median ratios suggest,
intraregional inequality is likewise egregious in the MMA.
Spatial disparities, both interregional and intraregional, in the
Philippines are undoubtedly serious. What is more alarming, however, is
that these have persisted over the years with only slight improvements oc-
curring from the postwar period up to the present. Polarization forces
apparently engendered by the industrialization strategies in the 1950s ap-
pear to have aggravated regional disparities. Empirical evidence points to
the spectacular increase in the MMA's output per capita , from just more
than thrice the national level in 1948 to about four times in 1961. In con-
trast the growth performance of the other regions was sluggish, especially
in the Mindanao, Eastern Visayas and Bicol regions. (Table 6). Meanwhile
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the regions near Manila, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog, have gained
in the economic ladder, showing family income levels higher than the natio-
nal average since 1957. The poor regions of Cagayan Valley,, Eastern Visayas
and Bicol had merely shifted positions at different years. Nevertheless
their positions relative to the MMA had somewhat appreciated as the latter's
average income level decreased from about three times the national average
in 1957 to just about twice in 1971. (Table 7). During this period the
problem of intraregional inequity has remained for the country as a whole.
It has worsened in Eastern Visayas, Southern Tagalog and Ilocos while easing
up marginally in Western Visayas and Bicol. (Table 8).
Major social indicators likewise reflect the premier position of the
MMA which has the highest literacy rate and the longest life expectancy.
Literacy rates are low in, Western and Central Mindanao, the Muslim regions,
while the life span is shortest in the Cagayan Valley and Northern Mindanao.
The largest concentrations of malnourished children are situated in Western
Visayas and Southern Tagalog, two relatively well-off regions with large
populations. In terms of housing facilities, only one per cent of dwelling
units in the MMA do not have safe water supply while, for the country as a
whole, more than three-fourths lack this type of service. (Table 9).
Similar observations regarding the dominance of the MMA can be made on
the basis of selected physical indicators. (Table 10). The area is totally
electrified while, fdr most regions, only half of their cities and munici-
palities have electric service. Consequently MMA's annual per capita power
consfimption is highest at more than 1200 kilowatt-hours while, for the de-
pressed regions, Cagayan Valley and Eastern Visayas, consumption is only
2.,8 and 7.8 kilowatt-hours per capita, respectively.
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After describing the past and present patterns of regional disparities
in the Philippines, we shall briefly analyze the various factors that ex-
plain these disparities. Although only an incisive analysis can truly iden-
tify all these factors, some generalizations can be made to provide a
glimpse of three of these important factors, namely; economic, political
and goegraphical, and the regions where each is significant in-accounting
for current disparities. The type of industrialization strategy after World
War II and the ensuing public investment program supportive of such a stra-
tegy are the economic bases that catapulted the MMA into its present posi-
tion. Industrial growth eventually spilled over to its neighboring regions
when it could no longer be absorbed within its confines. (This will be dis-
cussed in detail in the next chapter.) Export promotion appeared to have
been the stimulus for growth in Western Visayas and Southern Mindanao, since
their main products, sugarcane and timber, respectively, are the country's
major export commodities. With the increased emphasis since the 1960s on
the processing of traditional export products, the economies of these two
regions have expanded very rapidly.
Meanwhile Central Visayas was able to capitalize on its strategic lo-
cation in the archipelago in becoming an alternative and commercial center
outside the MMA. Similarly geographical location is important in explaining
the low level of development in the three poorest regions, Cagayan Valley,
Bicol and Eastern Visayas. These regions are all situated in the eastern
section of the country which bears the brunt of typhoons. Heavy dmage on
the economic (agriculture in. particular) activities in these regions is
frequently inflicted by typhoons, Moreover they have, until recently, been
physically isolated from the rest of the country because of large deficien-
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cies in the transport system in these areas,
In the case of the other regions of Mindanao, it should be pointed out
that this large island was a sparsely populated and undeveloped area before
the government sponsored settlement schemes in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Population inflow was inadequately complemented with physical development,
e.g., infrastructure, which in turn slowed down the mobilization of vir-
tually untapped natural resources. Due to its considerable distance from
the national capital and the under-representation of its Muslim interests
tn national government affairs, most regions in Mindanao were for a long
time not significant beneficiaries of development programs. Only recently,
in the midst of political pressures, have these regions-been given some
priority in resource allocation.
Concluding Remarks.
The pattern of regional disparities in the Philippines can be charac-
terized by the striking dominance of the MMA over the rest of the country.
There are a few other relatively developed regions whidh have benefitted
from national economic policies related to industrialization and export
promotion. However the gains of development in the past three decades have
not, for a variety of reasons, trickled down to the rest of the regions,
thereby leaving them in a state of underdevelopment.
Gross Regional Product*, Population, Per Capita Product, By Region,1975
Gross Regional Product
(in millions of pesos)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
Population
% Share (in thousands)
100.0
64.4
4.6
2.6
8.0
34.6
10.8
3.8
19.2
9.9
6.2
3.1
68,056
43,826
3,162
1,774
5,413
23,532
7,376
2,569
13,051
6,731
4,238
2,082.
11,179
2,073
2,658
4,581
1,867
16.3
3.0
3.9
6.7
2.7
42,071
22,790
3,269
1,933
4,210
4,970
5,214
3,194
10,133
4,146
3,387
2,600
9,147
2,048
2,341
2,715
2,070
Per Capita
% Share Product
100.0
54.1
7.7
4.6
10.0
11.8
12.4
7.6
24.2
9.9
8.1
6.2
21.8
4.9
5.5
6.5
4.9
1,618
1,923
967
918
1,286
4,735
1,415
804
1,288
1,623
1,251
801
1,222
1,012
1,149
1,687
902
* in constant 1972 prices
Note: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding
Source: National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO)
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Table I
Index
100.0
118.9
59.8
56.7
79.5
292.6
87.5
49.7
79.6
100.3
77.3
49.5
75.5
62.5
71.0
104.3
55.7
w
Table 2 Total F
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon
IV Metropolitan Manila
IV-A Southern Tagalog
V Bicol
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
amilies, Total Family Income*, Average Family Income, By Region, 1975
Families
6,859
558
329
662
770
888
518
679
595
441
314
370
433
301
% Share
100.0
8.1
4.8
9.7
11.2
12.9
7.6
9.9
8.7
6.4
4.6
5.4
6.3
4.4
Family
Income
40,058
3,082
1,679
3,824
8,057
4,832
2,216
3,722
3,078
2,134
1,779
1,408
2,731
1,515
% Share
100.0
7.7
4.2
9.6
20.1
12.1
5.5
9.3
7.7
5.3
4.4
3.5
6.8
3.8
Mean
Family
Income
(pesos)
5,840
5,525
5,102
5,773
10,439
5,441
4,280
5,484
5,172
4,834
5,662
3,803
6,307
5,025
Median
Family
Income
(pesos)
4,480
4,558
4,093
4,940
6,840
4,472
3,572
4,150
4,129
3,751
3,680
3,286
4,560
4,737
Mean/
Median
Ratio
1.30
1.21
1.24
1.17
1.53
1.22
1.20
1.32
1.25
1.29
1.54
1.16
1.38
1.06
* in current prices (millions of pesos)
Note: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding
Source: National Sample Survey of Households on Family Income and Expenditures, National Census and
Statistics Office
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Table 3 Families in the Bottom 40% and Top 20% of Income Range, 1971, By Region*
Families in Bottom Families in Top 20%.
Total Number Families 40% of Income Range of Income Range
Regions No.(000's) % No.(000's) % No.(000's) %
PHILIPPINES 6,348 100.0 2,539 40.0 1,267 20.0
LUZON AND ISLAND GROUPS 3,351 52.8 1,167 18.4 829 13.0
Metropolitan Manila 525 8.3 34 0.5 262 4.1
Southern Luzon 869 13.7 285 4.5 220 3.5
Central Luzon 855 13.5 250 3.9 211 3.3
Ilocos and Mt. Province 346 5.4 185 2.9 56 0.9
Bicol 496 7.8 257 4.1 60 0.9
Cagayan Valley & Batanes 260 4.1 156 2.5 20 0.3
THE VISAYAS 1,650 26.0 834 13.1 213 3.4
Western Vasayas 670 10.6 267 4.1 97 1.6
Eastern Visayas 980 15.4 572 9.0 116 1.8
MINDANAO 1,347 21.2 538 8.5 225 3.6
Northern Mindanao 522 8.2 235 3.7 67 1.1
Southern Mindanao 825 1.3 303 4.8 158 2.5
* Based on old regional classification. The regions in Luzon follow closely the present delineation, with
minor variations in Metropolitan Manila and Southern Tagalog. The old Eastern Visayas covers the present
Eastern Visayas and Central Visayas. The old Northern Hindanao 'includes the present Northern Mindanao'
plus the Lando provinces and Surigao del Sur, which belong now to Central and Southern Mindanao, respect-
ively. The old Southern Mindanao encompasses the present Southern Mindanao plus the Cotabato provinces
(presently in Central Mindanao) and the present Western Mindanao.
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey of the Philippines, 1971;
Bureau of Census and Statistics.
MW
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Table 4 Average Family Incomes*, Urban and Rural,
By Region, 1975 (in pesos)
Average Family Income Rural/Urban
Urban Rural Income Ratio. (%)
PHILIPPINES 8,328 4,744 57.0**
LUZON
I Ilocos 7,959 5,004 62.8
II Cagayan Valley 6,184 4,962 80.2
III Central Luzon 7,497 5,096 68.0
IV Metropolitan Manila 10,463 -
IV-A Southern Tagalog 7,137 4,784 67.0
V Bicol 5,770 3,986 69.2
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas 7,321 4,905 67.0
VII Central Visayas 6,471 4,697 72.6
VIII Eastern Visayas 5,400 4,702 87.1
MINDANAO
IX Western Mindanao 7,088 5,451 76.8
X Northern Mindanao 5,657 3,396 60.0
XI Southern Mindanao 9,543 5,126 53.7
XII Central Mindanao 6,660 4,752 71.0
* in -current prices
** If Metropolitan Manila's families and income is excluded from the
computation of average urban incomes, this ratio rises to 66.5 percent
as average urban income drops to $7,088.
Source: National Sample Survey of Households on Family Income and
Expenditures, National Census and Statistics Office
Table 5
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon
IV Metropolitan Manila
IV-A Southern Tagalog
V Bicol
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas
VII Central Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
Ix
X
XI
XII
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
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Gini Ratios, By Region, Urban and Rural, 1975
Whole Region Urban
0.4518
0.3887
0.3949
0.3674
0. 5083
0.4102
0.3950
0.4243
0.4297
0.3945
0.4770
0.4393
0.4858
0.3450
0.4727
0.4251
0.3864
0.3844
0.5083
0.4098
0.4263
0.4496
0.4553
0.3999
0.5501
0.3713
0.5847
0.3666
Source of Basic Data: National Sample Survey of Households on Family Income
and Expenditures, National Census and Statistics
Office
Rural
0.3803
0.3502
0.3939
0.3463
0.3880
0.3680
0.3789
0.4155
0.3945
0.5264
0.4594
0.3849
0.3384
Per Capita Output, 1948 & 1961, By Region*
(in pesos)
Per Capita
1948
Level Index
PHILIPPINES
Llocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
VISAYAS
VII Western Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
287 100.0
113
224
330
932
328
171
257
170
263
266
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
39.4
78.0
115.0
324.7.
114.3
59.6
89.5
59.2
91.6
92.7
Output
1961
Level Index
442 100.0
182
313
455
1,800
546
182
41.2
70.8
102.9
407.2
123.5
41.2
382 86.4
186 42.1
275 62.2
267 60.4
Population Shares
1948 1960
100.0
(50.8)
10.1
4.0
9.6
8.2
10.3
8.7
33.9
13.7
20.2
15.3
6.6
8.7
100.0
(51.4)
9.0
4.4
9.3
9.1
10.9
8.7
28.7
11.8
16.9
19.9
7.2
12.7
Note: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding
* Based on old regional classification
Source of Basic Data: National Census and Statistics Office, and A. Carreon's Study on "A Regional Study
on Income Distribution: Case for the Philippines," December 1973.
Table 6
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
MINDANAO
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Table 7 Average Family Incomes, 1957-1961-1965-1971
By Region* (in current prices)
1957
Level Index
PHILIPPINES
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
VISAYAS
VII Western Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
IX Northern Mindanao
X Southern Mindanao
1,471
1,292
1,273
1,509
4,255
1,504
1,084
100.0
87.8
86.5
102.6
289.3
102.2
73.7
1,303 88.6
928 63.1
1,178 80.1
1,146 77.9
1961
Level Index
1,804 100.0
1,242
1,189
1,713
4,790
2,092
1,501
1,614
1,166
1,560
1,463
68.8
65.9
95.0
265.5
116.0
83.2
89.5
64.6
86.5
81.0
1965
Level Index
2,541 100.0
1,433
1,322
2,595
6,590
3,025
2,024
64.3
52.0
102.1
259.3
119.0
79.7
1,990 78.3
1,622 63.8
2,342 92.9
2,004 78.9
1975
Level Index
3,736
3,299
2,390
4,127
7,785
4,332
2,784
3,206
2,548
3,062
3,577
100.0
88.3
64.0
110.5
208.4
116.0
74.5
85.8
68.2
82.0
95.7
* Based on old regional classification
Source: M. Mangahas, "Income Inequality in the Philippines: A Decomposition Analysis," Table 8, p. 52.
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
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Gini Ratios of Regional Income Distribution
By Region*, 1961-1965-1971
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
VISAYAS
VII Western Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO ~
IX Northern Mindanao
X Southern Mindanao
1961
0.50
0.42
0.44
0.43
0.48
0.44
0.45
0.47
0.44
0.53
0.43
1965
0.50
0.46
0.44
0.43
0.50
0.46
0.44
0.43
0.47
0.45
0.45
1971
0.49
0.54
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.48
0.45
0.42
0.51
0.45
0.44
* Based on old regional classification
Source: M. Maigahas, "Income Inequality in the Philippines: A
Decomposition Analysis," Table 8, p. 52.
Table 8
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Table 9 Social Indicators By Region
Malnourished Households without
Literacy Life Child Population Safe Water Supply2
Rate Expectancy (in thousands) (in percent)
PHILIPPINES 81.7 60.0 1,205.3 76.7
LUZON
I Ilocos 83.1 61.0 13.9 83.5
II Cagayan Valley 78.7 56.6 49.8 95.0
III Central Luzon 90.3 61.5 138.3 85.0
IV Metropolitan Manila 96.7 63.8 70.8 1.0
IV-A Southern Tagalog 92.0 61.0 160.9 50.2
V Bicol 86.4 59.7 137.7 80.0
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas 82.1 58.9 210.5 80.6
VII Central Visayas 77.8 58.8 121.4 82.5
VIII Eastern Visayas 77.7 58.6 65.3 76.7
MINDANAO
IX Western Mindanao 15.4 60.5 49.5 84.0
X Northern Mindanao 83.4 58.0 58.8 71.3
XI Southern Mindanao 81.8 62.0 93.3 94.0
XII Central Mindanao 66.6 60.4 35.3 88.0
1 Second and third degree malnutrition
2 Assumes water supply sources other than piped water or artesian wells
Sources: National Census and Statistics Office
National Nutrition Service, Ministry of Health
Boulier's Estimates on Life Expectancy
Table 10 Selected Physical Indicators By Region
Percent of Cities
and Municipalities
with Electric Service
Telephone
Density1
Per Capita Power
Consumption (KWH)
National Roads2
Per Square
Kilometer Area
LUZON
II
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
x
XI
XII
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
1.47
0.76
4.73
71.48
3.30
1.23
56.97
20.56
90.65
100.00
74.31
63.16
53.85
52.67
48.91
39.19
50.00
48.05
37.35
5.38
7.30
1.15
1.15
2.75
5.70
1.15
72.90
2.82
126.10
1,239.37
660.09
13.12
26.38
56.83
7.83
15.98
115.08
99.02
797.24
Telephones per 1,000 population
2 National roads are roads of nationwide or inter-provincial significance
Sources: NEDA Annual Report 1973
Bureau of Communications
Physical Planning Strategy for the Philippines, Vol. X, Power 1973
Project Monitoring Staff, NEDA
0.095
0.055
0.082
1.222
0.071
0.0139
0.990
0.110
.0.087
0.046
0.063
0.049
0.047
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III. Philippine Industrial Development and Regional Disparities.
The Philippine industrial structure manifests a high degree of geogra-
phical concentration in the MMA, with small but gradually growing industrial
centers spread across the country. The latter's level of industrial deve-
lopment pales in comparison with the dominance of the former, which accounts
for 42 per cent of national industrial output. (Table 11). MMA's neighboring
*
regions, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog, account for another 23 per cent,
clearly depicting the marked spatial imbalance in the industrial growth of
the country. The present locational pattern of industry has emerged as a
result of both government industrialization strategy and natural market for-
ces, which have shaped the country's economic history since colonial times.
This section of the study describes the various factors which contri-
buted to the present distribution of industrial activities and then relates
them to location theory. The intent here is to identify these factors inso-
far as they influence location decisions so that they can used to evaluate
present measures aimed at industrial dispersal and also to draw up diffe-
rent alternatives to support this policy. Subsequently the impact of the his-
torical pattern of industrial location on the growth of regional income
differentials and on the development of the national urban heirarchy will
be assessed.
A. The Historical Pattern of Industrial Location.
Initially we will trace the history of the MHA as a political, reli-
gious and educational center of the country from the 16th century up to the
early 1900s. It was in this period that the social and institutional foun-
dations were laid. Subsequently we will explore in detail the impact of the
*Actually industrial activity in these two regions is found mostly in four
provinces surrounding the NMA.
Map 2 - Major Philippine Industrial Centers
Seal* 1:6,750,000
Sourct.: NSC
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industrialization strategy on the growth of the MA as the country's indus-
trial center and identify the factors that guided the location of firms
into the area. These factors will surface again as we analyze the emergence
of manufacturing agglomerations in the other regions.
1. The Emergence of Manila as the Major industrial Center.
*
Since the colonial era, Metropolitan Manila has been the nation's
capital. It was the seat of the Spanish colonial administration, dating
back to 1571 and continuing up to the time the American forces took over
in 1898 and ruled the country until 1946. Ideally situated in the midwest
section of Luzon island, Manila became an entrepot of people coming from -
the different regions of the archipelago. Its harbor has also served as a
major link in the Orient trade because of the Philippines' strategic loca-
tion in this part of Asia. In fact, during the 18th century, the port of
Manila was a terminal point in the galleon trade between the Philippines
and Acapulco which brought goods from the Western world for distribution
in the Orient. In addition, typical of many colonial cities, it was the
source of exports shipped to the colonial ruler.
Due to the traditionally close association between Church and State
in the Spanish system of colonial rule, Manila also became the religious
center of the country, with the Archbishop of Manila always assuming a po-
werful political role. In areas outside Manila, Spanish priests acted as
*The city of Manila which used to be the political capital represents only
about 1.4 per cent of the land area of what is presently considered as MMA.
However its population share as of 1975 is 1.5 milllion out of a metropo-
litan population of close to 5 million. One of the cities of the MMA,
Quezon City, is the current official national capital.
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administrators of towns.- The collaboration between political and reli-
gious groups was also instrumental in the establishment of educational
institutions in Manila for the local population. Most of the early schools
were founded by the different religious orders. In the area of finance,
the first banks called "obras pias" were organized by the Church. From
these early origins, the city of Manila grew into an urban area, serving
political, educational, commercial and other functions.
By the time the American occupation began in 1898, Manila was undis-
putably the nation's major city and remained as the national capital. In
1903 it had a population of about 300,000. Its dominance in the national
setting was strengthened with the foreign trade, especially with the pre-
ferential treatment given to Philippine exports in the US market. Most of
the country's agricultural exports were shipped from the port of Manila
even though the processing of some exports like sugarcane and copra was
done in ither regions. Under American rule, political as well as economic
activities were centered around the Manila area.
When the United States relinquished control of the Philippines in 1946,
the country began to rebuid its economy. Industrial operations recovered
rapidly with reconstruction being aided by the United States and favorable
export prices. After this immediate postwar boom, foreign exchange diffi-
culties arose once reconstruction aid was terminated and as a recession
was experienced by the American economy, the country's major trading part-
ner. Consequently import and foreign exchange controls were imposed. These
controls set the stage for import-substituting industrialization strategy
in the 1950s whereby scarceforeign exchange resources were allocated on
the basis of "essential" gooods defined as capital and intermediate goods
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goods to be used for industry. These commodities were considered relatively
cheap because of the overvaluation of the Philippine peso.
Emphasis was laid on the finishing stages of consumer goods manufac-
ture which was heavily protected by import restrictions on foreign consumer
goods and undervalued imported inputs. Hence the types of industries encou-
raged by government policy were import-dependent industries engaged in the
17/final stages of manufacturing.- /Manila, being the principal port, was
strongly favored as location for industry. With industries mainly producing
for domestic consumption, the city also provided a large potential market
inasmuch as income growth from industrialization and population increases
were concentrated here. These considerations reinforced location preferen-
ces for Manila due to its transport cost advantage. Furthermore, from the
operational management point of view, it was virtually a necessity to be
close to the seat of government to facilitate. the approval of import and
foreign exchange applications. The bureaucratic set-up of government offices
necessitated personal interaction or contact with officials who could expe-
dite action on pending matters. Besides, the financial institutions were
mostly based in Manila and frequent follow-ups on loan applications re-
quired proximity.
With most of the country's foreign exchange already committed to pur-
chases of producer and intermediate goods which were essential to the ope-
ration of existing firms, decontrol and devaluation were instituted. The
use of foreign exchange controls which was effective in guiding the eco-
18/
nomic growth of the 1950s had lost its efficacy.- Moreover the adverse
impacts of the undervaluation of foreign exchange on the performance of
exports, which failed to keep up with import requirements, were very much
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in evidence with the recurrence of balance of payment difficulties..
Notwithstanding decontrol and devaluation, import substitution policy
persisted through the 1960s inasmuch as the highly protective tariff struc-
ture merely replaced direct import controls. On the other hand the tradi-
tional export sector was able to gain from devaluation. In the late 1960s
the need for altering the strategy for industrial growth was increasingly
felt, once the domestic market potential of import-substituting manufac-
19/
tured goods was being exhausted.-- In an effort to guide industrial invest-
ments into preferred areas and promote exports, two pieces of legislation
were passed, namely: the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 and the Export
Incentives Act of 1970. The Board of Investments (BOI) was organized to
draw up investments and exports priorities plans on an annual basis and
administer the system of incentives.
Based on the analysis of the industrial development of Manila, it can
be seen how the choice of industrialization strategy can confer upon a cer-
tain location a significant level of transport advantage. In general, pro-
ximity to either the market or the raw material source is instrumental for
the growth of industrial centers. In the case of Manila, the locations of
the market and the input base were effectively identical as a result of the
tmport-substituting strategy, hence, the tendency for agglomeration was
doubly strong. In addition the technology of import-substituting firms was
basically borrowed from advanced nations. Skill requirements were high and
Manila, being the educational center, was the main source of technically
skilled labor. Corrollary to this, technical personnel usually prefer loca-
tions where urban amenities are available.
Not only was Manila favored by the import-substitution strategy, its
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natural locational advantages were solidified by public investments since
it was the nation's capital, the source of economic and political power
that is crucial in determining budgetary allocations. The bulk of govern-
ment expenditures was on highway; Manila and Central Luzon had more than
30 per cent of expenditures in this category from 1967-72, while for sea-
20/
prots, Manila alone had a 40 per cent share from 1966-72.-- The combina-
tion of population concentration, a well-developed infrastructure, broad
industrial and commercial base, service quality and labor supply contribu-
ted to the attainment of agglomeration and scale economies in Manila.
Even after the shift in industrialization strategy from one that was
largely import-dependent to one that placed greater emphasis on utilization
of indigenous resources, the MMA was still a preferred location, particu-
larly for footloose industries. It had reached a level of economic and phy-
sical development which produced substantial external economies in the form
of a well-developed infrastructure and a high potential for industrial in-
terdependence. Theory expects that with the diminution of imports for indus-
21/
try, port cities like Manila will lose some attraction power. This pre-
diction however discounts the possibility that the industrial base and sup-
porting facilities built up in the previous import-substitution stage will
provide an opportunity for further agglomeration. This seems to be precisely
what happened in Manila. What subsequently took over as an important factor
$nfluencing location was the external economies engendered by import-subs-
titution and public investment programs. Hence it may be posited that the
Impact of the import-substitution strategy extends beyond the actual period
of its adoption.
Continued concentration in Manila materialized due to scale and agglo-
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meration economies emanating from the interaction of physical, economic
and social factors. These economies favorably affect the efficiency of a
firm and therefore offer a market-induced incentive for prospective indus-
tries. In some cases, these may even compensate for higher cost of trans-
22/port, labor and other production elements.-- For new industries which
have to rely on others for some services and materials, external economies
are particularly critical. To reduce uncertainty in service and material
availability, location in a large is preferable. Moreover it offers better
market opportunities in view of greater potential for personal contact and
a more rapid flow of information. All these advantages reinforced the ten-
dency towards spatial concentration of industries in Manila.
From the foregoing analysis, a number of important factors can be
$dentified as crucial to location decisions. These are: 1) transport cost
advantage, 2) the provision of infrastructure and 3) the role of external
economies. At different stages of the growth in Manila, these factors fi-
gured prominently. Transport cost advantage was the initial stimulus; it
was subsequently reinforced by public expenditures for infrastructure, and
eventually external economies wer realized and led to further agglomeration.
2, Growth of Other Industrial Centers.
In the following sections we will observe that the industrial' location
factors which led to the growth of Manila were also significant contributory
elements to the emergence of other industrial areas in the country today.
We shall explain how these factors, either singly or in combination, can
provide the impetus to a more dispersed pattern of industrial location. In
many cases like Davao City (Region XI), Bacolod (Region VI), transport cost
advantage triggered industrialization based on the processing of a few
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primary agricultural and mineral resources. After the initial growth stage,
ancillary activities with forward and backward linkages to major resource-
based industries were established.
With the expansion of infrastructure usually attendant to the rise of
these industrial areas, public investment in physical facilities has become
a stabilizing force to continued growth. It has also served as an impetus
to other industrial centers like Iligan City (Region X). The reasons for
these are: 1)basic services and facilities needed by industry are made avai-
lable, thus reducing production costs, 2) a well-developed physical infra-
structure induces external economies, and 3) infrastructure provision mani-
fests government support for a particular area's development. The import-
ance of infrastructure provision and the reliance on external economies
vary according to the size of the firm. Additionally therefore we shall
analyze how the size of firm affects location decisions and how a few large
companies wereresponsible for the rise of a number of hitherto remote areas.
a* Transport Advantage due to the Emphasis on Resource-Oriented
Industries.
With the passing of the Investment and Export Incentives Acts, greater
processing of traditional primary export products was strongly encouraged.
As local industrial linkages with the natural resource base were being es-
tablished, a certain degree of dispersion took place inasmuch as location
near input sources was essential in view of the bulkiness and weight of raw
materials like timber and mineral ores. Resource-based industries contri-
buted to the emergence of other industrial centers and laid the foundations
for subsequent industrial expansion.
Export promotion was aided by another devaluation in early 1970 which
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stemmed from a massive increase in money supply just prior to the November
23/1969 elections.- This devaluation somehow removed distortions in the price
of foreign exchange vis-a-vis the peso and enhanced the competitive posi-
tion of Philippine exports in the world market. Wood processing and coconut
processing in the Mindanao regions, mining in the Ilocos and Central Visa-
yas and sugar processing in Western Visayas, Southern Tagalog and Central
*
Luzon expanded and manufactured exports increased impressively. More re-.
cently the planned gradual phaseout of log and copra exports will further
encourage resource-based industries.
b. The Role of Infrastructure and External Economies.
The experience in Manila points to the importance of infrastructure
availability in location decisions. Fortunately infrastructure investments
are made by the public sector. Thus they represent an instrument for influ-
encing the geographical dispersion of industries to other areas of the coun-
try. A firm's profitability in a certain location depends heavily on the
costs of services associated with that location. If the government through
its expenditure program provides such services or minimizes their cost to
users, then the prospects for industries moving into that location are
better. In industrial development in the Philippines, government tradition-
ally relies on private initiative to undertake the necessary industrial
investments. Its role is restricted primarily to providing the supporting
industrial infrastructure that would promote a healthy investment environ-
,*These areas have traditionally been the major sugar producers. However
hectarage increased not only here but in other regions too, particularly
when sugar prices reached record levels in 1973. Presently almost all
regions have at least one sugar mill each.
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ment, enhance private profitability and serve as incentives for location.
Only in rare instances, e.g., "critical" and pioneering enterprises, has
the government been directly involved in industrial operations and even
this is only resorted to when private initiative is deemed lacking.
The potency of the role of government infrastructure expenditures in
guiding industrial investments into suitable locations can be strong when
the experience of the Maria Cristina hydroelectric project and the indus-
trial estates is studied. In the 1960s a major power development project
was initiated in Iligan City in Northern Mindanao with the generation of
inexpensive hydroelectric power from the Maria Cristina Falls. The govern-
ment then decided to set up within the vicinity its pioneering National
Steel Corporation engaged in steel production, perhaps as an assurance of
support for the developme'nt of the area. Subsequently other power-intensive
industries, e.g., cement plants, chemical factories, etc., followed suit,
converting the area into a major industrial location. Hence it can be seen
that firms are likely to take advantage of facilities and services provided
at low cost by the government. Mere availability of cheap power, coupled
with apparent government commitment, was sufficient inducement for indus-.
trial location.
The lack of infrastructure can be a major impediment to industrial
location even in regions where labor costs are low and raw materials are
available. In fact the establishment of the industrial estates, the Export
Processing Zone in Bataan (Region III) and the PRIVIDEC Industrial Estate
in Misamis Occidental (Region X) is intended to overcome the problem of
infrastructure deficiency. The advantages of central location are replicated
tn undeveloped areas through infrastructure provision by government so that
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such areas can become more attractive industrial sites. Industrial estate
development is based on the strategy of attaining external economies
through concentrated dippersal of infrastructure and industry. Infrastruc-
ture provision and the sharing or interdependence among firms in the use
of facilities and supply of certain goods and services are aimed at attrac-
ting industry to locations where otherwise firms would have had to bear the
full costs of these facilities and services. In a way government subsidizes
the firms' production costs by supplying basic industrial requirements.
Furthermore other financial and fiscal incentives usually granted to loca-
ting industries favorably alter cost efficiency.
c. The Sensitivity of Location Decisions to Size of Firm.
The profitability of small firms is highly sensitive to the availabi-
lity of basic facilities and services. This is why even in rural areas where
small firms are considered adapatiable to the meager size of the market,
their growth has been impeded by the general deficiency in rural infrastruc-
ture. Due to their limited capital resources, they are not in a position
to provide essential services for their operation.
Probably the only firms that were able to locate in relatively remote
sites and overcome the disadvantages of such locations were large firms,
mostly multinational corporations attracted to thePhilippines by low labor
costs and incentives granted to foreign investments.'These firms have been
capable of providing their own basic industrial infrastructure needs like
roads, water supply, and power, because of their ample capital resources.
Their political leverage is also considerable such that government invest-
ments are sometimes directed towards their sole benefit. Furthermore even
the amenities of urban locations could be provided, hence, personnel
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recruitment does not pose an insurmountable problem. The sheer size of
these firms and their potential impact not only on their immediate vicinity
but also on peripheral areas can attract skilled and unskilled laborers.
Among the industries that located in remote areas are the pineapple growing
and canning firms in Northern and Southern Mindanao, and the mining compa-
nies in the Ilocos and Central Visayas.
Without the participation of government, the disadvantages of remote
locations, e.g., the risk of cost due to uncertain local conditions, and
24/
the cost of performing functions that would normally be external,-- can
only be surmounted by large firms that are in a financial position to
modify significantly the conditions in their selected sites. This is essen-
tially what has been achieved by multinational corporations and other large
firms as they internalized the external economies normally found in deve-
loped areas. Physical facilities that have been set up are basically long
term investments intended to reduce production costs.
3. The-Unique Case of Cebu City.
In the rise of other industrial locations inthe country, the contri-
bution of transport advantage, infrastructure and external economies is
easily noted. To a certain extent, the case of Cebu City exhibits the same
features which influenced the growth of Manila, but in a more subtle manner.
deally situated in the central section of the archipelago, this- area has
become a major industrial and commercial center, second only to Manila.
Firms have found Cebu City a good vantage point for undertaking manufactu-
ring and distribution operations to serve the markets in the southern parts
of the capital. Initially, only warehouses and other storage facilities
were set up by Manila-based firms for southern operations. However with the
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growth in demand due to population and income increases, the establishment
of branch plants proved economic and subsequently industrial activities
expanded. To date most establishments serving a national market.-have offices
in Cebu. In some cases. Cebu City has become the base of operations of new
nationally-oriented firms. Moreover its strategic location makes it one of
the busiest ports in the country. With the rise in sea traffic volume,
industries like ship construction and repair and related ancillary opera-
tions have also emerged.
Viewed in one way, location in Cebu minimizes transport cost for dis-
tribution while in another, it maximizes market potential by increasing
the catchment area for goods and enhancing reliability of supply and ser-
,vice. Its industrial growth was also supported by public investments in
physical infrastructure. Educational, financial and other institutions are
found here. Now the city of Cebu has, not only a broad manufacturing and
commercial base, but also a well-organized physical and social system of
supporting facilities and services, all of which have complemented one ano-
ther in producing agglomeration economies.
4. Market-Induced Spillovers into other Areas.
With the growth in national demand, a significant degree of dispersion
has taken place, with firms being able to establish economic-sized plants
in different regional/provincial locations to service specific portions of
the country. A case in point are the provincial and city bottling plants
of soft drink companies operating on a national scale. Likewise local food
processing firms like rice mills and bakeries are spread throughout the
country, enjoying virtual monopolies over their market areas.
Meanwhile the city of Manila could no longer accomodate the rapid
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growth of industry. The provinces bordering Manila like Cavite, Laguna and
Rizal in Southern Tagalog and Bulacan in Central Luzon have absorbed the
spillover. Location in these areas was facilitated by the extension of road
networks originating radially from Manila. Moreover, with the heavy in-
migration into Manila, residential location has spread into the suburbs,
resulting in a co-location of industry and residences. Today these neigh-
boring regions rank behind Manila in terms of contribution to national
industrial output.
Concluding Remarks
Looking back at the historical pattern of industrial location, we can
assert that the growth of industrial centers was a consequence of both
government policy and the free functioning of the market mechanism. Poli-
cies aimed at building up the infrastructure base and other activities
exert a favorable impact in attracting industries. Other government programs
directed at improving the general level of incomes or increasing the phy-
sical accessibility of various areas indirectly support the dispersion of
industrial activity as firms take advantage of market opportunities.
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B. The Impact of the it-!-oricai Pattern of Industrial Location.
The preceding discussion traced the historical pattern of industrial
location in the Philippines. As was mentioned in Chapter I, industrial lo-
cation theory explains partly the emergence of regional income disparities
nasmuch as areas enjoying transport advantage, market and other resource
potentials, are usually the regions which first benefit from any develop-
ment strategy. Moreover the growth of these industrial areas influence popu-
lation movements as these centers undergo a rapid process of urbanization.
The experience of the Philippines confirms these expectations. In this
section we will examine the impact of the spatial patterns of industrial
development on regional disparities and on the development of the national
urban hierarchy. This task is intended to rationalize the policy of regio-
nal dispersal of industries for pursuing the goal of spatial equity. In
another perspective, this policy is conducive to a more balanced urbaniza-
tion process since industrial growth is a key prerequisite to the develop-
ment of urban centers.
1. On Regional Income Disparities.
The regional distribution of industrial output closely parallels the
regional distribution of income, i.e., the regions with large shares of
industrial output generally enjoy high per capita output. In addition, most
regions with sizeable industry shares to total regional output are basically
better off. For example, the major industrial center, the MMA, is the most
developed, followed by industrializing regions like Central Luzon, Southern
Tagalog, Western Visayas and Southern Mindanao. (Table 11). These observa-
tions are not particularly striking when one reviews the patterns of in-
dustrial location. Economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s through rapid
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industrialization benefi d mainly the MMA. Its share of industrial output,
already high at 42 per cent in 1948, rose further to 50 per cent by 1961.
CTable 12). The industrial structure that was in effect promoted by import-
substitution and various government policies involved very few backward
linkages to the natural resource base of the regions since it was heavily
25/
dependent on undervalued imported raw materials.- Asids from the MMA,
only regions which were fortunate enough to be exporters of primary or
processed agricultural products like Western Visayas and Southern Mindanao,
or whose location is strategic for industrial activity like Cebu, were able
to participate in the industrial drive. Growth in the rest of the country
gained momentum only quite recently as a consequence of government policies
related to power development and agri-industrial processing. The dominance
of the EMA has been somewhat diminished. However its neighboring regions
are generating additional output to compensate for this loss.
Agriculture - the lifeblood of many rural regions - was virtually
neglected during the import-substitution era, resulting not only in low
regional productivities but also in wide urban-rural gaps in development.
Incomes of people dependent on agriculture were depressed. The general eco-
nomic strategy based on import-substitution did not encourage the linking
between industry and agriculture through the utilization of domestic raw
materials. Due to the heavy protection of manufactured goods, investment
in manufacturing was more profitiable and less risky. Meanwhile, in the
domestic market, with prices of manufactured goods increasing as a result
of government protectionist policies, the terms of trade turned against
agriculture. In addition, the competitive position of the country's agri-
cultural exports in the international market was weakened by the over-
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valuation of the local currency.
Although general economic policy did not promote faster agricultural
expansion, the agricultural areas near Manila, Central Luzon and Southern
Tagalog, benefitted from rapid economic growth due to import-substitution.
The growth in incomes in Manila raised the demand for food products which
were supplied mostly by these regions. Because: of their importance to the
MMA, they were given preference in irrigation and transport investments.
In more recent years, Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog have indus-
trialized rapidly. New industries which could no longer be accomodated in
the MMA have chosen to locate in the adjacent provinces of these regions.
If one considers the industrial expansion here as an extension of the growth
$nfluence of the NMA, then it can be said that there is further concentra-
tion rather than dispersion of manufacturing activities in this part of the
country. This is why the regional dispersal of industries must become a more
positive policy of developing other industrial locations in the country in
order to counteract the continued gravitation of industries towards Manila
and its environs.
2. On the Development of the National Urban Hierarchy.
The pattern of industrial location has exerted considerable impact on
Philippine urban development in a variety of ways. Most apparent is the
dominance of the MMA over all other areas of the country which, in turn, has
influenced massive outmigration from the different regions. Likewise other
industrial centers are growing rapidly such that these, together with the
W0A, are beset with problems associated with mounting and incessant popu-
lation pressure,
The national urban hierarchy exhibits primacy with the MMA visibly as
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the major urban center. The metropolis has a population of about five mil-
lion people as of 1975, which is almost four times the combined population
of the next four largest cities. (Table 13). Its population, growing at an
average of 4.6 per cent annually from 1970-75, represents approximately 40
per cent of national urban population. Furthermore population density in the
central city of Manila is close to 40,000 persons per square kilometer and
household size is 6.9 persons, the largest in the country. Due to the pri-
macy of the MMA, the national urban structure is distorted. In fact, if its
population is excluded from the national urban population, the degree of
urbanization among the regions does not vary substantially. The problem of
primacy is a direct result of historical economic and political forces.
Certainly the fast rate of industrialization of the MMA can be considered
as a primary factor in its growth into the primate city.
Although considered slow on the basis of inter-country comparisons,
urbanization in the Philippines has been unbalanced, with the MMA and a few
big cities like Cebu, Davao and Bacolod accounting for a large share of ur-
ban population growth.- Moreover the expansion of these large cities has
been at the expense of the smaller cities, further skewing the national ur-
ban hierarchy. An analysis of the sources of urban population growth indi-
cates that migration has been a significant contributor to the growth of
these cities. The MMA has been the prime destination of migration streams
27/
from both urbanized and less urbanized regions;- consequently, about half
of its population growth rate is due to migration. Besides, the neglect of
agriculture in the rural areas of the regions did not promote employment
generation there and induced migration to areas with better economic pros-
pects. Rural to urban migration has also been selective with migrants to
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the MMA being highly educated young adults. These factors reinforced
the primacy of the MMA and aggravated regional disparities, which in turn
affect the direction of population movements.
Rapid population growth in the MMA brings with it numerous difficulties.
Despite the high average incomes in urban areas, significant disparities
exist within and among cities. Urban poverty appears to be more concentrated
in the MMA and in the key urban centers of the Visayas which have absorbed
29/
some of the spillovers of the rural poor.- In general low income house-
holds in the MMA have tended to concentrate in the central city section,
e.g., the Tondo slums, although there are also large concentrations of poor
families in the inner ring, e.g., Quezon City, Caloocan. Moreover the prof
vision of public services has not coped with population growth in urban
areas, as evidenced byesubstantial deficiencies in the supply of transport
services, water, sewerage and drainage, and housing, especially in low
income areas.
Similarly industrial expansion has also led to the urbanization of
other areas in the country. The cities of Davao, Iligan, Cebu and Iloilo,
not to mention the cities of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog, are regis-
tering significant in-migration, both from other regions and their surroun-
ding rural areas. Slowly they are beginning to experience the urban problems
wiich population pressure brings.
The consequences of the pattern of industrial location on the country's
urbanization process are clear. In an effort to rationalize the national
urban structure, the regional dispersal of industries must play a key role
in strengthening as well as developing other urban centers of varying sizes.
A more balanced settlement pattern is the ultimate goal.
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Table 11. Regional Per Capita Output, Distribution of Industrial
Output, and Industry Share of Total Regional Output.
(1977)
Per Cent Share of Per Cent Share of
Regional Per Capita Per Cent Philippine Indus- Industry of Total
Output (in pesos) to MMA trial Output Regional Output
PHILIPPINES 1,733 38.7 100.0 29.1
LUZON 2,034 45.5 72.7 33.1
I Ilocos 1,068 23.9 4.3 27.5
II Cagayan Valley 1,072 24.0 1.2 13.0
III Central Luzon 1,379 30.8 9.4 33.1
IV Metropolitan Manila 4,474 100.0 42.2 36.4
IV-A Southern Tagalog 1,694 37.9 13.5 35.9
V Bicol 906 20.3 2.1 15.8
VISAYAS 1,494 33.4 17.9 27.7
VI Western Visayas 1,933 43.2 8.6 26.0
VII Central Visayas 1,405 31.4 7.0 32.6
VIII Eastern Visayas 935 20.9 2.3 22.9
MINDANAO 1,273 28.5 9.4 15.9
IX Western Mindanao 1,014 22.7 1.3 12.0
X Northern Mindanao 1,275 28.5 2.5 17.5
XI Southern Mindanao 1,769 39.5 4.0 16.0
XII Central Mindanao 905 20.2 1.7 17.7
Source: National Accounts Staff, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
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Table 12-A Growth in Industrial Output*
1948-1961
1948
Level
(in million pesos)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
VISAYAS
Western Visayas
Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
747
18
7
43
315
143
19
Share
(in %)
100.0
2.4
0.9
5.7
42.2
19.1
2.5
10.2
9.4
2.8
4.9
1961
Level
(in million pesos)
2,647
34
15
249
1,340
441
21
305
109
68
65
Average Annual
Share Growth Rate (in %)
(in %) 1948-61
100.0
1.3
0.6
9.4
50.6
16.7
0.8
11.5
4.1
2.6
2.4
10.2
5.0
6.0
14.5
11.8
9.0
0.8
11.3
3.5
9.5
4.7
Note: Old regional classification for 1948-61
* Industrial output figures for 1948 & 1961 include only manufacturing and construction.
Source: NEDA and A. Carreon, op. cit.
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Table 12-B Growth in Industrial Output*
. 1971-1977
1971
Level
(in million pesos)
1977
Share Level Share
(in %) (in million pesos) (in %)
Average Annual
Growth Rate (in %)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
VISAYAS
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindano
* Industrial output figures for 1971 & 1977
and utilities.
Source: NEDA and A. Carreon, op. cit.
include manufacturing, construction, mining, quarrying,
16,222
746
144
1,541
6,791
1,935
478
1,508
1,085
346
294
397
633
325
100.0
4.6
0.9
9.5
41.9
11.9
2.9
9.3
6.7
2.1
1.8
2.4
3.9
2.0
22,783
970
269
2,152
9,606
3,086
470
1,952
1,603
532
292
567
900
384
100.0
4.3
1.2
9.4
42.2
13.5
2.1
8.6
7.0
2.3
1.3
2.5
4.0
1.7
5.8
4.5
11.0
5.7
6.0
8.1
0.3
4.4
6.7
7.4
0.0
6.1
6.0
2.8
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Table 13 Urban Population for Major Cities, 1960-1970-1975
1970 1975
Percent of Urban Population
1960 1970 1975
Average Annual
Growth in %
1960-70 1970-75
Metropolitan Manila
Manila City
Quezon City
Caloocan City
Pasay City
Others
Davao
Cebu
Iloilo
Zamboanga
Bacolod
Angeles
Butuan
Cagayan de Oro
Cadiz
Batangas
Olongapo
San Pablo
Iligan
Other Urban Areas
Total Urban
Total Philippines
2,462
1,139
398
146
133
646
226
251
151
131
119
76
80
69
89
83
45
71
58
4,101
8,168
27,088
3,967
1,331
754
274
206
1,402
392
347
200
200
187
135
131
124
124
109
108
106
104
5,863
12,071
36,684
4,970
1,479
957
397
255
1,882
485
413
227
265
223
151
133
165
128
125
147
117
119
5,653
13,304
42,071
30.1
13.9
4.9
1.8
1.6
7.9
2.8
3.1
1.8
1.6
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
50.2 48.6 42.5
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Census and Statistics Office
1960
32.9
11.0
6.2
2.3
1.7
11.6
3.2
2.9
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
37.4
11.1
7.2
3.0
1.9
14.2
3.6
3.1
1.7
2.0
1.7
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.1
0.9
0.9
4.6
2.1
4.9
7.7
4.4
6.1
4.3
3.5
3.4
5.8
3.6
2.3
0.0
5.9
0.1
2.8
6.4
2.0
2.7
4.5
1.6
6.6
6.5
4.5
8.1
5.6
3.3
3.4
4.3
4.6
5.9
3.3
6.0
3.4
2.8
9.2
4.1
6.0
3.6
4.0
3.0
-0.8
2.0-
2.8
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PART III
The problem of spatial inequity arising from the unbalanced growth of
the country has been duly recognized in policy making. Accordingly the for-
mulation and implementation of regional policies aimed at rectifying spatial
disparities in income is now formally instituted into the regular functions
of government. A number of regional policies are presently in force, aside
from national policies with varying degrees of spatial significance.
In Part III of this study, regional policies and national policies
with strong spatial implications will be evaluated. The purposes of this
exercise are: 1) to examine how the planning and political processes have
$nfluenced policy making in terms of the relative importance given to effi-
ciency and equity objectives, and 2) to analyze the consequences or to pre-
dict the possible outcomes which originate from the interaction of these
two processes. In addition each policy will be initially reviewed in isola-
tion in order to assess its impact on interregional disparities and, to a
lesser'extent, on intraregional disparities and to identify its weak and
strong points in relation to its stated goals. Subsequently these policies
will be appraised with respect to one another as a means of verifying their
complementarity and consistency as components of an overall strategy for
spatial equity.
The succeeding chapters will deal with four types of policies. These
are related to: 1) the institutional machinery for regional planning which
s charged with the development of regional policies, 2) the regional dis-
persal of industries, 3) agriculture and rural development, and 4) the allo-
cation of public expenditures. Likewise the experience with the regional
development authorities will be introduced as a historical background.
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IV. The Regional Development Authorities.
To provide a historical component into the analysis of present regional
policies in the Philippines, the experience with the regional development
authorities, of which fourteen (14) were set up (at least by enacting legis-
lation) from 1961-1972, will be briefly reviewed. These authorities were
organized for the development of specific areas of the country and, thus
can be considered as the first real attempt at regional policy and planning.
Their creation was based on a strategy of joining planning with effective
power, a strategy which has been found successful in many countries. Unfor-
tunately the operations of the Philippines' regional development authorities
encountered numerous difficulties from the very start, arising primarily
from the political factors behind their establishment. Although the exces-
sive influence of politics is not at all uncommon in the policy making pro-
cess of the country, the experience of these development authorities was
probably the first visible indication of the unceasing political pressures
which are brought to bear on any initiative towards regional development.
And as we shall see later in the succeeding chapters, present regional po-
licy making still has to learn from the valuable lessons provided by this
past experience. In this section, the reasons for the creation of the re-
gional development suthorities, their eventual operationalization, problems
and performance will be discussed.
A. The First Two Regional Development Authorities.
The Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) and the Central Luzon-Cagayan
Valley Authority (CLCVA) were the first two regional development authorities
*This chapter benefitted greatly from the work of Richard Prado, a colleague
at NEDA-RDS, who studied in cosiderable detail the experience of the regio-
nal development authorities.
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created by the defunct Congress of the Philippines in June 1961. The former
covers the southern part of the country - Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan - a
frontier region and the source of political tension between its Christian
and Muslim populations. Its establishment was spearheaded by a group of
nationally prominent political leaders coming from the area. On the other
hand, the latter's areas of responsibility are Cagayan Valley which was,
and still is, one of the poorest regions of the country and Central Luzon
which was then the center of communist insurgency activities caused by
agrarian unrest. Even at this stage, the political motivations behind this
regional development effort is easily seen. The creation of these two re-
gional bodies was further justified by their sponsors inCongress on the
grounds that Mindanao, Central Luzon and Cagayan Valley were resource-rich
areas in terms of land and water resources, the exploitation of which could
best be undertaken by autonomous development agencies. Both of them were
established as public corporations, with the MDA and CLCVA, having autho-
rized capitalizations of P300 million and PL200 million, respectively. It
was expected that, with adequate financial back-up, these two public corpo-
rations could function efficiently. The MDA was envisioned as a vehicle for
setting up pioneering industrial and agricultural ventures, coordinating
private and public sectoral programs within the area and extending financial
and technical assistance to worthwhile projects. Meanwhile the CLCVA was
patterned closely after the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States
and was primarily concerned with comprehensive river basin development for
bydropower generation, irrigation and flood control.
B. Political Opportunism.
The establishment of these two authorities was too irresistible an
opportunity for legislators to forego, hence, congressional leaders from
different regions initiated moves to replicate these authorities in their
own regions. It could be an easy way for extracting financial resources
from the national government to support projects in the legislator's area.
30/
Moreover it was good publicity and public relations.-- By 1969 there were
already 12 more such bodies established by enacting legislation. (Table 14).
The sponsoring bills were passed without much political opposition inasmuch
as some "horse-trading" was resorted'to.-
Essentially the basic objectives and functions of the regional deve-
lopment authorities can be stated into the following: 1) to translate na-
t$onal goals formulated in the national development plan into regional
objectives for easier identification of appropriate regional programs and
projects, 2) to spread proportionately public expenditures among regions,
3) to provide a close working relationship with government agencies and the
private sector in undertaking directly productive activities, and 4) to
prepare an inventory of the regions' resources.12
The rate at which the authorities mushroomed supports the observation
that they were more manifestations of a political fad than deliberate ef-
33/forts toward an effective approach to regional development.-- Furthermore
it indicates ignorance on the part of the sponsors as to the requirements
for a viable use of this corporate approach. Or one can detect a lack of
seriousness in pursuing spatial redistribution. More importantly, however,
the issue that rises to the.fore is that any attempt by the central power
to favor particular sections of the country, no matter how rightly justified'
it may be, will bring considerable pressure on government to mount similar
efforts in other areas. It leads to a sense of relative deprivation and -
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and therefore will raise clamor for equal treatment. Once government yields
to this pressure, the success or effectiveness of the initial attempts is
jeopardized. The demonstration effect of the first two regional development
authorities turned out to be difficult to control and eventually led to a
multiplication of regional agencies. The impact of this corporate approach
to regional development hinges on the amount of resources at the disposal
of the regional body and the commitment of the national government. The
experience of other countries, e.g., the Guayana project in Venezuela, the
SUDENE in Brazil, attests to this contention. With the establishment of too
many regional authorities, resources for promoting development are diluted.
Only the very largest or richest country with adequate financial and tech-
nical resources can undertake more than one or two large-scale concerted
34/
efforts like the regional development authorities.-- Once the proliferation
of agencies and consequent dilution of resources occur, very few results
can be expected from these corporate bodies.
C. Problems in Operation.
These expectations were confirmed in the subsequent performance of the
regional authorities. The R1.5 billion capitalization for all the authori.
ties (Table 15) translates into P150 million annually for the national go-
ernment appropriations for ten years, aside from operating expenses. Ob-
viously the legislated appropriations were not within the financial capacity
35/
of the national budget.-- Not surprsingly only five of the fourteen regio-
nal authorities were activated insofar as an organization was formed and
funded. In addition to this, only 2.3 per cent of the programmed releases
were actually released, most of which went to operating costs. (Table 16).
Finally, because Congress, with the establishment of so many, regional
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authorities, passed appropriation acts not within government capability,
it paradoxically relinquished its function as the originator of laws re-
quiring the use of public funds, since it in effect gave the Presidency
wide discretion to choose its own priorities in fund releases. Hence parti-
cular members of Congress were subject to the patronage of the President in
36/
pushing through their favored projects.--
To compound their financial problems, mismanagement, graft and poli-
tical intervention haunted the operations of the regional authorities. For
instance, the sponsor-legislator would usually use his influence to place
his proteges and followers in the Board of Directors or in some important
positions in the staff, without any regard for the requirements of the job.
Agency funds were sometimes diverted to personal businesses of officers, or
some illegal transactions- were entered into, to the detriment of the autho-
rity.- In effect the regional authorities became a source of political
patronage and corruption.
At the technical level, inspite of the fact that interagency coordi-
nation at the regional level was one of the main objectives in their esta-
blishment, the regional authorities were often caught in conflicts with
existing regional agencies regarding jurisdictional responsibilities. Fur-
thermore duplication and overlapping of function among agencies operating
in the region were not uncommon. Apparently at the outset, the role of the
regional authorities vis-a-vis other agencies was not clearly specified.
This is especially crucial since their financial and technical resources
were inadequate and therefore, these authorities had to rely on other agen-
cies for assistance in undertaking some activities. Even at the national
level, there was virtually no integrative or coordinative body to link
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together the activities of the authorities in order to relate them to
38/
national development efforts of the government.--
Concluding Remarks.
In contrast to the experience of regional authorities in other coun-
tries which were supported with ample financial resources and technical man-
power capability and were set up with a clear understanding of their con-
tribution to national and regional development, the regional authorities in
the Philippines badly lacked the basic ingredients essential to successful
and efficient operations which characterized the regional bodies after which
they were patterned. They were an ill-fated attempt at joining planning to
effective power since it was expected that, with planning and implementation
under one umbrella, impact projects could be easily undertaken. Unfortu-
nately the sponsors in Congress were not aware of the resources necessary
to efficiently operationalize this corporate approach to regional develop-
ment. Powers and resources of the authority should be commensurate with
its envisaged objectives and functions.
Nevertheless, before their abolition or absorption into other bodies,
some accomplishments were achieved by the regional authorities which cannot
be totally ignored. Industrial and agricultural enterprises were started,
socio-economic surveys, industry and feasibility studies were completed.
Some of these proved later on to lay the basic groundwork for the identi-
fication or implementation of important regional development projects.
Notable among these are the water resource studies prepared by the CLCVA
for the Magat, Casecnan, Cagayan and Pampanga Rivers, in which multi-pur-
pose investments in irrigation, flood control and power generation are
currently being undertaken.
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Table 14 Regional Authorities Established After the
Creation of MDA & CLCYA
Date of Formal
Creation
1) June 22, 1963
June
June
1, 1964
18, 1964
4) June 18, 1964
5) June 20, 1964
6) May 4, 1965
7) August 4, 1965
8) June 19, 1965
9) June 19,
10) June 19,
1966
1966
11) June 21, 1969
12) August 4, 1969
Official Name
Hundred Islands Conservation
and Development Authority
Panay Development Authority
Mountain Province Develop-
ment Authority
San Juanico Strait Tourist
Development Authority
Northern Samar Development
Authority
Mindoro Development Author-
ity
Sulu Development Company
Catanduanes Development
Authority
Bicol Development Company
Laguna Lake Development
Authority
Southeastern Samar
Ilocos Development
Authority
Legal
R.A.
R.A.
R.A.
Basis
3655
Regional
Locations
III
3856
4071
R.A. 3961
R.A. 4132
R.A. 4188
R.A.
R.A.
R.A.
R.A.
R.A.
R.A.
6042
4412
4690
4859
5920
6077
Note: R.A. = Republic Act
VIII
VIII
VIII
I
Table 15 Capitdl Structure of Regional Development Authorities
(in million pesos)
Development Authorities
1. Mindanao Development
Authority
2. Central Luzon-Cagayan
Valley Authority
3. Hundred Islands
Programmed Amounts of
Paid-up Capital
Authorized Upon Approval Succeeding Fiscal
Capital of charter Year (annually)
200
Appropriations for
Operations and Expenses
Initial Annual
Appropriation Appropriation
.5
(Up to
.5 fiscal year
1967)
4. Panay Development
Authority
5. Mountain Province
Development Authority
6. Northern Samar Devel-
opment Authority
7. San Juanico Strait Dev-
elopment Authority
8. Mindoro Development
Authority
9. Catanduanes Development
Authority
10. Bicol Development Company
11. Laguna Lake Development
TOTALS
Source of Table:
30 fiscal
20 fiscal
10 fiscal
5 fiscal
yr. '65
yr. '66-67
yr. '68-71
yr. '72-73
(up to
3 fiscal year
1970)
30
not indicated
300
100
1,470
1
1
(or any such
1 sum needed or
necessary)
20 (up to fiscal
year 1969)
.5 (Such sums as may
be necessary)
25.5
Samonte, A., "Regional Development Authorities: Role, Structure and Feasibility,"
Philippine Journal of Public Administration, vol. XII, no. 2 (April 1968), p. 117.
W W
Table 16 A Comparison of Programmed Fund Releases with Actual Fund
Releases of Four Regional Development
Authorities up to Fiscal Year 1967
Total programmed releases up to Total actual releases % of actual to
Development Authorities fiscal year 1967 (in P million) 1967 (in P1 million) programmed
1. Mindanao Development Authority 215.50 12,01 5.57
2. Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley 203,5 1.30 0.64
Authority
3. Mountain Province Development 122.5 0.24 0.20
Authority
4. Bicol Development Company 61.5 0.30 0.49
T 0 T A L 603.0 13,85 2,30
Source: Samonte, op. cit.
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Summary of Accomplishments of Regional Authori-ties
Development
Authorities
1. Mindanao Develop-
ment Authority
(MDA)
Accomplished Tasks and/or
Projects Undertaken
a) survey of the region's
physical and natural re-
sources, and plan for
regional development
b) investment in the
stocks of Pacific Cement
Corporation, Inc.,
Surigao del Norte
c) construction of
Zamboanga Ice and Cold
Storage Plant
d) supervised Pilot Rice
Project at Cotabato and
Misamis Occidental
Nature/Description
A joint venture between
the Authority and the
private sector with the
former having 10% worth
of shares of the common
stocks at par value
placed at P10 million.
This plant is the first
and largest of its kind
in Mindanao. It has a
storage capacity of 150
tons, a cold storage
capacity of 300 tons.
Designed to cater to the
needs of trading firms
engaged in the export of
frozen tuna and shrimps.
A deal with 173 farmers
Cotabato and Misamis
Occidental, with a com-
bined rice farm area of
65 hectares.
The role of the MDA is
to provide technical
assistance and operating
capital for seeds, fer-
tilizers, chemicals and
hired labor. Farmers in
turn agreed to be under
the supervision of MDA
technicians.
*The Mindanao Development Authority was abolished in 1975 and was superseded
by the Southern Philippines Development Administration. Mountain Province
Development Authority was abolished in 1973 and was not reconstituted. The
CLCVA was attached to the Department of Public Works, while Bicol Develop-
ment Company and Laguna Lake Development Authority were attached to the
central planning ministry (National Economic and Development Authority) for
policy direction.
Table 17
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Development
Authorities
2. Central Luzon -
Cagayan Valley
Authority
(CLCVA)
3. Mountain
Province
Development
Authority
4. Laguna Lake
Development
Authority (LLDA)
Accomplished Tasks and/or
Projects Undertaken
e) Palawan Cannery and
Fishing Development
Corporation
f) Bukidnon Livestock
farm
g) Davao Rice and Corn
Corporation
a) Magat River Multi-
Purpose Project
b) Casecnan River Multi-
Purpose Project
c) Cagayan Valley and
Pampanga River
d) Potential damsites
at Cagayan River
a) Kalinga and Apayao
b) Vegetable industry
c) Sericulture and
mushroom culture
a) Alternative water
supply for Manila and
suburbs
b) Irrigation, fishing
and recreation
Nature/Description
A subsidiary corporation
designed to encourage the
sector to construct a
cannery with capacity to
process 75 to 100 tons of
fish daily.
MDA undertook construction
of fishing vessels to put
project into operation.
A joint venture with Cen-
tral Mindanao University,
to raise improved live-
stock breeds through the
Bukidnon Central livestock
farm.
This is a P100,000 loan
accomodation to the said
corporation.
A report
A report
Master plan
Feasibility studies
Socio-economic survey
A project study for the
region-
A feasibility study
Feasibility studies
Feasibility studies
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Development
Authorities
5. Bicol Development
Company (BIDECO)
Accomplished Tasks and/or
Projects Undertaken
c) Physical and insti-
tional aspects of lake
water quality management
a) Rice Production
Project
b) Bicol Livestock
and Agricultural
Development Corporation
(BLADCOR)
c) Bicol Swine and
Poultry Development
Corporation (BSPDC)
d) Sugar Central Project
e) Pilot Vegetable
Project
Nature/Description
Feasibility studies
Establishment of "show-
window farms" demonstrating
the effective use of modern
techniques and scientific
rice production methods.
A subsidiary of the Author-
ity (BIDECO) which is cap-
italized at P100,000; 51%
of which was subscribed and
fully paid for by the same.
Formed to engage in and
carry on the business of
breeding and raising live-
stock and poultry, also of
processing and preparing
them for sale locally or
export to foreign markets.
Another subsidiary of BIDECO
capitalized at P100,000.
This practically duplicated
the functions and objectives
of BLADCOR (see above).
Another subsidiary: the
Bicol Sugar Development
Authority (BISUDECO) was
created to manage a sugar
mill which is export orien-
ted. The mill is also
designed to provide employ-
ment opportunities.
A vegetable farm demonstra-
tion project in Albay and
Naga City to encourage
farmers to plant vegetables
for local consumption and
regional export.
Source: R. Pradu, "The Politico-Administrative Context and the Implementation
of Regional Policies."
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V. The Present Institutional Machinery for Regional Development Planning.
Due to the traditional centralization of powers in the national govern-
ment and the limited autonomy and resources of local governments, the adop-
tion of regional development and industrialization as a national objective
necessitated the creation of a new institution at the intermediate level
which would be mainly responsible for the development of policies aimed at
this particular objective. This institution would not be confined to the
articulation of purely local and parochial interests but rather would be
involved in the integration of such interests into a unified set applicable
to a broader geographical area - the region. Ultimately these regional in-
terests would be harmonized with national development goals.
The Regional Development Councils (RDCs), whose formation was part of
the regionalization program, were the response to the need for an institu-
tional mechanism midway between the national and local levels. Corrollarily;
to support the regionalization process, the gradual devolution of decision-
making to the regional level was planned. It was expected that, with grea-
ter decision-making powers at the regional level, theoretical and bureau-
cratic rationality could be infused into the planning system to complement
the political process. Unfortunately the devolution of decision-making
proceeded slowly, thereby incapacitating planning activities of the RDCs.
In view of the problems facing the RDCs and emerging political issues,
more adhoc and informal approaches were resorted to. A special type of re-
gion was created in areas which were politically very critical, e.g., the
14uslim Mindanao regions, or in areas where the political leaders were per-
sonally close to the central power, e.g., the MMA. Another type of arrange-
ment was Integrated Area 'Development. It is in these regions or subregions
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where more substantive powers were delegated, in addtion to adequate finan-
cial support. Their subsequent better performance appeared to undermine the
effectiveness of the RDCs.
Since then institutional reforms have been made to correct the initial
technical deficiencies and to strengthen the RDC organization. But still
the slow pace at which national decision-making functions are being de-
volved poses a constraint to improved performance by the RDCs. Moreover,
with the political support being enjoyed by the special regions, one tends
to doubt the influence the RDCs can exert in national decisions regardless
of additional powers vested in them.
In this section we will trace the different stages of evolution of
the RDCs and other regional bodies. Special emphasis will be laid on the
problems encountered by the RDCs and the institutuional reforms implemented
in response to these problems. The effectiveness of the RDCs will be com-
pared with that of the special regions through an analysis of the effects
of institutional reforms on the power of the RDCs, in order to verify the
potential influence over policy formulation and implementation.
The discussion is divided into two main parts Phase I covers the pe-
*
riod from 1972 to 1975, which represents the early stages of the regiona-
lization program. Phase II extends from 1976 to the present, in which re-
forms were instituted as a response to the problems encountered in the
preceding period. A new set of issues has emerged and innovative approaches
are currently being tested to improve regional planning operations.
*It was also from 1974-75 that the author was actively involved in regional
planning as a member of the staff of the NEDA Region XI office.
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A. Phase I - Regionalization and the Creation of the RDCs.
1. The Regionalization Scheme
Regionalization was mandated by the Integrated Reorganization Plan
*
(IRP) of 1972 (as set forth in Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1 ) which aimed
to decentralize national government functions by dividing the country into
eleven regions. Prior to this, there was no uniform regional set-up, with
each national agency maintaining its own regional subdivision according to
its discretion and needs. The present regional delineation proposed by the
IRP is largely based on a study conducted by the Physical Planning Strategy
of the Philippines and is for "administrative, planning and management
purposes, with special attention given to problems of regional equity and
39/
existing administrative, political and ethnic boundaries."
The regionalization scheme which requires national government agencies
to establish regional offices accroding to the prescribed regional delinea-
tion, preferably on a department-wide basis, is intended to provide admi-
nistrative and substantive powers to regional offices. Through the delega-
tion of these powers it is expected that transaction of public business and
the implementation of government development projects at the regional level
will be facilitated. Moreover more coordination is anticipated inasmuch as
it is proposed that regional offices will all be located physically close
to one another in a regional center. Viewed from another perspective, the
designated regional capitals would be gradually built up into strong urban
*The Philippines has been under martial law since September 21, 1972, where-
by legislative and executive powers are assumed by the President. Presiden-
tial Decrees CPDs) and Lettera of Instruction (LOIs) are issued by the
Office of the President, the former becoming laws of the land, Recently
the representatives to the National Legislature have been elected,
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centers through infrastructure provision.
Aside from administrative decentralization, the IRP advanced the
40/
following objectives, 4
a. the promotion of the socio-economic development of the various re-
gions within the country by providing the institutional framework
for the conduct of regional planning and development, within the
context of aggregative planning at the national level and the spe-
cific planning and programming at the local level.
b. the creation of a regional development council for each of the
eleven administrative regions of the country. The councils shall
be broadly representative of local governments and sectoral depart-
ments of the national government operating in the region.
c. the adoption of a policy that will provide the broad framework for
the integration of development efforts in each of the eleven admi-
nistrative regions.
In effect the IRP provided the institutional machinery for pursuing the
objective of regional development and industrialization embodied in the
national plan, with its provisions for administrative decentralization and
the creation of the RDCs.
2. Organizational Structure of the RDCs.
The RDCs, activated under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 22 (See
Appendix 2 for salient features of the organization and operation of the
nDC), are composed of provincial governors, mayors of chartered cities,
regional directors of some national government offices and heads of regional
development authorities in the region. Tasked with coordinating planning
activities and monitoring program implementation, the RDC is assisted by
a technical staff, the regional office of the National Economic and Deve-
lopment Authority (NEDA), the country's economic planning body. At the pro-
vincial and municipal levels, the organization of local development councils
with their own planning staffs had been ordered under Executive Order
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No. 121 in 1970 but very few had actually been set up by 1972.
It is interesting to note at this point that the RDC is a replica of
the NEDA Board, the country's highest policy making body composed of the
President and heads of ministries and assisted by NEDA Central Office, at
the national level and the local development councils at the local level.
While there are similarities in organizational structure, the NEDA Board
and the local development councils are political units in the hierarchy of
the government system of administration, but the region is not. It is merely
a creation for planning purposes. What this implies is that the RDC Chair-
man, unlike the President or provincial governor, does not have direct
authority over the regional agencies which fall under the umbrella of the
RDC. Moreover the RDC, as an organization, is limited to planning activities
with virtually no direct control over plan implementation. Perhaps this
separation of planning and implementation functions is an offshoot of the
disappointing performance of the regional development authorities which
were vested with these dual functions. Consequently the RDC has had to coor-
dinate and plan mainly by persuasion because of its limited powers.
The organization of the RDCs reflects an attempt at combining the
political leadership with the government bureaucracy in order to secure
commitment to development programs conceived at the regional level and
enhance the participation of local elective representatives in the planning
process. Local issues can be discussed and settled within the region; at the
sate time national objectives are brought into direct relationship with
local situations.- However the danger in the RDC approach lies in the
possibility that the political leaders would overwhelmingly assert their
supremacy over the appointed regional directors, in which case, politics
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becomes the dominant ideological perspective, not bureaucratic rationa-
42/lity.- The very purposes for which the regionalization program was under-
taken and the RDCs established will be nullified if there is excessive
political intrusion into the decision-making process. The pace at which
the decentralization scheme is pursued will be affected adversely.
3. The Presidential Officers.
Complementing the RDCs at the regional level are the Presidential
Regional Officers for Development (PROD) and the Presidential Regional
Action Officer (PRAO), who are presidential appointees charged with moni-
toring important development programs and projects, the latter specifically
with the food production drive. They are "extensions of the President" and
have been vested with the prerogatives of his office in the solution of
local problems and those affecting priority government projects. In some
regions of the country are also found the project offices for Integrated
Area Development Proojects (IAD) which undertake planning activities for
subregional areas. Their work also involve the various regional line agen-
cies in both planning and implementation. In July 1973 a coordinating com-
mittee, the Cabinet Coordinating Committee for Integrated Rural Development
Projects (CCC-IRDP) was set up to oversee the progress of the IADs and iden-
tify areas where the IAD approach is warranted.
4. Sectoral Planning Exercises.
The different RDCs in the country were activated between 1973 and 1975.
Then the planning exercises at the regional level commenced immediately
after the activation of an RDC with the formation of sectoral* task forces,
* The sectoral groupings are patterned after the major planning sectors
covered by the national plan for easy integration. However the RDC, at its
discretion, can form more task forces as well as expand membership.
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empowered by the RDC to prepare a regional development plan. Every task
force was composed initially of representatives of government agencies
whose functions are related to the sector, e.g., agriculture task force -
Bureaus of Plant Industry, Agricultural Extension, etc. Coordinated by the
RDC Technical Staff, each task force's expected main output was a sectoral
development plan for the region. Various sectoral plans were checked for
consistency and integrated to form the regional plan, submitted to the RDC
for approval. Eventually the RDC plans were reviewed at the national level
and incorporated into the national development plan.
During the establishment. of the RDCs, the NEDA regional offices and
the formation of the task forces, a multitude of problems was encountered.
As was expected, there was difficulty in staffing the NEDA regional offices
because of the lack of qualified personnel at the regional level and the .
unattractiveness of regional assignments to competent specialists based in
Manila. This was partially alleviated by NEDA-sponsored training programs
in Manila whose participants were assigned to the different regions upon
the termination of studies. The personnel problem was more acute at the
43/
provincial and municipal levels- where pay scales are low and non-compe-
titive. However, during the first few months of operation of the NEDA regio-
nal offices, RDC-organized seminars and workshops were held at the regional
level to build up capability of local planning staffs. Likewise during the
planning exercises, the work of the sectoral task forces suffered from the
lack of planning experience of most participants. This problem was further
complicated by the varying degrees of decentralization among the different
line agencies such that their participation in the planning exercises was
constrained by the amount of decision-making powers delegated to them.
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Hence the success of the whole planning activity came torest on the initia-
tive of the RDC Technical Staff who were responsible for organizing, plan-
ning and catalyzing the work of the task forces.
Despite the problems encountered in the early stages of their opera-
tion, the RDCs were able to complete their regional plans before the end of
1975. This is a tribute mostly to the improvisation of their technical
staffs.A-/ The regional plans are wider in scope and content than those
covered by the currently available machinery for implementation at the
regional level. For example, while plans for housing and industry have been
prepared, there are no region-specific entities specifically mandated to
implement the plan. Furthermore the degree of detail varies but analysis is
generally more developed for those sectors in which public expenditures
dominate, for which there are regional field offices or where statistical
45/$nformation is relatively better developed.--
5. Technical Issues.
Even as early as the first planning exercises, a number of technical
issues surfaced. The manner in which the regional plans were evolved varied
widely from one region to another. No concrete guidelines were set or agreed
-upon beforeh'and among the NEDA regional offices and the main office. In some
cases the preparation of the regional plan was done by putting "spacetags"
to the programs and projects contained in the different sectoral components
of the national plan and then collecting those belonging to a certain region.
Iegional objectives and goals were lifted from the national plan and reworded
to give the impression of its regional conception, In other cases the pro-
grams and projects submitted by agencies belonging to the task force were
compiled, after which a broad conceptual framework was made up to relate
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these projects to regional objectives. It should be borne in .mind that
these projects were often not identified by the regional office itself but
by some study groups organized by the head office to undertake a nation-
wide project identification activity. In either case, the regional plan-
ning exercise does not produce a set of objectives and a listing of programs
and projects that truly reflect the peculiar aspirations and conditions
within the region. Probably the attempt to use nationally conceived projects
was inevitiable since the RDC as an organization does not possess implemen-
tation powers.
It was also to be anticipated that the region, in its planning exer-
cises, would tend to consider itself in isolation and not as part of a na-
tional space economy inasmuch as there had been no previous intensive stu-
dies on interregional differences in resource endowments nor assessments
of comparative advantage. Hence overambitious targets were often set, making
integration more difficult. Even at present the mechanism by which targets
are set is still not fully developed.
Aside from the problems present in plan formulation, the RDCs were
faced with unsettling predicaments in performing coordinative functions.
Apparently the PRODs have built up their own constituency among regional
offices because of their broader powers and the speed at which they could
respond to crisis situations. On the other hand, the relationship of the
RDC vis-a-vis these regional agencies was not clear except perhaps th6se
$nvolving the planning exercises. As mentioned earliery the RDC has no di-
rect control over line agencies. Even with respect to the local government
units in the 3egion, its relationship is ambiguous since these units are
administratively controlled by the Department of Local Government and
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Community Development (DLGCD) particularly in areas of local planning and
46/
implementation.- Some agencies or local governments resent or, at least,
consider as an unnecessary work burden the requirements of the RDC to sub-
mit periodic reports on the progress of implementation of development pro-
jects. It was mainly in instances where the PROD or PRAO, if he was not the
RDC Chairman himself, gave his support to the RDC that the latter was able
to mobilize the line agencies and local governments. Hence a common strategy
adopted by the NEDA Regional Executive Director is to start and sustain a
close personal relationship with the PROD with the view of capitalizing on
47/it in his coordinative endeavors.-- Moreover the RDC Technical Staff star-
ted to form a constituency of its own by extending technical assistance to
line agencies and local governments. The previous training seminars and
workshops on local development planning and project development proved to
be invaluable in gaining recognition for the expertise of the RDC personnel
and in establishing personal contacts with local planners.
In the case of the IADs, although in principle they fall within the
jurisdiction of the RDC, coordination is more dependent on the interpersonal
relationships established by the RDC staff with the project offices. Similar
to the PRODs and PRAOs, the IAD project offices were given more powers and
therefore tended to duplicate or even challenge the policy making power of
the RDC. Their powers come from the fact that they are under the supervision
of the CCC-IRDP which is composed of high ranking cabinet members. In ad-
dition they receive more funding from both national as well as foreign sour-
ces; they can avail of the services of foreign experts through the technical
assistance components of loans and grants; and lastly, they are empowered
to undertake direct project implementation. On the other hand, the IADs
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have a self-declared short life span unlike the RDCs which have been orga-
48/
nized as permanent institutions in the regions.- To a certain extent,
therefore, the presence of the IAD in a particular region puts additional
pressure on the RDC in its coordinative efforts.
Even if no difficulties had been met during the planning exercises
and in coordinative efforts, the RDC still had to. contend with a major defi-
ciency of the regional planning system - the lack of control over financial
resources necessary to implement the plan it conceives. All the budgetary
appropriations come through the national line agencies and from local govern-
ments. Budgeting by line agencies was not done on a regional basis and the
regional directors had little influence over their department budgets. Hence
the RDCs not only must plan by persuasion but their role is severely res-
tircted by the absence of regional budgets for the line agencies and by the
lack of any effective mechanism to deal with conflicts in resource alloca-
tion at the regional level.A-
At this juncture, it appears rather obvious that the problems which
faced the regional development authorities in the 1960s were also hampering
the operations of the RDCs. The superimposition of another regional body,
without an accompanying precise specification of its functional relation-
ship with other government entities based in the region, raises eventually
the problem of coordination. The RDC, although tasked with coordination,
has no powers to enforce cooperation; responsibilities are well-defined but
lines of authority are ambiguous. Of course, apathy and indifference do.
not stem purely from technical considerations but from behavioral issues
as well. It is to be expected that some resistance will be met once a coor-
dinating "superbody"' emerges on the scene. Resistance comes from the pattern
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of personal loyalties and institutional autonomy.-I- Coordination always
implies a cost, not the least of which is the cost of freedom of action.
No administrative agency will therefore acquiesce to being coordinated
51/because such relationships are postulated theoretically.-- Moreover, until
it is clear how regional planning is undertaken, coordination among sectors
will always pose a problem.
Similarly the problem of resources which constantly plagued the regio-
nal development authorities reappeared during the early phase of the RDC
activities. Financing prkvides the vital link between planning and implemen-
tation; without it programs and projects cannot be matched with available
resources. Because of the inability of the RDCs to provide the financial
leverage for pushing through important regional projects, its effectiveness
has been undermined by politicians who manage to gain access to the Presi-
52/dent and secure funding for projects within their area.-- Consequently
plans, which represent the output of long periods of technical work, are
just relegated to the bookshelves and do not receive the support of imple-
menting agencies.
6. The Special Regions.
Probably the only regions that were able to avoid or minimize these
problems were the two Muslim regions and the MMA. It was in 1975 that the
three regions in Mindanao were regrouped into four regions because of the
clamor of the Muslim segment of the population for more representation in
government affairs. (At this time and even up to the present, there have
been moves calling for their secession from the republic.) Region XII was
formed by combining three provinces of Region XI with two provinces of
Region X, all of'whith have large Muslim populations. Subsequently the
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Muslim regions IX and XII were declared as semi-autonomous regions with a
regional commssion as the governing body. The Regional Commissioners in
these two areas, one a local political leader and the other a military
officer, are also the RDC Chairmen.
Neanwhile Region IV was divided into two regions, the MMA covering
four cities and thirteen neighboring municipalities and Southern Tagalog
region. Even before this, the MMA was already considered as a separate
region for planning purposes because of its distinct socio-economic charac-
teristics and this move merely formalized such a division. The MMA is under
a governorship type of administration, with the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos as governor and general manager. The Metropolitan Manila Commission
(MMC) is charged with planning the integrated development of the area.
There is an RDC for Southern Tagalog.
The Regional Commissioners in the Muslim regions are appointed by the
President, report to him directly and are his "personal representatives"
in the region. They were given more authority in financial and budgetary
matters and authority to call upon any agency of the government at any
level to undertake action related to coordination, planning and project
implementation. Besides these already overwhelming powers, they were also
given administrative supervision and control over local governments and
share the full powers of the Secretary of the DLGCD to investigate and
decide on administrative cases involving local elective officials.
In these commission-type regional organizations, it appears that most
of the coordination and control problems of the RDCs over regional planning
and implementation are not evident. In fact, during the Third Regional Con-
sultative Meeting (August 5-7, 1976) of the various RDCs held in Western
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Visayas, there was a strong consensus towards the adoption of a regional
53/
commission-type set-up for the other regions.-
The MMC was empowered to act, not only as a special planning and imple-
mentingAnstitution, but a de jure central government to perform policy
making, executive and administrative function for the local governments
54/
under its jurisdiction.-- It is an attempt at coordinating and integrating
efforts in the metropolitan region where serious problems transcend poli-
tical boundaries and therefore a concerted move guided at the metropolitan
level is necessary. Because of its extensive powers and undisputed leader-
ship, the MMC is assured of considerable financial support at both the local
and national level. This can be deduced from its 5-year plan (1977-81) bud-
get of F8.9 billion, of which 27 per cent will come from local sources
while the rest will be provided by the national government.
On the basis of the preceding description, we can see that the special
regions - the MMA and the Muslim areas - enjoy greater delegation of subs+-
tantive powers and preferential treatment in resource allocation, compared
to the other regions. Their political clout provides the main source of
their power.
Concluding Remarks for Phase I.
In evaluating the overall performance of the RDCs during the first
phase, what appears to be important is not the quality of the plans prepared
by the regions nor the success at plan implementation. The constrainsts on
these two aspects of their operations have been discussed earlier. It should
be borne in mind that regionalization is a long-term process and many ap-
parettly insurmountable obstacles and issues, which may frustrate its suc-
cess unless threshed out properly, are bound to arise in the early stages
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of evolution. The identification of problems and constraints during these
stages, e.g., the absence of regional budgets, lack of planning expertise,
differences in competencies and decision-making powers among regional agen-
cies, etc., can be considered by itself as a major breakthrough in the
planning process because, as we shall see later on, it served as the basis
for determining and instituting remedial measures to rectify the deficien-
cies in the regional planning system. Moreover the RDC, despite its short-
comings, was able to mobilize the different instituions operating at the
regional level and organize them into a permanent planning machinery. It
served as a forum for dialogue between regional officers -of line agencies
of the national government and local political leaders. Not inappropriately
the early phase of the RDC operations can be termed as a consciousness
raising exercise at exploring more regional and locally oriented issues
which could be inputed into the formulation of regional and national poli-
cies as a means of ensuring their responsiveness and relevance to needs at
the gressroots level.
On the technical side, critical issues were raised for consideration
regarding the linkages that need to be developed among the different levels-
local, regional and national- of the planning hierarchy and the mechanics
of integration among sectors and among regions. The regional disaggregation
of national targets, the responsibility for target setting and the trans-
lation of objectives into meaninglful action programs and projects are other
pressing issues. Nevertheless, during the early phase of the RDCs, the re-
gional planning process was initiated and became an important function of
regional institutions.
The better performance of the commission-type regions and the IADs
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underscored the need for joining planning with effective power, a link that
has eluded the regional development authorities and the RDCs. Effective
power emanates from the control over the legal and monetary resources neces-
55'
sary to carry out intended actions.-- Undoubtedly the regional commissions,
the MMC and the IADs have this type of control in view of the broad powers
delegated to them by the central government.
One is led to ask why it is only to the so-called special regions that
broad powers have been given, and not to the other RDCs as well. Perhaps
the greater degree of decentralization to the Muslim regions is considered
by the national government as a politically expedient way of meeting demands
on the state; by planning divisive issues at lower levels of government,
conflict with central government is reduced. It may even further reinforce
56/
the acceptance of legitimacy of the central government.-- Alternatively
the inadequacy of RDC powers may reflect a lack of sincerity or commitment
to the entire process of decentralization as one may be led to believe
from the slow pace of devolving decision-making duties. It appears that
political circumstances carry more weight and influence over national go-
vernment's response whenever objective criteria are unclear. Hence there
is unequal treatment in the delegation of substantive powers to regional
bodies, with the special regions enjoying the favor of the central govern-
ment largely because of their political strength or strategic importance.
With the joining of planning to effective power in these latter regions,
their capability for more independent action has been enhanced.
In the next section, the measures taken to strengthen the RDCs will
be assessed in order to verify whether these are capable of altering the
balance of power among the regions, i.e., whether the RDCs if vested with
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more powers will be capable of building up their influence over national
decisions especially with regard to resource allocation. These measures
were a reaction to the difficulties met in Phase I which emanated prima-
rily from the slow progress of decentralization of national government
powers inspite of the regionalization program.
B. Phase II - A Period of Institutional Reform.
1. Preparation of Five, Ten and Twenty-five Year Plans.
The initial plans prepared by the RDCs were superseded with the issu-
ance of LOI 363 in late 1975 directing the simultaneous preparation of 5,
10 and 25-year plans. During this time the Philippine government was fina-
lizing the agreements with the United Nations Development Programme and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the Regional
Planning Assistance Project which started in 1976. This project involving
the NEDA, especially its Regional Development Staff, the regional offices
and a small team of foreign experts, was instrumental in prviding the plan-
ning gnidelines to the RDCs for the preparation the multiyear regional
development plans. In addition to this, it spearheaded efforts at rationa-
lizing the regional planning organization as well as the planning process
itself through continuous interaction with NEDA regional offices and through
research. As organizational reform measures were being considered, the pro-
ject staff performed the necessary technical studies to evaluate the propo-
aals and make recommendations. Training seminars and workshops were also
conducted to develop regional planning capabilities.
The RDCs completed their 25-year plans before the end of 1976 and
their 5- and 10-year plans by early 1977. These plans were evaluated by the
Regional Development Staff and subsequently integrated into the National
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Development Plan through the interagency technical sectoral subcommittees,
in which the RDS staff was actively involved as proponents of the regional
"cause". It is gratifying to note that the present national plans contain
a regional development framework and the regional dimension is evident in
their sectoral components.
2. Organizational Improvements.
Largely as a response to the difficulties met during the early stages
of operation of the RDCs, a number of significant reform measures have been
undertaken since 1975. Among these are the appointment of the RDC Chairman
by the President, the establishment of the regional budgeting system and
the regional development fund, the creation of planning positions in re-
gional offices of line agencies and the expansion of powers of the RDC.
In recognition of the need to strengthen the RDC, it was deemed that
the appointment of its chairman by the President could bring bout a more
positive realization by the line agencies and local governments of the role
of the'RDC in the region. This move was an admission of the ineffectiveness
of the RDC Chairman if he does not enjoy the confidence of the central power
in a martial law regime. Personal access to the Presidency is of paramount
importance to regional bodies as exemplified by the PRODs, the regional com-
missioners and local political leaders close to the President. The central
power, with its extensive authoritarian powers, has great control over fis-
cal and financial resources and is in a position or reject or ,support any
move initiated from below. The past inability of the RDC and its staff to
command respect and deference was partly due to the agencies' awareness
of its lack of authority over them.
In mid-1976 LOI No. 447 was issued instructing the regional offices
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of the sectoral departments of the national government to appoint a plan-
ning officer for their office. It was followed soon by LOI No. 448 which
directed the delegation to regional directors of a standard set of minimum
administrative powers and ordered the heads of national departments, bu-
reaus and agencies to determine substantive powers that may be delegated
and to issue the corresponding directives for delegation. These instructions
were an offshoot of the findings of the survey conducted to follow-up on
the implementation of the IRP which revealed that, while physical decen-
tralization was largely achieved, there was not enough delegation of autho-
57/
rity on administrative and substantive powers.-
*
Six months after the issuance of LOI no. 448, two surveys conducted
to determine the extent of its compliance showed that its provisions have
not yet been implemented. In general the department orders/circulars indi-
cate that the delegation of authority on administrative matters had been
better achieved while the delegation of authority on substantive matters
has been very partial, if not totally absent. Among the problems cited to
account for the slow implementation are the lack of a clear definition of
planning responsibility at the regional level vis-a-vis that of the national
office, lack of competent personnel to fill the positions which only com-
inand low salaries.58/
3. The Regional Budgeting System and the Regional Development Fund.
LOt Nos. 447 and 448 mandated the Budget Commission to formulate the
necessary systems and procedures to operationalize the regional budgeting
*One was conducted by the Budget Commission, the other by the University
of the Philippines' College of Public Administration.
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*
system. In early 1977 the system of regional budgeting (RBS) was intro-
duced with the organization and conduction by the Budget Commission, in
coordination with the RDCs, of seminars and workshops to orient regional
offices on the mechanics of the new system. The regional offices are ins-
tructed to evolve their own regional budgets in consonance with the prio-
rities set in the RDC Plan. In effect the national budget of sectoral
departments is regionalized to support the financial requirement of the
regional plan. Since 1977 the system of regional budgeting has been gra-
dually implemented, with its full operationalization by 1979.
To complement.the RBS, a regional development fund (RDF) is set aside
from the national budget to finance priority local projects of the RDC. In
1977 the General Appropriations Act (PD 1050) provided an allocation of
F94.56 million, of which P50 million is made available for current outlays,
P30 million for capital outlays, and the rest earmarked for a number of
existing regional development authorities. The law specifically provides
that the PF30 million for capital outlays will be released on a matching
*The main objective of the RBS is to enhance the effectiveness of the
national budget as an instrument of regional and national development.
Specifically the immediate aim is to develop a budget mechanism that will
support and enhance the regional integration and interagency coordination
of plans and operations for optimum results within specific geographic areas.
The other objectives of the RBS are: 1) to make the budget system harmonize
with the decentralized administrative and political structures, 2) to pro-
vide a mechanism with which to review, evaluate and monitor government
program and project activities and relate them with those embodied in the
regional plans, and 3) to make the budget more receptive to the aspirations
and needs of the regions, local governments and communities.
The system is operational when 1) the regional allocation of each depart-
ment budget is made, 2) the regional offices are aware of the level of
resources allocated to their region, and 3) the regional offices can trans-
late the regional plan into the budgetary program and project structure
and can determine the level of budgetary requirements for such programs
and projects.
Source: Regional Budgeting Manual prepared by the Budget Commission.
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basis of PO.50 for every P1.00 of funding raised by local governments for
regional projects. Accordingly implementing rules governing the disburse-
ment and allocation of the RDF have been proposed. The RDC shall be directly
accountable to the Budget Commission for the utilization of the fund.
4. More Attention for Local Planning.
With some of the administrative and financial issues already under-
going gradual resolution, the central government took the lead at supprting
local level planning through the establishment of the Human Settlements
*
Commission (HSC), as a means of further improving the effectiveness of
regional planning. Broadly the main functions of the HSC are to engage in
physical planning and guide the development of the land resources of the
country. In early 1977, the National Program on Town Planning, Housing and
Zoning was initiated by the HSC, covering all chartered cities, regional
capitals and important urban centers. Since it did not have any local coun-
terparts, it relied on the NEDA regional office staff to head the prqgram
at the-local level, in conjunction with the HSC regional coordinator. Plan-
ning teams were formed to assist and train the city/town planning staffs
in the preparation of town plans, covering both economic and physical di-
mensions, a housing program and a land use plan, together with the necessary
*plementing measures, e.g., zoning ordinances, building standards, etc.
5. Shift Towards Plan Implementation.
Nore recently the RDCs, with the planning exercises behind them, are
giving more attention to planning for plan implementation. In this connection,
the NEDA through the NEDA-UNDP/IBRD Regional Planning Assistance Project
*The HSC is now under the newly-created Ministry of Human Settlements and
Ecology.
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is experimenting with a version of the IAD approach, whereby contiguous
areas within a region are delimited for the purpose of the identification
of functionally-linked programs and projects. A region is divided into a
number of IADs. This approach is a reaction to the need to translate the
regional plan into implementable programs and projects, which then would
be prioritized and grouped into a Regional Investment Program (RIP) and
eventually matched with available resources through the RBS. The IAD con-
cept assumes a relatively advanced degree of decentralization since the
provision of adequate substantive powers is a prerequisite to project
development. Again some amount of coordination and interlink among agencies
is needed in this approach, with a coordinating body envisaged at the sub-
regional level.
6. A New Set of Emerging Issues.
With the periodic review and reform of the RDC structure and adminis-
trative decentralization, the organizational framework for the development
of regional policy has undergone a great deal of transformation since its
inception. The RDC in particular has been given more responsibilities and,
accordingly, efforts to strengthen it have been made. As a result of these
changes, a new and more complex set of issues and problems is on the scene.
The effectiveness of the institutional machinery for regional planning
is contingent upon the speed and pattern at which central government func-
59/
tions are decentralized to the regional level.-- As discussed earlier, the
reforms made in the past few years have placed new demands in terms of func-
tions and responsibilities on regional offices, that presume a certain
level of devolution of decision-making. With the increased tasks attendant
to the RBS and the RDF, the regional offices, especially the RDC as a body,
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are no longer confined to plan formulation but will be actively involved
in project development, resource allocation , prioritization and program-
ming, and monitoring. Compared to the original functions contained in LOI
No. 22, the entire organizational structure of the RDC, e.g., its functions,
manpower and operating resources, needs modification and upgrading to cope
with the additional demands. In fact during the Regional Consultative Meet-
ing held in May 1977, a number of proposals were presented and accepted in
this regard, specifically calling for the expansion of RDC powers to include
project prioritization, review and monitoring and the administration of the
RDF.
The strengthening of the RDC becomes more crucial because one of the
main bottlenecks facing regionalization and regional planning is that the
60/
region is not a political subdivision.-- What this implies is that the RDC
as a body is divorced from the instruments of action. The experience in
many countries has shown that planner's advice, separated from the uses of
61/
effective power, accomplishes but little.- If the region cannot be con-
'Verted into a political unit with its own system of government, the RDC
phould at least be clothe with more executive powers related to plan imple-
'nMentation as a means of checking compliance with its decisions by regional
bodies.
The effectiveness in resource allocation at the regional level depends
to a large extent on how the RDC can influence the line agencies during the
regional budgeting process. But before the regional budget and the RDF can
become powerful tools for pursuing regional development objectives, the
regional offices have to be given more leeway and control in project deve-
lopment so that identified programs are truly directed towards a set of
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strictly regional aims. Progrars and projects can subsequently be reviewed
and ranknd by the RDC using its own scheme for prioritization and then
programmed for implementation.
The planning experience has also raised the need for flexibility in
national government intervention in traditional local concerns. Certain
activities which are strongly influenced by location-specific factors are
more efficiently planned at the subnational level as In the case of planning
for health services wherein conditions are affected by factors such as ac-
cessibility, geography and climate. On the other hand, planning for power
development must be directed at the national levelto take heed of the re-
62/
quirements for industrial dispersal.-
Finally the prennial problem of coordination is again present. With
the proliferation of government agencies, a situati6n that is symptomatic
of the excessive fragmentation of the system of administration, this will
often be experienced. For example, with the entry of the HSC, the issue
arises'as to the distinction and theoretical boundaries between economic
and physical planning which could guide planning agencies in their parti-
ctpation in the planning process. Conflicts will often emerge if there are
no provisions for inter-organizational coordination . These are bound to
defeat the very purpose of integrating the physical and economic dimensions
and producing a comprehensive plan document. Even with the new IAD approach
at the regional level, the requirements for interlink are even greater.
laybe another layer in the planning hierarchy will just be added without
a proportional increase in organizational efficiency.
Concluding Remarks for Phase II
All the institutional reforms in Phase II undoubtedly strengthen the
n m il iin 1911|||1910151@||111119
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RDCs. But what appears more important is whether these reforms provide the
RDCs greater capability for utilizing regional resources efficiently and
increasing their leverage in influencing national government decisions. As
of now, the changes in the mechanisms within the RDC, like the RBS and the
RDF, expand opportunities for more independent action. However the benefits
which these recent changes offer may not be realized if decision-making
powers are still limited. Political factors may intrude excessively in
decision-making if the technical and objectives elements of proposed poli-
cies or programs cannot be decided and enforced by the RDC. Moreover the
additional powers given to them have not reduced the overwhelming advantage
of the special regions especially the MMA. Most of the substantive powers
enjoyed by these latter regions have only been partially given to the RDCs.
Decisions on regional plan implementation, particularly on resource
allocation, depends heavily on the national government. These are subject
to competing demands from the various regions. Very often the regions which
are politically stronger or close to the central power can influence these
decisions in their favor. Hence, despite the rational criteria that can
justify or support the valid claims on the national government, what even-
tually turns out to be the major determinant of the outcome of national
decisions is the political influence of the favored regions like the MIMA
and the Muslim regions. Presently this is happening in the Philippines.
The MMA, in particular, has been accorded preferential treatment because
of its present leadership. Since the degree of influence of the MMA on cen-
tral government action is very crucial to any policy towards decentralizing
population and economic activities from the area, additional measures are
therefore necessary to further strengthen the capability of the institutional
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mechanism at the regional level for plan formulation and implementation
and, at the same time, reduce effectively the significance of the political
influence of the favored regions.
Even accepting that, for the meantime, most of the RDCs will be at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis the special regions, any resources channeled to them,
no matter how meager, have to be used efficiently for regional development.
This is why the strengthening or expansion of the powers of the RDC becomes
more important. The RBS, the RDF and the RIP and other reform measures aim
to give the RDCs more control over resource allocation on the basis of prio-
rities determined from the planning exercises. However, if the devolution
of decision-making continues to proceed slowly and constrains the ability
of the RDC to control resource allocation, the potential impact of these
newly-installed systems and fund sources will be weak. In addition, the
influence and interests of political leaders in the RDC are magnified if
the capability for imposing more objective criteria in decision-making is
$mpaired. The chances for an inefficient allocation of resources are very
high. Later on, any inadequacies on the part of the RDC even if originally
stemming from the central government's reluctance to share more powers may
affect adversely future appropriations for the region. The primary essence
$n a decentralization scheme is the establishment of a strong regional ins-
titution that is capable of determining its own set of priorities based on
an assessment of regional needs and potentials, utilizing resources for
programs and projects consistent with these priorities and monitoring im-
plementation effectively. This should be the ultimate goal in institutional
development efforts.
With the requirement for a permanent planning machinery fulfilled by
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the creation of the RDC, the formulation and implementation of policies
directed towards regional development and industrialization could now be
given adequate institutional support. The RDCs, as part of their planning
function, have devised strategies for industrialization together with im-
plementing measures. With each region aiming for economic structural change
through an increasing emphasis on industry, the task of implementing the
industrial dispersal policy becomes more problematic inasmuch as every
region is unwilling to be left out in this policy. The RDC, as a body,
assumes a political role in demanding the inclusion of its region in this
nationwide effort. Its demands have been validated in its planning exercises.
However, within an interregional framework, efficiency requirements dictate
that only a few regions should be given priority. Thus some regions may lose
out when measures of comparative advantage are made. It is at this stage of
analysis where thorny issues regarding spatial equity and efficiency are
bound to arise and where the political and planning processes must interact
and resolve these issues before the substantive content of regional policies
is finalized.
I'' I 'I! '~IIIII~!I~U
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VI. The Regional Dispersal of 'Industries.
With the adoption of the industrial dispersal policy, various attempts
have been made to support this new policy in ongoing industrial development
schemes. Foremost among these is the amendment to the Board of Investments
(BOI) Investment and Export Incentives Acts which had originally been en-
acted without any explicit regard for spatial objectives. Other piecemeal
,measures have been likewise tried, but all these were basically adhoc res-
ponses and lacked any clear direction. Since then, more positive approaches
have been designed, specifically the Nationwide Industrial Estate Program
and the promotion of small and medium-scale industries.
In the ensuing discussions, industrial dispersal measures will be eva-
luated largely with respect to their stated goals. Based on the findings
in Chapter III, the potential effectiveness of these measures will similarly
be assessed insofar as identifying the factors of industrial location these
attempt to replicate. Furthermore their impact on interregional disparities
will be the primary consideration in the appraisal since data availability
limits us to this level of analysis. Nevertheless some qualitative assess-
ment on intraregional disparities and dispersal will be made, especially
$a the case of the small and medium-scale industries and, to a lesser extent,
the industrial estate program. Subsequently an interregional inventory of
resource endowments and comparative advantage for industrial location will
be conducted to provide a technical framework for the prioritization of the
regions for the industrial dispersal program. Finally the implications of
this prioritization exercise on equity and efficiency objectives and the
issues it raises will be related to the interplay between the planning and
political processes which determine the ultimate outcome for policy.
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A. Investment Incentives and Other Initial Measures.
In 1967 the Investment Incentives Act (IIA) , R.A. 5186, was passed
by the now defunct Congress of the Philippines. Railed as a milestone in
industrial policy, its primary objective is to stimulate economic activities
63/
which are preferred from the standpoint of the development program.- To
$mplement the law the BOI was immediately organized to administer the sys-
tem of incentives. In 1970 another bill, the Export Incentives Act (EIA),
R.A.6135, was introduced as a complement to the IIA and as an instrument
for the export promotion drive. The BOI prepares on an annual basis an
Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) and an Export Priorities Plan (EPP) which
list the preferred areas of investment that can avail of incentives by
*
registering with the BOI.
1. Inclusion of Industrial Policy in Incentives Schemes.
Originally the IIA did not include the regional dispersal of industries
as a criterion in the preparation of the IPP and in the evaluation of pro--
jects by the BOI. The major criteria used were economic viability, aggregate
employment effects and foreign exchange savings/earnings. The IIA was amen-
ded in response to the regional development objective in the national plan
*Under the IIA, industries may be registered as preferred, pioneer or non-
pioneer. Preferred industry is one that is included in the IPP while a
pioneer industry is either engaged in the manufacture of goods that have
not been or are not currently produced in the Philippines on a commercial
scale or which uses a manufacturing technique that is new and untried in
the country. Among the incentives given are: accelerated depreciation,
tax exemptions on imported capital equipment, tax red-ction for expansion
reinvestment, etc. For pioneer industries, tax allowances, capital gains
tax exemption and a few others are further granted. The EIA added to the
package of incentives by exempting exports from export taxes and providing
additional credits on export sales and excise taxes on inputs, etc.
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and Sec. 2 now states that investments shall be encouraged in pursuance
of a "planned, economically feasible and practicable dispersal of industries'
Inspite of this amendment, however, no new specific measures were instituted
to effect this additional objective; neither was there any move to opera-
tionalize it in project evaluation.
The EIA was also amended and two extra incentives were provided to put
more force to industrial dispersal. These are: 1) the deduction in taxable
income of an amount equal to the total cost of direct labor and local raw
materials used in the production of exports for the first five years after
registration, and 2) deduction from income taxes payable of an amount equal
to the cost and maintenance of necessary infrastructure works.
Although the IPP and the EPP have incorporated regional dispersal of
industries as one of their main objectives, the present incentive scheme
appears to be ineffective as a tool towards regional development. This can
be deduced from an analysis of the regional distribution of BOI-registered
$9ndustries throughout the country. (Tables 18 & 19). Clearly Southern Ta-
galog (Region IV) which includes the MMA still has the most number of re-
gistered projects, followed by Northern Mindanao which has the advantage
of the Maria Cristina Falls hydroelectric power and excellent ports location,
and then by Central Mindanao where industries are mostly resource-based.-6
For export industries Region IV accounts for more than 60 per cent of invest-
=ent. Even in recent periods, the dominance of Region IV has not been dimi-
*Data constraints do not permit a deeper analysis of regional distribution
before and after the inclusion of regional dispersal as a criterion since
available data is on a cumulative basis. Nevertheless the 1975 figures sup-
port strongly the contention regarding the ineffectiveness of the present
incentives scheme.
nished as evidenced by its large share of enterprises availing of incentives
in 1975.
Of late, there have been attempts by the BOI to correct its inadequa-
cies vis-a-vis the industrial dispersal policy. For instance, it includes
within its industrial priorities formula a factor to make industries located
outside the MMA obtain a favorable treatment. Other promotional measures
have been undertaken such as BOI regional seminars and an experimental re-
gional development program in Northern Mindanao. Moreover the BOI has tried
to make negotiations on the project approval before approval. But all these
have not induced a movement away from the MMA .
2. Ineffectiveness of Initial Measures.
65/Three reasons for these ineffectual moves have been advanced,- viz.F
1) in making the industrial priority plan, regional location is only one
of the numerous factors considered, 2) proposals for new industrial enter-
prises are critically dependent on the pattern of industrial protection
and gefneral economic policy which is biased towards the MMA, and 3) the
industrial priorities formula is not the crucial policy variable for indu-
cing regional dispersal of industries.
As described earlier, the main concerns in the preparation of the IPP
and the EPP are economic viability, employment generation and foreign ex-
change savings. Even with the incorporation of industrial dispersal, it is
still unclear how such a policy can be adequately supported in the IPP and
in the granting of incentives. This new policy may even conflict with other
national objectives in industrial development. It cannot always be asumed
that incentives aiming to steer development to particular regions will al-
ways contribute to national growth because resources may be diverted away
66/from areas of high return to areas of low return,-
3. Considerations for a Redesign of the Incentives Scheme.
In the design of an incentive scheme for industrial dispersal, several
important factors have to be considered. The degree of influence of incen-
tives on location decisions depends on the peculiar structure, e.g., cost,
factor intensity, etc. and requirements of the industry and on the relevance
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of the type of incentives to the location concerned.- Moreover the effect-
iveness varies over time, especially with situational changes in different
locations and general economic conditions. The effects of other regional
policies may alter the relative attractiveness of the regions which, in
turn, would require a modification in the type of appropriate incentives.
Lastly the possibility that firms do not always make rational decisions
cannot be ignored. Even.with the existence of incentives schemes, factors
other than incentives, i.e., infrastructure, transport cost advantages,
may prove to be more instrumental for encouragin dispersal. Much can be
learned from the country's industrial location experienne.
If incentives are to be successful in drawing industries away from the
1W04, they should create distortions, i.e., bring about situations different
from those that would result from the free play of market forces.-- General
economic and market conditions presently favor MMA because of the numerous
advantages in locating there. In view of this, the distortions that are
required to change the relative competitive position of regions in attrac-
ting industries need to be substantial in magnitude. Although much has been
said and written about the role of incentives, very little is precisely
known about the type and magnitude of distortions they create and to what
extent they can influence location decisions and induce a dispersal of
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industries. As the historical pattern of inadustrial location shows, even
without fiscal and financial incentives, industries have moved to certain
areas once they perceive bright profitability prospects in locating there.
It is also worthwhile reiterating that there may be adverse repercussions
on economic viability and employment generation if incentives encourage the
establishment of new enterprises on a wrong scale in unfavorable locations
producing higher operational costs. Certainly the proper role of incentives
in the industrial dispersal program deserves serious investigation before
an appropriate scheme is designed.
4. Other Initial Measures.
Other policies have been implemented to shift the balance of invest-
ments away from the MMA. A ban on industrial location within a 50-km. radius
of Manila, except for export industries, has been imposed. Also a Central
Dank circular has been issued, requiring financing institutions to allocate
75 per cent of their accumulated deposits in their branch offices to invest-
ment projects in their areas of operation. Similarly these two measures
did not work well. What has been observed is the tendency for new firms
to locate just outside the 50-km radius, pointing to the fact that the
attraction of the MMA due to its agglomeration economies still prevails.
An indiscriminate proliferation of export-oriented industries has also been
noted in the MMA. It is believed that many of these would possibly have
been established even if the Manila area had been closed to them.--/ The
possibility of loopholes in the classification of an export-oriented in-
dustry cannot be discounted. On the overall these observations point to the
continuing primacy of the MMA. While there have been spillover effects,
these have been confined to the neighboring provinces of Regions III and IV-A,
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a reflection of the extension of the MMA's dominance and sphere of influence.
The industrial growth in these two regions further worsens the spatial im-
balance in industrial development.
Meanwhile the impact of the Central Bank circular has not been encou-
raging. Bankers complain of inadequate investment demand in certain areas,
.eaving them with idle funds. The Central Bank also allows banks to comply
with the 75 per cent requirement through the purchase of Central Bank Cer-
tificates of Indebtedness (CBCIs) which are relatively attractive because
of tax-free interest payments and their use in meeting reserve requirements.
Besides these, there are difficulties in monitoring interregional flows of
funds within financial institutions.
The ineffectiveness of these early policies puts into question the
more relevant variables that can influence location decisions. It appears
that the present incentives by themselves do not suffice as instruments
for diverting investments away from present concentrations, specifically
the MA. The provision of basic infrastructures like electricity, water,
transport and communications, is very essential for location decisions
aside from natural advantages arising from proximity to raw materials,
labor and markets. A firm will usually prefer to locate near the MMA even
if it incurs high transport costs in acquiring inputs or distributing out-
put as long as it does not have to provide its own supporting facilities
and services. This is especially true for small and new firms which are more
dependent on the external economies of central location while large firms
are capable of internalizing these economies. While some exceptions to these
general observations can be cited, these have been supported by empirical
evidence, Of course the impact of government action, e.g., incentives,
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restraint systems, physical development programs, on location is sensitive
to the peculiar characteristics of the firm. Accordingly the government is
evaluating its policy instruments and is currently initiating different
approaches to disperse industries away from the MMA and into the regions.
Technidal Note: An Analysis of the Composition of BOI-Registered Projects.
Agri-based industrialization is a key element of the national deve-
lopment strategy. The BOI, through the IPP and the EPP, is tasked with
promoting the greater utilization of indigenous raw materials and the ab-
sorption of labor in industrial undertakings. Progress in this direction
will benefit the regions where the natural, agricultural and human resources
are abundant.
Among the BOI-registered projects under R.A. 5186, agri-based indus-
tries dominate, with almost half of the total number of projects. (Table 20).
These projects are also the most labor-intensive among a generally . capi-
tal-intensive group of industries. Capital intensity of industries is partly
attributable to the capital bias of incentives like accelerated depreciation,
tax-free importation of capital equipment, etc. Moreover industries which
were established during the import-substitution period are also eligible
for availment of incentives. Most industries which have registered with the
.0I are large firms so that on the average, investment per employee is about
140,000. However the capital-output ratio varies among types of projects,
with agri-based firms needing only about P30,000 for every job generated
while, for mining projects, the corresponding requirement is P230,000.
Export-oriented industries registered under R.A. 6135 are less capital-
intensive compared with those registered under R.A. 5186. (Table 21). On
the average, an investment of P45,000 generates one job. For the most
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capital-intensive, the mining projects, the investment requirement is P145,
000. Most export-oriented industries are engaged in chemical and metal pro-
jects, which together account for 75 per cent of total projects. Agri-based
industries account for only 17 per cent. In all types of projects registered
under both R.A. 5186 and R.A. 6135, Region IV which includes the MMA has
the largest share.
Industrial investments generated by the BOI incentives schemes are
increasingly linked to the natural resource base of the country. Typical
of agri-based activities are grain and fruit processing, wood production,
livestock, fishing, etc. Many projects have also been set up to extract and
process mineral reserves of copper, nickel, cement and a few others. Des-
pite the increased backward linkages to the resource base, the industrial
concentration in the MMA still continues. Except for those which are re-
source-based, most industries prefer location in. the 4MA, an indication
perhaps of the critical dependence on the pattern of industrial protection
and general economic policy which is considered biased towards the MMA.
The industrial structure that has developed in the past ten years is
a marked improvement from the import-dependent manufacturing activities
promoted by import-substitution in the 1950s and 1960s. The indigenous
resources of the country are being utilized more in industrial enterprises.
However the degree of capital intensity is still not reflective of the
country's factor endowments. Finally, with regards to regional distribution,
the tendency for conglomeration in the MMA and its neighboring regions has
remained unchanged.
B. 'The Natidmnride-Industrial'Estate Progrem.
A major ongoing program in support of the regional dispersal of
-116-
industries is the Nationwide lIdustrial Estate Program (NIEP). Based on a
study project undertaken by an interagency group in 1975-76, a two volume
report was prepared. The report contains recommendations pertaining to:
1) potential sites for industrial estates in the different regions (with
at least on in every region), 2) the possible industry mix in each estate,
3) the phasing of implementation, 4) management of the program, and 5) in-
Vestment requirements.
Rationale for the Industrial Estate Approach.
The estabishment of industrial estates represents an approach to in-
dustrial development whereby sites and services are offerred to prospective
enterprises. In addition technical assistance, training, common services
and incentives may also be provided to locating fimrs. It is considered to
be a more efficient use of government resources inasmuch as infrastructure
facilities are concentrated in a particular site, making the area more con-
ducive to industrial location. It is expected to pave the way for a rational
pattern of land use and for the development of urban centers. Ultimately
it is anticipated that the establishment of an industrial estate will pro-
vide a strong stimulus to the economy of a region, not only within the
$mmediate vicinity of the estate but to other parts as well, by inducing
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the emergence of functionally linked economic activities.---
The success of an industrial estate rests on its ability to create
external economies through the concentration of firms and services. Accor-
dingly, in the site selection process, preference was given to areas where
other services like housing, schools, transport, etc. are already available.
This is consistelt with the objective of optimizing the use of investment
resources. Moreover it obviates the need for starting from a very undeveloped
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state of physical development. Looking at the economic criteria (Table 22),
it is no wonder that the selected sites are in relatively developed urban
areas with a high level of existing service and facility availability. It
is duly recognized that these are the most efficient locations within the
region since industries are not likely to locate in areas without some mini-
mum level of basic services required for profitable operations.
2. Features of Selected Sites for Industrial Estates.
The selected regional sites and relevant details about the proposed
industrial estates are presented in Tables 23 and 24. It can be noted that
15 industrial estates are programmed for implementation from 1978 to 1990
(Phase I) and another 8 estates from 1980-2000. An estimated P1060.7 million
and P800.9 million are required for the program in Phases I and II, respec-
tively. In simple terms, an average of one industrial estate with a project
cost of about FL70 million will be established every year up to 1990. Addi-
tionally most proposed estates are relatively large, based on the area pro-
posed in the study, although they are still smaller than the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) and the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate (Region X) pro-
jects which cover 1600 hectares and 3000 hectares, respectively.
3. Some Potential Difficulties.
a. Capital Constraints.
Looking at the features of the NIEP, the question that immediately
comes to mind is the feasibility of the plan with regards to actual imple-
mentation and construction, Considering the experiences of the BEPZ and
the PRIVIDEC industrial estates, it is difficult to imagine how such a plan
can materialize. The BEPZ required six years (1972-78) to implement the
first two phases, with a third phase programmmed for construction up to
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1982. The PRIVIDEC started planning in 1975; it is now only partially de-
veloped and complete development is expected to take a total of 18 years.
Furthermore the financial requirements of the NIEP are huge relative to
the government's financial capacity. While it is contemplated that the local
governments and the private sector will actively participate in the deve-
loped of the industrial estate, the burden of financing most of the project
cost requirements still falls on the government, either through subsidies
or loans. It should be pointed out that the two existing industrial estates
managed to attract industries because the government was able to allocate
sufficient funds for the conversion of the sites into attrative locations.
In contrast the present NIEP may strain government finances or result in
a dilution of resources.
At this point it may' be proper to assess different alternatives for
government participation in industrial estate development in order to con-
serve scarce resources. The first alternative is to reduce the current plan
requirements by establishing a set of priorities consistent with the re-
gional priorities in the overall industrial dispersal Program. (This will
be discussed in a later section which will deal with a framework for prio-
ritization.) The other alternative is to explore the possibility of indus-
*
trial areas or industrial zones in lieu of industrial estates in cases
where such a possibility merits serious consideration.
* Industrial estate - a tract of land which is subdivided and developed
according to a comprehensive plan for the use of a community of industrial
firms.
Industrial area - offers improved sites an an incentive to the establish-
ment of industries of all types and sizes, as differentiated from industrial
estate,
Industrial zone - part of urban or suburban center restricted to indus-
trial use, on which no improvements are made.
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Instead of undertaking full scale development of sites, i.e., cons-
tructing an industrial estate, it may be worthwhile and less financially
burdensome to regulate the participation of government according to the
sites' present level of "attractiveness" for industries, the industrial
mix and resources available to prospective firms, the degree of involvement
or interest of the private sector or local governments, etc. As the expe-
rience with Iligan City (Maria Cristina Falls power project) shows, indus-
tries are quick enough to capitalize on a certain resource provided by
government. There may be certain areas among the proposed sites which, as
they exist, are already preferred by industries and for which only some
improvements, e.g., infrastructure, or incentives need be granted in order
to encourage location. In these cases the feasibility of industrial areas
or zones appears promising.
In the site selection stage, more favorable treatment was already given
to areas with existing facilities and services. Besides the sites are in,
or very near, major urban centers such that even with a moderate degree of
government inducement, they are at present the most probable choices for
location in the regions. Aside from these considerations, most industries
expected to locate in these estates are large firms which are capable of
and willing to supply some services once an industrial area or zone has
been set aside for them. Industrial estates are more important for small
industries in view of their limited capital resources. Thus one may question
the rationale for excessively subsidizing large firms which are financially
equipped to pay direct and indirect development costs. Very often government
policy unduly favors large industry even when profitability outlook is good.
The rather ambitious plan of putting up one industrial estate in every
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region of the counLry is a reflection of the ambivalence and indecision
of policy makers in determining priority regions for the industrial dis-
persal program. They probably fear that any decision on industrial estates
fatoting a particular region will almost always have political consequences
and, reminiscent of the regional development authorities in the 1960s, will
raise clamor for equal treatment. The present industrial estate program is
an attempt at following the path of least resistance. While the planning
process may recognize the need for establishing priorities to effectively
$mplement the industrial dispersal policy, it is inevitably exposed to the
adverse repercussions which any regional priority setting might entail.
Political pressures enter into the planning process which has to make some
adjustments in an effort to gain political acceptability for its proposals.
However this often results in each region gaining a share of the develop-
1nent program, in this case the industrial estate program. If such an ambi-
tious program is followed, the danger of a dilution of resources is imminent.
Otherwise those regions which can exert greater influence on the national
government during the implementation stage will be accorded priority in
resource allocation regardless of the requirements which the planning pro-
cess might establish for an efficient implementation of the policy. There-
fore the political process opts for equal treatment for the regions in a
nationwide program such as the NIEP.
b. Intraregional Imbalance.
In addition to the issue of interregional balance, the establishment
of industrial estates will have repercussions on intraregional equity. As
was mentioned earlier, the proposed sites are in relatively developed parts
of the regions. While the intent is not to criticize the urban location
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bias of industrial estates (since these selected sites may well be the
most feasible locations), the probable consequences on intraregional dis-
parities have to be identified beforehand since these affect the rate of
rural to urban migration. It is expected that the establishment of an indus-.
trial estate in a region will stimulate the economy into a process of sus-
tained growth, similar to the role of growth centers. This stimulus may be
limited however if the estate's industries are not functionally linked to
the rest of the local economy in terms of labor supply, raw materials,
interindustry connections, etc. Even worse the industrial estate may just
become an enclave. It is therefore essential that measures aimed at diffu-
sing the growth emanating from the industrial estate be explored.
Analyzing the possible composition of industries in the various planned
estates, some semblance of agricultural linkages is evident. Nevertheless
most proposed industries like iron and steel, appliances, chemicals and
other footloose industries, appear to have very little potential linkages
with the regional economies. Their importance is more at the national rather
than the regional level. In these industries, modern technical skills are
often demanded; the market is largely national in orientation; and lastly,
capital intensity is high. While it may be premature to make any firm state-
ments without any clear picture of employment patterns, some possibilities
can be roughly outlined. Heavy industries generally tend to rely on imported
inputs. Moreover, because of the high technical requirements, the labor
force is likely to be brought from outside the region. Even if policy guide-
lines encourage the hiring of more local labor, it is doubtful whether the
available skills in the community will match the firmsi requirements. If
firms in the estate do not provide employment opportunities to the indigenous
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population but instead brings its cwn workers, the impact on regional deve-
lopment cannot be substantial. The hypothesis is that as output increases
from the industrial estate, incomes rise correspondingly. The implicit as-
sumption is that a greater share of output is retained in the region as
salaries and wages to the local people. However if the effect on employment
generation for the local population is minimal, a growth in the regional
product will not necessarily mean an improvement in regional incomes.
Furthermore, because of the higher standards of living of the new "residents"
there will be pressure on wages and prices to rise, thereby affecting ad-
versely the original local population. It is also not clear to what extent
$ubcontracting possibilities with existing industries outside the estate
was considered, if at all, in the determination of the industry mix. Through
interindustry complementation, the estate induces a wider spread of multi-
plier effects to the local economy.
C. The Promotion of Small and Medium-Scale Industries.
The promotion of small and medium-scale industries (SMSIs) is a vital
component of the country's industrial development strategy. SMSIs are
considered most adaptable to rural areas because they are basically agri-
based and labor intensive operations whose production can be oriented to-
wards small rural markets. Their promotion is also based on a realistic
assessment of the managerial, technical and financial resources available
in these areas. Thus in June 1974 the Commission on Small and Medium-
Scale Industries under the Department of Industry (DI) was created under
F.D, No. 488 "to promote, assist and develop small and medium-scale indus-
tries, particularly in the rural areas."' This body would be responsible
for coordinating the various programs of other government agencies.
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1. Programs for the Dv ment of SMSIs.
Various programs have been initiated in support of the development of
SMSIs, encompassing financing, technical assistance, marketing and other
aspects. Special financing progrmas are administered by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and other financial institutions; loan gua-
rantees are being extended under the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund
(IGLF); technical assistance in the preparation of pre-investment feasibi-
lity studies is being rendered for free by the Medium and Small-Scale
Industries Coordinated Action Program (MASICAP); management services can
be availed from the Small Business Advisory Center under the DI; market
and marketing information is available from the Trade Assistance Center
of the Department of Trade. In addition cottage industries under the Natio-
nal Cottage Industries Development Authority (NACIDA) enjoy tax exemption
privileges, aside from financial and technical assistance. Meanwhile man-
power training schemes are being conducted by the Regional Manpower Train-
ing Center. A nationwide rural electrification drive is being implemented
with the formation of rural electric cooperatives.
SMSIs may prove crucial to the successof the industrial decentralization
program because promotion activities are being undertaken up to the local
level in the different regions. If more industrial activity is generated
in the rural areas, excess labor can be mobilized for productive purposes,
aside from stimulating increased agricultural output. This hopefully will
raise income levels and arrest the heavy rural to urban migration.
2.- ConstrAints-to -the'Growth of SMSIs.
Unfortunately, despite the ongoing promotional activities, there are
numerous constraints impeding the growth of SMSIs. Firstly, even now that
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lending programs are specifically directed to SMSIs, the structure and
procedures of financing institutions are ill-adapted to the needs and pecu-
liarities of small investors. In evaluating loan applications, credit
worthiness is measured principally in terms of collateral requirements
rather than the viability of the project. Very often, small firms are unable
to comply with collateral requirements. Banks tend to discriminate against
small loans because administrative and processing costs are just the same
as those incurred in dealing with larger loans. Also the maze of complex
bank procedures baffles small investors and lengthens unnecessarily the
loan processing time. In many cases loans have to be referred to head of-
fices for final approval.
Even when SMSIs do get started, recurrent problems in marketing,
production, e.g., quality control, raw materials procurement, etc., and
general management place considerable stress on the operations of these
fimrs and hamper efficiency. Without any external assistance, these pro-
blems may prove insurmountable and eventually cause the shutdown of small
companies.
3. SMSIs and Industrial Estate Development.
As mentioned in the preceding section, the promotion of SMSIs can be
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related to the establishment of industrial estates in the regions.- The
location of small firms in an estate greatly facilitates the provision of
some of the services under the ongoing promotional programs. For example,
the extension of technical assistance, the processing of loan applications,
the holding of training programs and the sharing of common facilities
become easier if the firms are concentrated in a particular location. In
the site selection, however, the need of SMSIs for proximity to the market
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must be given more attention. In large industrial estates, subcontracting
agreements entered into between big firms in the estate and SMSIs outside
the estate will establish linkages and spread the benefits and growth ge-
nerated by the industrial estate.
4. Initial Impact on Industrial Dispersal.
Notwithstanding the difficulties facing the development of SMSIs, the
various government programs have generated a substantial amount of invest-
ment, judgin from the number of firms given financial and technical assist-
ance. (Tables 25-28). Their impact on the regional dispersal of industries
has been vsried. MASICAP-assisted projects are distributed more evenly
throughout the country due to the deployment of field teams in all regions.
Most projects are engaged in agricultural and manufacturing lines of acti-
vity. Meanwhile DBP's performance has been impressive in terms of amount
of loans. However these loans have been concentrated in Regions III, IV
and IV-A, although a slight but still encouraging dispersion has taken
place in recent years. In contrast, when the number of loans is used as a
basis, the percentage share of loans to Manila-based firms has decreased
significantly but some of these loans have been big. Similarly for IGLF
projects, the distribution has been in favor of the MMA, its neighboring
regions, and a few years back, Region I, with these regions accounting for
60-70 per cent of total projects. Some plausible explanations for this
situation is the procedure of referring all loan applications to the IGLF
review committee based in Manila and the limited regional dissemination
of information regarding the loan program,
5 -A Reassessment of SMSIs and Rural Industrialization.
It has been observed that these new small investments are still largely
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found in urban areas of the regions, in direct contrast to the original
intentions for the promotion of SSIs. Actually this should not be very
surprising when one analyzes income and expenditure patterns in rural areas.
While the rural sector represents a sizeable source of potential demand,
levels of income here are much lower than those prevailing in urban areas.
Moreover the incidence of poverty is higher, even after employing different
*
poverty thresholds. for urban and rural areas, More than half of rural fa-
milies can be considered as poor. (Table 29). In some regions like Regions
V, IX and X is more widespread with two-thirds of rural families below the
assumed poverty line.
Looking at expenditure patterns for rural families, about 60 per cent
of income is spent for food, beverage and tobacco. Less than 20 per cent
goes to expenses for clothing, footwearhousing, household furnishings and
operations.- It is in this latter category of expenditures toward which
the production of SMSIs can be directed. When income rise, the proportion
spent for these items increase correspondingly. But: at present levels of
rural incomes, the markets for SMSIs in rural areas are limited.
Even granting the existence of small rural markets, the location of
SMSIs in rural areas is hindered by other constraints. An important one is
the basic deficiency in rural infrastructure. Due to the dispersed popula-
tion pattern in rural areas, the provision of facilities and services
*Strictly speaking we cannot just compare income levels in urban and rural
areas without accounting for differences in prices, standards of living
and other factors. Moreover it may be difficult to account accurately for
income in kind which is a significant part of rural income. Under-reporting
is another problem.
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entails high costs. Hence many sections of rural areas are unserved by
infrastructure. So-called rural centers in most towns have not reached
levels of physical development that could induce the location of even sim-
ple industries. Besides these factors, the financial system has not really
reached far-flung areas because of financial and manpower limitations. Most
government entities pursuing the different SMSI-related programs are ope-
rating in urban areas and are generally unable to extend assistance to rural
areas. Finally studies in many developing countries indicate the slow pro-
cess of entrepreneural development in rural areas._Z'
At this point in time, one tends to view with skepticism the feasi-
bility of rural industrialization. Efficiency considerations preclude a
more dispersed intraregional location pattern. Furthermore the present
levels of rural incomes and the limited supply of basic infrastructure
militate against the location of more SMSIs in the rural sector of the
regions. Essentially rural industrialization is a long term goal that is
predicated on attaining a certain level of economic development in the
rural areas. Policies to support agriculture and rural development need to
be given more emphasis and the promotion of SMSIs can be integrated with
these efforts.
D. An Analysis of the Resource Endowments of the Regions. (A Framework for
Ptioritization for the Industrial Dispersal Program)
The regions are at different stages of their growth path; some are
basically agricultural while others are relatively well-advanced in their
industrialization. Nonetheless every region is presently aiming for an ex-
panded role of industry as a means of transforming its economic structure
and accelerating regional growth, However, as mentioned at the beginning
-128-
of this study, industrial decentralization is not and cannot be interpreted
as the simultaneous industrialization of all regions because of differences
in basic resource endowments, the need to establish agglomeration economies
in certain areas, and other constraints related to implementation. A general
issue, therefore, surrounding the goal of spatial equity via the regional
dispersal of industries is the extent to which industrial expansion should
be promoted and be a priority in the development strategy of each region.
More broadly this encompasses the issue of phasing in the implementation
of the industrial dispersal policy.
In planning a strategy for industrial decentralization, a selection
or prioritization process within an interregional framework has to be under-
taken to determine the regions where industries should be dispersed and
which industries should occupy a major role in the region's growth process.
*
In this connection, this section presents an analysis of the resource
endowments of the regions which can serve as the basis of an initial appro-
ximation of the relative levels of need among the regions for the expansion
of non-agricultural activities. It will be largely on this basis that re-
gional priorities will be set. To the extent possible this analysis will
be supplemented by a qualitative evaluation of comparative advantage for
industrial production.
The rationale behind the resource assessment is that traditionally the
regions' thrust has been on agricultural development. However regions vary
in their agricultural resource base and the extent to which this has been
*This section is based on a study entitled "The Natural Resource Base of
the Regions" prepared in 1976-77 by the author and the members of the Agri-
culture, Natural Resources and Rural Development Sector under the NEDA-UNDP/
ITRD Regional Planning Assistance Project.
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exploited. Thus agriculture can be a basis for economic expansion only up
to a certain point, beyond which the region must resort to alternative
sources of growth. Now that the national economy is moving towards a period
of intensified industrialization, it is necessary to verify which regions
have used up their agricultural resource potential and those which have not,
in order to establish regional priorities for industrialization. Moreover
if regional incomes are to converge, lagging regions must grow.: faster than
those relatively advanced. Rapid growth can come either from agricultural
and traditional sources or non-agriculture-based approaches. A region's
scope for agricultural expansion and employment generation is measurable
by relating land, irrigation and other resource potentials with projections
of labor force. For regions with restricted agricultural possibilities,
non-agricultural, e.g., industrial, expansion remains as the sole alterna-
tive for accelerating regional economic growth and raising regional incomes,
probably in conjunction with some form of migration policy or resettlement
program to encourage population transfers to areas with better economic
prospects. In addition to agriculture, fishing, forestry and mineral re-
sources can supply the inputs to industrial activities. The experience of
a number of regions like Southern Mindanao and the Ilocos confirms the con-
tribution of these resources to industrialization.
1. The Agriculture Resource Base of the Regions.
a. Agricultural Land and Irrigation Potential.
The extent of unused agricultural land and unexploited irrigation
potential constitute two major dimensions of the agricultural resource base.
Unused agricultural land offers opportunities for expansion at the extensive
margin, while irrigation potential represents scope for intensification.
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Map 3 - Population Density by Region, 1975
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Estimates of land still available to agriculture and unexploited irrigation
potential are presented on a region by region basis.(Tables 30 & 31) Refer
to Appendix for supporting tables and projection methodology for land uses
for 1975 and 2000, from which agricultural land estimates were derived.
Regional estimates reveal that Regions II and IV in Luzon have the
greatest potential at both the intensive and extensive margins of cultiva-.
tion. The Cagayan River Basin, the largest in the country, can serve as the
focus of agricultural production in Region II because of its vast fertile'
lands and enormous irrigation potential. Likewise Regions X, XI and XII in
Mindanao, because of the presence of the Cotabato and Agusan River Basins
which cut across these three regions, have considerable scope for irrigat
tion. There is also modest scope for expansion of the land area under cul-
tivation. The regions of the Visayas have limited scope for further irriga-
tion development and restricted possibilities for bringing more land into
agriculture, except for the island of Samar. For Regions III and VI, which
have used up most of their irrigation potential, possibilities lie in
rehabilitation of silted irrigation systems and protection of watersheds.
Region III, which has the highest output per person in agriculture, is
the most developed region in an agricultural sense, having 41 per cent of
its cultivated area under irrigation. On the other hand, Region VII is il-
lustrative of a region which has realized much of its potential in terms
of land and irrigation, but which has stabilized at a lower level, with
output per person in agriculture less than half that in Region III. This
is a reflection of differences in basic resource endowments since Region VII
has only 3 per cent of its cultivated land under irrigation, and only a 2
per cent share of national irrigation potential (Table 32).
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On the basis of agricultural land and irrigation potential, the agri-
cultural resource base of the regions can be characterized in the following
way:
High potential - fully exploited : Regions III, VI
High potential - not fully exploited : Regions II, IV, X, XI, XII
Moderate potential - fully exploited : Regions I, VII
Moderate potential - not fully exploited : Regions V,,VIII, IX
b, Soil and Climate.
The preceding two dimensional analysis oversimplifies the meaning of
the agricultural resource base which should also include climatic and soil
factors as additional components. It needs to be recognized that the unused
agricultural land potential in most regions will be of lower productivity
than that currently being farmed.
It is only in Regions II, IV-A and VIII where there are still areas of
unused land falling under ABCD soil types. Other regions have used up this
type of land and cultivation has extended into intermediate land (M soil
type). With the exception of Region VIII the unused agricultural land in
the regions consists mostly of M and X soil types. Also slope considerations
limit the possibilities for which land can be used. (Table 33).
'Rainfall distribution and typhoon frequency affect the exploitation of
the agricultural resource base. (Table 34). In relatively dry areas like
Region I, unused agricultural land offers scope for intensified livestock
grazing while in regions with even distribution of rainfall, e.g., Mindanao,
the variety of crops that can be grown is wider. Interseasonal water storage
in regions with distinct dry and wet seasons, e.g., Regions I, III, should
be given consideration in harnessing irrigation potential. Likewise, in
-133-
typhoon-frequented areas like Regions V and VIII, flood control is a pre-
condition for maintaining the productive form of agricultural land.
c. Agricultural Technology.
Regional variations in crop yields which cannot be atributed to dif-
ferences in climate and soil characteristics seem to indicate regional
variation in the rate of adoption of new technology or on the impact of new
technology. In rice production, for example, average yields of irrigated
ricelands are 40 per cent higher in Region III than in Region VIII. Corn
yields per hectare in Region XII are more than twice the level in Region
VII,.It appears that the impact of technology var.es among regions precisely
because of differences in resource endowments. For instance, high yielding
variety (RYV) technology has benefitted primarily regions with extensive
irrigated areas while rainfed ricelands ahev not received attention in
technology development.
d. Population vis-a-vis Land Availability.
Differences in population/farmland ratios and farm sizes between re-
gions are quite significant. (Refer back to Table 32). Farm sizes are smal-
lest and population/farmland ratios are highest in Regions I and VII. Larger
farm sizes and lower population/farmland ratios predominate in the Mindanao
regions. Over time continuing interregional migration within agriculture
will tend to equalize these differences subject to land capability variations
related to soil fertility and irrigation potential. A wider distribution
of land through land reform, resettlement or planned migration schemes is
more conducive to a fuller expl6itation of this natural resource.
2. Fisheries, Fdrestry and Mineral Resources.
In inland fisheries, about 176,000 hectares of fishponds and 530,000
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hectares of freshwater and mangrove swamps are available for development
in the country. Regions VI, IV and III have the largest shares for the
former while Regions VIII, IX and X account for almost 50 per cent of the
latter. (Table 35). In commercial fishing, meanwhile, it is estimated that
around 125 million hectares or bout three-fourths of the country's marine
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waters still has to be explored.-- At present, the seas of Sulu, Palawan
and Visayas, which are close to Regions IV, VI, VII and IX are among the
country's major fishing grounds. It is expected that fishing effort in
Manila Bay, the Visayas Sea and Lingayen Gulf are approaching the point of
maximum sustainable yield. Conversely the fishing gorunds around Palawan
and the islands of Region IX have substantial potentials which are far
from being fully exploited.
The Philippines has considerable forest resources, with 8 million hec-
tares of commercial forests having an estimated timber reserves of about
1,5 billion cubic meters. Luzon has the largest forest land area but the
commercial forests in Mindanao contain 20 per cent more timber reserves,
thus making the latter area more attractive for exploitation. Almost three-
fourths of the country's total timber reserves are found in five regions
with Cagayan Valley and Southern Tagalog having 17 per cent each while Nor-
thern Mindanao, Southern Mindanao and Central Mindanao's shares are 13,
12 and 11 per cent, respectively. (Table 36).
Most of the commercial forest lands are already licensed. In the Min-
danao regions practically all commercial forest lands are under concession.
Nearly threerfourths of the national log supply come from Mindanao, most
of which are for export markets.
With regards to minerals, the major known metallic minerals in the
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Philippines are copper, nick.y'e, gold and iron ore. Small amounts of zinc,
chromite, lead, manganese and other minerals are also know to exist. In the
case of copper, there are roughly 1.76 billion tons of copper deposits, of
which 40 per cent is in Western Visayas, 24 per cent in Central Visayas,
and 18 per cent in Ilocos. The latter two regions are currently the two
main producers of copper concentrates. (Table 37).
Nickle reserves are estimated at about 3,140 million tons. About 64
per cent of these is located in Nrrothern Mindanao, where a newly-built
nickel plant is already in operation, while the bulk of the remainder is
in Soutthern Tagalog and Southern Mindanao.
The total reserves of iron ore amount to about 2,820 million tons,
mostly found in Mindanao. However ore reserves have a relatively low iron
content of 40 per cent. For non-metallic minerals, cement raw materials
constitute the bulk. Most of the known reserves are in Southern Tagalog
and Bicol but other deposits are also found in the Ilocos, Northern Minda-
nao and Southern Mindanao where cement plants are located.
3. Implications for Regional Priorities in Industrial Dispersal.
On the basis of the two dimensional analysis presented earlier, the
magnitude of each region's potential for agricultural expansion is indicated.
To further snbstantiate the process of determining the priority regions
$n the industrial dispersal program, the population and employment dimen-
sions shall be included in the analysis.
Estimates of employment potential of farmland expansion have been
nade, after which these are compared with projections of additional labor
force in each region from 1975-2000. (Table 38). Approximately 3.4 million
jobs can be generated through the utilization of the unused agricultural
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land and irrigation potential of the regions. Agriculture will be major
provider of employment to jobseekers in Regions II, VIII and XII, while
in most regions, especially Regions III, IV-A, VII, X, .XI and, of course,
the MMA, entrants to the labor force will have to find work mainly in non-
agricultural activities. These latter regions also happen to be the most
industrialized or, at least, account for a sizeable portion of national
industrial output. It is very plausible that their present levels of indus-
trialization was necessitated precisely by resource constraints in agri-
culture, Needless to say, they have high per capita output. At the other
extreme, the regions where there is still substantial scope for agricultural
expansion are among the poorest in the country.
If the regions' development strategies are dictated primarily by re-
source endowments, the poor regions where agricultural potential is still
considerable may lose ground vis-a-vis the other regions. The large part
of land expansion will occur mainly in steeply sloping marginal lands of
poor soil quality. Consequently agricultural productivity will be low un-
less efforts can be directed toward increasing the productivity of these
lands. Studies-5 show that in lands of this type presently under culti-
vation, land productivity is low and labor requirements are high, hence,
most-'farmers of these lands belong to the rural poor. In upland farming,
there are low gross margins per hectare because poor accessiblity leads to
low farm gate prices or high transport costs. On the other hand, regions
growing along industrial lines will be able to raise incomes faster on the
presumption that industry ahs higher productivity.
We are faced with a serious dilemma regarding the selection of the
priority regions for the industrial dispersal program. If the scope for
IIII M IIII JI
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agricultural expansion shall serve as the primary basis for selecting prio-
rity regions, then the presently industrialized and more developed regions
will be given preference because of their limited agricultural expansion
potential. On the other hand, the poor regions will continue along present
lines of activity which generate only small returns. The likely consequence
of the prioritization, scheme for industrial dispersal is wide differentials
in rates of growth in favor of the more developed regions, thereby leading
to a divergence in regional levels of development. This runs directly
counter to the main objective of the industrial dispersal policy - spatial
equity.
Thus it can be counter-argued that resource constraints should not be
the major criterion for prioritization. If spatial equity is the objective
of industrial dispersal, then the present levels of regional income should
be adopted as dominant criterion and, therefore, the poor regions must be
given utmost priority. Intuitively this may make more sense. However the
conditions necessary for industrial location are usually lacking or even
non-existent in poor underdeveloped areas. For example, Regions II and VIII,
due to lack of an industrial base and infrastructures may not be able to
support any large scale enterprises and to have a competitive edge over
other regions in industrial production. Unless the government is willing
and able to mount a massive effort to transform underdeveloped areas into
attractive industrial sites, priorities set on this basis will have to be
modified in order to give industrial decentralization a better chance at
success. Intertemporal priorities should reflect the immediate, inter-
mediate and long run objectives of industrial dispersal policy.
At this stage of pursuing the strategy of industrial decentralization,
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what appears to be a more realistic short term goal is to counteract the
gravitation towards Manila rather than to industrialize the poor regions.
This can be achieved by strengthening present industrial centers in the
regions so that they can serve as countermagnets. The more logical candi-
dates for such a function are Cebu City (Region VII), Cagayan de Oro (Re-
gion X), Davao (Region XI), Iloilo (Region VI), just to mention the major
ones. Fortunately these are located in regions with restricted agricultural
apoortunities where the need for generation of non-agricultural employment
is most evident. Hence some complications are avoided becuase of this coin-
cidence. In the long-run, a more dispersed pattern of location will be
sought and industrial development in every region shall be the ultimate
objective. In essence the phasing of the industrial dispersal strategy
reflects a trade-off between a certain level of inequity in exchange for
some efficiency gains.
This phasing of the implementation of industrial dispersal is not
without any concomitant bad consequences. Aside from forcing a reconsidera-
tion and moderation of spatial equity objectives, it is possible that re-
gional disparities may even deteriorate in the short-run even if other
industrial centers are built up. Of course the outcome will be determined
partly by how these new growth points can establish linkages with neigh-
boring provinces or regions in order to diffuse the benefits of industria-
lization. In addition, this will depend on complementary measures to ensure
that industrial expansion in these centers is at the expense of the MMA
rather than the other regions. The application of restraint systems, e.g.,
disincentives, in the MMA therefore becomes an immediate requisite in order
to set in motion centrifugal forces. Moreover policy initiatives directed
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towards the welfare of the regions which are, in the interim, not accorded
priority in the industrial dispersal program, are crucial for influecing
the direction of this outcome regarding divergence in regional incomes. In
order to reduce the probability of a deterioration of regional priorities,
strategies specific to the needs of the poor regions become critically
important. Subsumed in the prediction of divergence between agricultural
and industrial regions is that industry has higher productivity. Accordingly
programs that enhance the productivity of agriculture or policies that
improve the terms of trade for the agriculture sector will reduce divergence
effects.
After the development of alternative industrial location and a sus-
tained parallel thrust in agriculture, the prospeces for achieving spatial
equity become more promising. An appropriate policy mix aimed at supporting
a wider participation of the regions in the industrial dispersal drive
must be formulated. With the growing proportion of the rural labor force
seeking jobs outside agriculture, rural development efforts must be in-
creasingly concerned with the generation of off-farm employment and have
to be integrated with industrialization strategy.
Concluding Remarks.
The preceding analysis is based on a combination of spatial equity
and efficiency objectives which the planning process deems appropriate for
effective implementation of the industrial dispersal policy. However the
controversial implications of the prioritization exercise will be subject
to scrutiny by the political process. In fact, because of the attempt to
resolve the conflict between equity and efficiency made by the planning
process, it will be pitted against the political process. Their divergent
p l il'lIll ll li l l 1
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views on the relative importance of these objectives are amplified in the
prioritization scheme.
The inclination of the political process towards equity can be surmised
from the industrial estate program. As was stressed earlier, this ambitious
program reflects the apprehension of policy makers in setting priority
regions for industrial dispersal because of the possible political conse-
quences. It can be even asserted that the plan for establishing at least
one estate in every region rather than a combination of industrial estates
in some regions and industrial areas or zones in others (or none at all)
is an attempt at avoiding these consequences. Hence equal treatment is
resorted to since it offers less politically adverse effects. But by such
a move, efficiency requirements (generally favored by the planning process)
are compromised. Some regions do not have the comparative advantage for
industrial location nor are their present level of need for industrializa-
tion very pressing. Furthermore, even in the use of scarce resources,
investments in industrial estates may be inefficient if,all that is required
to convert an area into an attractive manufacturing location, is the pro-
vision of land plus some physical improvements, i.e., an industrial area.
In other words, the social costs of excess investments will be greater
than the marginal benefits which can be derived from such investments.
The preference for equal treatment as opposed to prioritization is
linked to the issue of phasing in the implementation of the industrial
dispersal policy. The political process is not agreeable to phasing since
it views this particular policy in isolation. Regions are unwilling to
make sacrifices now in the hope that programs for their benefit will be
initiated later on. Uncertainty about the future forces the political
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process to take advantage of present opportunities, in this case, the indus-
trial estate program. It cannot rely on other future policies for which
there is no assurance of their sharing in the benefits. Hence, at each
stage of policy implementation, the tendency is for equal participation
even when the planning process recognizes the need for priority setting
as a means for effective implementation. Only when the planning process
Overcomes the objections of the political process can it impose its own
requirements and preferences.
Assuming that there are no. priorities set and, if at each stage of
implementation, equal treatment is given, a dilution of resources and inef-
ficiency in application will most likely occur. Even upon the construction
of an industrial estate, some regions may not be able to make a significant
contribution to national industrial growth because of the inherent defi-
ciencies of decision-making processes. The absence of priorities exposes
the implementation to political pressures during the resource allocation
stage.'The huge financial requirements of a proposed program based on equal
participation will inevitably force a prioritization in fund releases but
this will be determined more on the grounds of political expediency.
Table 18 Project Cost and Employment by Region for BOI-Registered Firms
RA 5186
(July 1968 - June 1976)
Project Cost Employment
(in millions) -
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon
IV Southern Tagalog
V Bicol
VISAYAS
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
15,699
2,563
45
202
3,560
82
113
1,203
607
111,164
22,265
1,149
3,572
33,225
3,587
2,383
13,462
2,396
RA 6135
(1970 - June 1976)
Project Cost Employment
(in millions)
2,121
10
129
1,572
47,167
254
4,257
38,930
189
448
IX
X
XI
XII
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
1 Includes Metropolitan Manila
Source: Board of Investments
Region
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
270
4,040
765
2,250
2,575
12,543
9,100
4,907
11
50
303
166
1,631
1,292
1w
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Regional Distribution of Projects Approved by the
Board of Investment, 1975 (Percentages)
9th Investment
Priorities
Plan (RA 5186)Region
7th Export
Priorities
Plan
(RA 6135)
Population
Distribution
1975
PHILIPPINES
I
II
III
IV + IV-A
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
Source: Board of Investment, (BOI) 1976
Table 19
100.0100.0
4.4
1.5
6.8
43.7
0.9
100.0
7.8
4.6
6.1 10.3
23.679.0
1.3
1.6
3.2
3.2
6.8
2.4
3.5
9.7
7.4
7.4
5.2
0.3
0.3
1.3
7.6
9.1
8.0
5.9
5.3
5.7
6.6
5.51.1
w 9w1
Table 20
Region
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
No. of BOI-Registered Projects - R.A. 5186
(By Type of Project)
Total Number
422
I Ilocos
II Cagayan Valley
III Central Luzon
IV Metropolitan Manila
V Bicol
VISAYAS
VI Western Visayas
VII Central Visayas
VIII Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
IX Western Mindanao
X Northern Mindanao
XI Southern Mindanao
XII Central Mindanao
(Total Project Cost in Pmillion)
29
7
31
176
12
11
26
13
13
34
49
21
15,699
Agro
207
5
6
10
64
8
8
8
4
9
26
45
14
5,347
Mining & Mineral
Processing
79
7,494
111,163 52,378 32,712
Chemical
55
Metal
81
2,371 487
11,9386 14,9688(Tot al Employment)
Table 21
Region
No. of BOI-Registered Projects - R.A. 6135
(By Type of Project)
Total Number
121PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Agro
24
Mining & Mineral
Processing
6
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Bicol
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
Northern Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Central Mindanao
(Total Project Cost in Pmillion) 2,121 399 1,260 371
47,167 3,367 2,751
w 1
Chemical
53
Metal
38
(Total Employment) 23,287 17,762
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Criteria for Industrial Estate Site Selection
A. Economic Criteria
1, Proximity to Urban Center
2, Proximity to Resources
3, Land Acquisition Cost
4, Availability and Condition of
Transport System
5. Availability of Power and
Potential Supply
6. Availability and Capacity of
Points
20
20
10
15
10
(in per cent)
Water Supply 10
7. Size of Provincial Population 10
8. Availability of Skills 5
100
B. Social Criteria Points (in per c
1. Unemployment 35
2. Low Income 25
3, Out-Migration 30
4. Experienced Workers 10
100
Source; Nationwide Industrial Estate Program Report - vol. II.
Table 22
ent)
Table 23 Probable Sites of Industrial Estate Development Program, 1978-2000
Phase I (1978-1990) Phase II (1980-2000)
* Feasibility study and construction to be initiated within the period up
** Special Projects (for social reasons)
to 1982
Note: 1. Phasing of individual projects under NIEP may be altered, subject to the recommendation of the
respective Regional Development Councils.
2. It is envisioned that private industrial estates will be developed in the areas of Calamba San
Pedro, and Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Batangas, Surigao, Angeles, Pampanga and others.
Source: IUS-NEDA
1W 1W 1W
Target Start of Commercial Number of
Regions Operation Firms Employed
I. Bacnotan, La Union - - Bugallon, Pangasinan
II. Tuguegarao, Cagayan - -
III. San Fernando, Pampanga Subic, Zambales
Sapang Palay, Bulacan** 1979 (20 ha. initially) 29 5,000
1981 (50 ha.) 40 10,000
IV. Batangas City - -
Dasmarifias, Cavite** 1978 (6 ha. initially) 10 2,000
1981 (50 ha.) 65 15,000
V. Malilipot, Albay* possibly 1981 or 1982 - -
VI. Talisay, Negros Occidental - - -
VII. Mactan Export Processing
Zone 1978 (41 ha. initially) 25 9,500 Sibulan, Negros Oriental
Lapu-Lapu City 1985 (full occupancy) 82 -
Talisay, Cebu* possibly 1981 or 1982 - -
VIII. Palo, Leyte -- - Catbalogan, Catarman, Samar
IX. Zamboanga City
X. PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate partly ongoing - -
Misamis Oriental
Cagayan de Oro City* possibly 1983 - - Agusan Piqueno, Butuan City
XI. Davao City possibly 1983 Tagum,.Davao del Norte
General Santos City -
XII. Matalam, North Cotabato - - Marawi City
Table Z9 Summary of Priority Sites' Features Phase 1 (1979-2000)
R
E Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
G Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other is- Power Water Indi- Features:
and Site Area and Urban tance Mar- ance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0
N Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) kets Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'1 Project, etc.
I Bacnotan, 1,098 -Manufacture of fabrica- San
La Union ted metal products, iron Fernando 14 Manila 283 Luzon Maragayap 204.3 113,178 '978,759 Proximity to
(Study & steel basic industries Baguio Grid River San Fernando
Area-2) -Manufacture of basic City Hlydro- 2,600 Port
chemicals plant
-Hand and loom weaving 115-138
-Manufacture, assembly & kv.
repair of industrial Baroro
machinery River
-Tobacco manufacturing - 11,500
II Tuguegarao 700 -Meat processing Claveria 185 Baguio 311 Luzon Pinaana- 110.7 211,938 632,800 Primary Urban
Cagayan -Food processing City Grid nan River Center, Growth
(Study -Manufacture of grain Manila 432 115-138 10,800 Point for the
Area-1) mill products kv. Region
-Manufacture of basic
Industrial chemicals
-Manufacture of electri-
appliances for house-
hold use
III San Fernando 500 -Manufacture of beverages San 4 Manila 73 Luzon Pasig 163.6 255,417 1 P95,097 Growth Center
Barrio Calulut -Manufacture of electri- Fernando Grid Potroro for the Mani'la
& De la Paz cal lamps & fixtures Angeles 8 Mexico River Bay
(Study -Manufacture of textile Sub- 2,120
Area-3) Products Station
-Manufacture of wood & '100 mv.
related products thru 69
-Manufacture of cigar, kv.
cigarettes, and tobacco lines
-Manufacture of miscel- SFELAP
laneous paper & paper diesel
board gen..
-Commercial and job plants
. printing 3,191 kw.
R Avail- + H A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
G Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
I and Site Area and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Cov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
-Terminal food market & NPC Sub-
food processing station
-Manufacture of clay at San
products Fernando
-Manufacture of vehicles 10 mva.
& parts
-Manufacture of medical
& surgical supplies
-Manufacture of optical
products
-Manufacture of metal
cans & boxes
-Manufacture of pens &
office materials
-Manufacture of cork
products
-Small & medium scale
industries
-Food processing plants
-Shoe manufacturing
-Machine tools manu-
facturing
-Shell & wood products
-Electronics
-Optical products
-Garments manufacturing
-Integrated food pro-
cessing plant
-Beverage plant &
warehouse
-Electronics & elect.
appliances
-Ice plant & cold
storage
-Cacao, chocolate &
confectionery olants
Quezon
City
Batanga.-
City
Manila
Manil.9
Tagay-
tay
City
111
54
NEA Elec-
tric Co-
operative
Luzon
Grid
19,558
kw.
Proposed
.69 kv.
line to
sub-
station
MWSS
Reservoir
Sta.
Maria
River
1,960
Ground
Water
5,000
25,000
gal./day/
ft.
Sto.
Nifio
River
22
34.7
San
Jose
Gel
Monte
11,576
86.1
279,110 1,095,097
312,932 2,780,942
Resettlement
Area for 8,000
families
Proximity to
to National
Port Growth
Center in the
Manila Bay
Region
*Special Project
Sapang
Palay*
(Study
Area-3)
250Tabangao,
Batangas
City
(Study
Area-4)
I I I
Possible Industry Mix
and
Type of Estate
-Steel & non-ferrous
-Foundry/machine shop
-Coco chemical plant
-Grain milling plants
-Manufacture of agri-
cultural implements &
garden tools
-Actuated carbon plant
-Charcoal manufacturing
plant
-Furfural
-Spinning and weaving of
iusi
' M A R K E T S
Nearest Dis-
Urban tance
Center (Km.)
Other
Mark-
ets
Dis-
tance
(Km.)
Infrastructure
Power
Source &
Capacity
Water
Source &
Capacity
L/Second
Indi-
cative
Cost
P M
Labor Force
1970
Prov'l I Reg'l
Other
Features:
Growth
Center, Gov't
Projiectseetc.
IV Dasmarifnas, 100 -Fruit processing Manila Sub- Pabparan 39.5 369,414 Resettlement
Cavite* station and Banal Area
Bo. Palapala -Dairy & milk processing of River
-Coco by-products plant First
-Fish meal & poultry Cavite Dasmari-
feeds - Elec. ias River
-Vegetable oil factory Coop. 370
-Coffee & cocoa
processing
-Charcoal processing
plant
V Tiwi, Albay 200 -Steam based industries Legaspi 40 Naga 150 Tiwi Bacolod 126.3 231,982 965,277 Goethermal
(Study -Rice milling Sorso- Geother- 190 Project at
Area-6) -Confectionery gon mal Power Tiwi
-Pulp, paper & paper- Project
board mills 100 mega
-Iron castings watts
-Aluminum products
-Basic industrial
chemicals
-Industrial machinery
*Srecial Project
Avail-
able
Area
(Has.)
Name
and Site
Location
Tabangao,
Batangas
City
(Study
Area-4)
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
I and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
Location (as.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
L/Second F M Prov'l Reg'l Pojects, etc.
V Tiwi, Albay -Electrical appliances
(Study -Fabricated structural
Area-6) metal products
-Automotive industries
-Fabricated wire pro-
ducts
-Iron & steel basic
industries
-Dairy products
VI Talisay, 100 -Canning & processing Bacolod 7 Cebu 303 Sipalay Imbang 43.1 526,799 1,243,873
Negros of fish & other sea City Manila 678 Plant River
Occidental foods Duma- 108 mega 350
(Study -Manufacture of grain guete 632 watts in
Area-8) mill products 1979 &
-Iron & steel basic 162 mega
industries watts by
-Food manufacturing 1980.
-Manufacture of basic
industrial chemicals
-Manufacture of medici-
nal preparations
-Manufacture, assembly
& repair of industrial
machinery
-Manufacture of electri- From
cal appliances other
-Manufacture of bakery sources
product by
-Manufacture of paints 1985
& varnishes
-Manufacture of fabri-
cated structural
metal products
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
G
I and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
VII Talisay, Cebu 200 -Manufacture of tradi- Cebu Genera- Tabunac 25.7 241,000 1,107,586 Relocation Site
City tional handicrafts City ting River of Shell Craft
(Study -Shell craft, wood- Proper plant 5,791,200 Industries
Area-9) craft, ceramics, rattan for area- gals./day
craft 34.5-
-Food processing, such 69 kv. Linao
as biscuit making, food River
preserving & candy 4,064
making 
_ _ 
__ 
I I II
1III Palo, Leyte 50 -Meat processing Taclo- 10 Cebu 209 Tongonan Malirong 30.2 388,092 842,472
(Study -Corn & rice milling ban Geother- River
Area-10) -Industrial machinery City Catba- mal 2,000
-Structural metal logan 110 Project
products
-Fabricated wire products
-Automotive engine
products
-Ceramics
-Dairy products
-Basic industrial
chemicals
-Household appliances
-Beverages
-Misc. fabricated metal
products
IX Ayala-Recodo, 50- -Corn milling Zambo- 14-16 Debu 479 Hydro & Ayala 42.3 362,937 642,755 Growth Center
Zamboanga 100 -Confectionery anga Paga- diesel River of the Region
City -Animal feeds City dian 247 plant 60
(Study -Fish processing Proper for city
Area-14) -Pulp, paper & paper- 3,600 kw.
board mills Proposed
-Iron & steel basic Zamcello
industries plans
-Dairy products will be
-Basic industrial tapped
chemicals
R Avail- K A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
G
and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
-Non-ferrous metal basic
industries Beg.1980
Add'l 165
X Cagayan de 200 -Machine & vehicle repair Cagayan 31 mega
Oro City, shops de Oro watts.
Misami -Manufacturing shops City Sub-sta-
Oriental engaged in metal, wood tion 1,000 Main 22.9 113,926 632,723 Relocation site
(Study & concrete based kva to pipe- of industries
Area-13) activities 10,000 kva line of affected by the
-Cottage industries Ma. Cris- City widening of the
tina Hydro Water- Iligin-Butunn
Electric works. Highway.
Plant line 3.9
69,000 million
volt line gal/day
XI Panacan, 350 -Meat processing Davao 7 General 247 Thermal, Lian 260,659 736,471
Davao City -Corn milling City Santos diesel & River
(Study -Fruit processing Cagayan hydroelec- 213 35.5
Area-li) -Corn & vegetable oil de Oro 307 tric plant
-Coffee products Butuan 372 in Davao
-Miscellaneous fabricated Cebu 532 City.
metal products 60,000 kv
-Electrical appliances Line (69kv)
-Bakery products from Davao
-Motorcycles to Tagum &
-Dairy products 138 kv to
-Industrial pumps Compostella
by 1977.
XI General 1,000 -Rice & corn milling City 7 Davao 137 Soteco Makar 99.6 156,011 732,471
Santos -Fruit processing Proper Cebu expansion River
City, South -Corn & vegetable oil program 56
Cotabato -Meat processing -15,000 kw
(Study -Dairy products by 1977
Area-12) -Soft drinks
-Fish processing
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
G
I and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
-Fish mill
-Basic industrial
chemicals
-Iron castings
-Fabricated wire
products
-Automotive engine parts
-Electric motors
XII Matalam, 100 -Food processing: Kidapa- 20 Debu 692 Diesel Simnay 46.2 384,504 939,872
North meat processing & wan Davao 130 run elec-
Cotabato canning Digos 77 tric
(Study vegetable & corn oil plant
sugar milling 202 kw.
confectionary
rice milling 69 kv
coffee products line from
-Tobacco products Kabacan
-Wood products to be
-Agricultural machinery completed
-Metal wares by 1980. 1 1 1 1
PHASE II
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
o Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second F M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
I Bugallon, 40 -Fish canning, drying Dagupan 20 Manila 205 Hydro- Agno 31.7 402,972 978,789 Proximity to
Pangasinan & smoking plant River Gov't Project
(Study -Processing of coconut 1,000 -Sual Fishiig
Area-2) products Capacity 1/sec. Port
-Patis & Bagoong factory 34.5-69
-Rice & corn milling kv.
-Manufacture of synthetic
coffee
-Manufacturing of unpre-
pared animal feeds
-Manufacture of wood &
stone products
-Manufacture of wood
housing components
-Trucking, machinery
repair & engineering
services
L11 Subic, Olo- 200 -Iron & Steel processing Olonga- 10 Marive- 95 Extension Boton 127.5 105,904 105,907 Growth Center in
ngapo City mill po City less of 69 kv River the Manila Bay
(Study -Iron & steel foundry Proper Manila 142 transmis- 248 Region
Area-3) -Copper & non-ferrous sion line 1/sec.
metals smelting plant from
-Ship building & repair Olongapo
ship yard City to
-Manufacture of electri- Botolan
cal machinery apparatus, Sub-sta- Sta.
appliances and supplies tion at Rita
-Manufacture of fabrica- Antonio 1020
ted metal, machinery 5 mva 67/ 1/sec.
and equipment 13.8 kva Panatawan
River
1820 1/sec
R Avail- M A R K E T S * Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
G
and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'l Projects, etc.
VII Sibulan, 50 -Ceramics manufacturing Duma- 5 Baco- Elec. Ocon 31.7 168,186 1,107,586
Negros Or. -Sheelcraft guette lod 315 plant River
(Study -Food processing City Cebu 127n 120 1/sec.
Area-8) -Grain milling Manila 785 34.5- Tutuban
-Wood carving & products 69 kv 190 1/sec.
-Furniture shops Power
-Fiber products Plant
-Metal sheet fabrication (Negros
-Iron works Grid)
-Machinery repair shop 860-1000
-Agricultural implements kw.
fabrication
VIII Catarman, 30 -Corn & rice milling Calbayog 55 Sorso- Sub-sta Catarman 24.3 388,082 842,272
N. Samar -Corn oil gon 89 tion River
(Study -Confectionery Cebu 233 (Visayas 10,000
Area-10) -Fish processing Grid)
-Pulp, paper & paper board 69 kv
-Vegetable oils & fats transmis-
-Cement products sion line
-Meat processing
-Dairy products
-Bakery products
VIII Catbalogan, 100 -Rice & corn milling Calbayog 60 Taclo- Proposed 4alanog 32.9 165,216 842,272
N. Samar -Confectionery ban 85 sub-sta- River
(Study -Fish processing tion at 30 1/sec.
Area-10) -Pulp, paper & paper Catbalo-
board gan t:9
-Vegetable oils & fats kv & 138
-Dairy products kv lines.
-Meat processing Proposed
Ulot proj.
48 kv line
in 1984.
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:
and Site Areas and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) ets (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'1 Projects, etc.
X Agusan 800 -Rice and corn milling Butuan 8 Cebu 28 Electric Agusan 92,773 632,731
Pequefno, -Confectionery City Co. Pequeio
Butuan City -Vegetable and oil fats Surigao 30 230 kw. 300 1/sec. 298.9
Agusan del -Fruit processing
Norte -Fish processing Karia
(Study -Meat processing Cristina
Area-13) -Animal feed power
-Pulp, paper & paper lines
. board mills
-Iron and steel basic
industries
-Steel bars and related
shops
-Pipes and iron castings
-Aluminum products
-Dairy products
-Basic industrial
chemicals
-Metal products
-Industrial machineries
-Mechanical appliances
-Electrical appliances
-Bakery products
-Wood based products
Madaul Tagum 1,000
Davao del 2,000
Norte
(Study
Area-11)
-Aluminum products
-Medicinal preparations
-Industrial machinery
-Soap and detergent
-Fabricated structural
metal products
-Fishing boats, inter-
island and ocean
going vessels
-Fertilizers
-Glass factory
Davao
City
Gen.
Santos
City
Cagayan
de Oro
Butuan
Cebu
Sub-sta-
tion at
Ta gum
69 kv.
transmis-
sion line
Hijo
River
15,000
1/sec.
198.1 153,762 732,491
W WW
R Avail- M A R K E T S Infrastructure Other
E Name able Possible Industry Mix Nearest Dis- Other Dis- Power Water Indi- Features:G
I and Site Area and Urban tance Mark- tance Source & Source & cative Labor 
Force Growth
0 Location (Has.) Type of Estate Center (Km.) eta (Km.) Capacity Capacity Cost 1970 Center, Gov't
N L/Second P M Prov'l Reg'1 Pro ects, etc.
-Bricks and ceramics
-Wood products
-Bakery products ..--. -.-..............-... _ ---
XII Marawi City 100 -Rice and corn milling Marawi 5 Cebu 285 Maria Agus 55.8 121,088 939,872
Lanao del -Animals feeds Cristina River
Sur -Confectionery Iligan 35 hydroel- 124,561
(Study -Vegetable oil milling ectric I/sec.
Area-13) -Abaca products plant
-Coffee processing
-Agricul tural machinery
-Fabricated metal
products
-Fruit processing ,
-Wood processing
-Metal ware
-Meat processing
-Dairy products
-Bakery products
-Cement products
-Pulp, paper and paper
board mills
-Soaps and table pre-
paration
Source: Nationwide Industrial Estate Program
1W
Distribution of Projects Assisted by Masicap by Type of Industry
Agriculture
Fishing and Mining and
Forestry Processing
PHILIPPINES 961
LUZON 324-
I 78
II 29
III 69
IV' 61
V 87
VISAYAS 226
VI 135
VII 53
VIII 38
MINDANAO 411
Ix 104
X 119
XI 82
XII 106
1Includes Metro Manila
Manufac-
turing
Construc-
tion
Transport
Warehousing
Commerce and Com.
1,393
690
173
62
174
163
118
338
155
137
46
375
60
127
106
82
Activities
Adequately
Services Described
129
61
35
7
10
5
4
* Source: MASICAP Quarterly Reports
TOTAL
2,605*
1,121
293
104
264
237
218
608
306
201
101
876
189
276
210
201
Table 25
Table 26 Amount of Industrial Loans Approved by DBP, By Year and By Region
(in thousand pesos)
1972-73 %0 1973-74 1974-75 1975-761
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
61,377 100.0 55,205 100.0 94,923 100.0 749,985 100.0 1,351,589
48,567
12,752
268
7,922
26,864
519
242
4,022
305
3,679
38
8,788
286
27
7,870
605
1July 1975 - December
79.1
20.8
0.4
12.9
43.8
0.8
0.4
6.6
0.5
6.0
0.1
14.1
0.4
0.1
12.8
1.0
29,621
2,992
2,462
4,766
16,817
2,399
185
9,207
955
945
7,307
16,377
468
505
14,523
881
53.7
5.4
4.5
8.7
30.5
4.3
0.3
16.7
1.7
1.7
13.2
29.6
0.8
0.9
26.3
1.6
69,920
13,001
l,268
13,982
33,397
6,476
1,796
11,467
4,237
6,987
243
13,536
559
1,531
4,684
6,762
73.7
13.7
1.3
14.7
35.2
6.8
1.9
12.1
4.4
7.4
0.3
14.2
0.6
1.6
4.9
7.1
581,397
5,195
4,710
67,580
277,164
168,729
58,019
65,959
26,933
17,362
21,664
102,629
20,453
71,816
5,833
4,527
77.5
0.7
0.6
9.0
37.0
22.5
7.7
8.8
3.6
2.3
2.9
13.7
2.7
9.6
0.8
0.6
682,529
40,576
6,548
85,893
440,289
92,513
16,710
171,023
88,978
62,499
19,546
498,037
8,756
359,565
44,141
85,575
1976
Source: DBP
1971-72
100.0
50.5
3.0
0.5
6.4
32.6
6.3
1.2
12.7
6.6
4.6
1.5
36.8
0.6
26.6
3.3
6.3
Number of Industrial Loans Approved by DBP, By Region, 1971-1976
% 1972-73 % 1973-74 % 1974-75 % 1975-761
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
III
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
1July 1975
246
167
34
10
57
41
12
13
47
6
34
7
32
14
9
7
2
100.0
67.9
13.8
4.1
23.1
16.7
4.9
5.3
19.1
2.4
13.8
2.9
13.0
5.7
3.7
2.8
0.8
277
152
23
-12
24
62
24
7
82
10
67
5
43
11
8
16
8
100.0
54.9
8.3
4.3
8.7
22.4
8.7
2.5
29.6
3.6
24.2
1.8
15.5
3.9
2.9
5.8
2.9
684
470
127
29
'55
128
97
34
125
20
97
100.0 2,381 100.0 8,306 100.0
68.7
18.6
4.2
8.0
18.7
14.2
5.0
18.3
3.0
14.1
1.2
13.0
2.6
4.4
2.2
3.8
1,587
79
283
606
251
282
86
378
176
142
60
416
147
142
83
44
- December 1976
Source: DBP
1971-72
66.7
3.3
11.9
25.5
10.5
11.9.
3.6
15.8
7.4
5.9
2.5
17.5
6.2
5.9
3.4
2.0
4,718
569
456
2,139
338
869
347
1,268
526
478
264
2,320
748
676
573
323
56.8
6.9
5.5
25.8
4.~1
10.4
4.1
15.3
6.3
5.8
3.2
27.9
9.0
8.1
6.9
3.9
1w
Table 27
Regional Distribution of IGLF Loan Approvals, 1973-1976
1973-74 % 1974-75 % 1975-76 % Total %
PHILIPPINES 7,159 100.0 52,572.5 100.0 41,748 100.0 101,479.5 100.0
LUZON 7,159 100.0 41,188.5 78.3 33,037 79.2 81,385.5 80.3
I 1,931 27.0 6,922.5 13.2 2,699 6.5 11,552.5 11.4
II 70 0.1 70 0.1
III 5,588.5 10.6 4,620 11.1 10,208.5 10.1
IV 3,189 44.5 22,612 43.0 17,527 42.0 43,328 42.7
IV-A 2,039 28.5 5,895.5 11.2 6,479 15.5 14,413.5 14.2
V- - 100 0.2 1,712 4.1 1,812 1.8
VISAYAS - 9,934 18.9 5,848 14.0 15,782 15.5
VI - 3,800 7.2 2,010 4.8 5,810 5.7
VII - 5,322 10.1 3,073 7.4 8,395 8.3
VIII - 812 1.6 765 1.8 1,577 1.5
MINDANAO - 1,450 2.8 2,863 6.8 4,313 4.2
IX - - - 740 1.8 740 0.7
X - 50 0.1 1,315 3.1 1,365 1.3
XI - 1,400 2.7 660 1.6 2,060 2.0
XII - - - 148 .3 148 0.2
Source: IGLF
Table 28
Table 29
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Number of Families and Percent Below Poverty Line1
Urban and Rural, By Region, 1975
RURAL
Region No. of
Families
(000)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
4,764
460
291
478
640
430
517
439
362
273
303
317
254
URBAN
Percent of
Families Below
P4,000 Income
56.3
40.0
54.3
48.2
56.5
64.5
No. of
Families
(000)
2,096
98
38
185
770
248
87
56.3
54.0
58.9
65.2
74.2
46.8
51.5
162
157
80
41
67
116
47
Percent of
Families Below
P5,000 Income
48.1
46.6
53.5
43.2
40.8
49.6
63.9
53.8
55.6
60.2
55.2
56.5
55.3
44.8
1For rural areas, the assumed poverty threshold is an annual income of
P4,000, while for urban areas, it is P5,000. These are still conservative
compared to the food threshold levels estimated in 1974 of P4,630 and
P5,310 for rural and urban areas, respectively.
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey, NCSO
w w
Table 30 Farmland Expansion Potential, 1975-2000
(in 000 hectares)
Farmland Area
1975
Farmland Available
to Agriculture, 2000
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI:
VII
VIII
Ilocos
Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Metropolitan Manila
Southern Tagalog
Bicol
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
IX Western Mindanao
X Northern Mindanao
XI Southern Mindanao
XII Central Mindanao
8,802
3,599
379
617
539
1,110
954
1,946
783
488
675
3,257
671
788
955
843
15,351
7,003
1,039
1,766
807
1,988
1,403
3,111
1,281
775
1,055
5,237
1,194
1,123
1,550
1,420
6,549
3,404
660
1,149
268
878
449
1,165
498
287
380
1,980
473
335
595
577
Source: "Natural Resource Bases of the Regions," NEDA-UNDP/IBRD
Regional Planning Assitance Project
Refer to Appendices 3 and 4 for Land Use Projections 1975 and 2000.
Farmland
Potential Percent
100.0
52.0
10.1
17.5
4.1
13.4
6.9
17.8
7.6
4 4
5.8
30.2
7.2
5.1
9.1
8.8
-165-
Actual and Potential Irrigable Land By Region
Land Areas Un-
der Irrigation
Thousand
Hectares
Percent
Land Areas Poten-
tially Available
for Irrigation
Thousand
Percent
Hectares
TOTAL
Thousand
Hectares
Existing
Irrigated
as % of
Total
Percent Irrigable
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
951
706
179
127
249
100
53
119
77
12
29
125
20
23
37
46
100.0 1,580
74.3
18.8
13.4
26.2
10.5
5.6
12.5
8.1
1.3
3.1
13.2
2.1
2.5
3.9
4.8
790
141
224
68
240
116
191
91
36
65
599
65
177
161
195
100.0
50.0
8.9
14.2
4.3
15.2
7.3
12.1
5.8
2.3
4.1
37.9
4.1
11.2
10.2
12.4
2,531
1,496
320
351
317
339
168
310
168
48
94
724
85
200
198
241
Source: National Irrigation Administration
Table 31
100.0
59.1
12.6
13.9
12.5
13.4
6.7
15.6
6.7
1.9
3.7
28.6
3.4
7.9
7.8
9.5
37.6
47.2
55.8
36.1
78.4
29.4
31.3
38.3
45.8
25.5
31.2
17.3
21.9
11.7
18.5
19.0
Farm
Population
Region ('000)
Table 32
Irrigated 2
Area
('000 ha)
Agricultural Land and Farm Population
Cultivated 3
Land Area
('000 ha)
Farmland 4
Area
('000 ha)
Average
Farm Size
(Hectares)
Farm Popu-1
lation per
Hectare of
Farmland
4GVA per
Person in
Agriculture
(P)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
x
XI
XII
Source: a
1
2
4
16,055
6,956
1,354
1,080
1,154
1,805
1,663
4,074
1,456
1,352
1,266
5,026
1,062
1,160
1,310
1,494
952
708
179
127
249
100
53
118
77
12
29
126
20
23
37
46
6,429
2,842
425
417
431
752
818
1,437
594
351
492
2,150
398
586a
5 84a
584a
8,494
3,496
380
581
540
1,074
921
1,935
782
479
674
3,063
632
727
898
806
Old Regions X and XI allocated equally to new Regions
Agricultural Census, 1971
BAECON, 1972
NEDA, National Accounts Office, 1972
4.61
3.33
1.74
3.38
3.20
3.97
4.13
3.16
3.69
2.03
3.55
5.79
5.55
5.85
6.21
5.52
X, XI and XII.
1.89
1.99
3.56
1.86
2.13
1.68
1.70
2.11
1.86
2.82
1.88
1.64
1.68
1.60
1.46
1.85
477
948
1,766
1,166
680
1,537
695
665
790
1,261
1,384
683
Table 33 Farmland According to Soil Type,* 1975 (Thousand Hectares)
1975 1
Farmland
Net ABCD Land
Available to
Agri. 1975
M x X3 Land
in Farmland
1975
PHILIPPINES 8,802 7,514 2,004
LUZON 3,599 3,364 623
I 379 356- 23
II 617 902 -
III 539 532 7
IV-A 1,110 1,213 -
V 954 361 593
VISAYAS 1,946 1,601 673
VI 783 400 383
VII 48 198 290
VIII 675 1,003 -
MINDANAO 3,257 2,549 708
IX 671 624 47
X 788 701 87
XI 955 492 463
XII 843 732 111
*For description of soil types, refer to Appendix 6.
ABCD 
4
Land
6,798
2,976
356
617
532
1,110
361
1,273
400
198
675
2,540
624
701
492
732
Unutilized
ABCD Land
1975
716
388
285
103
328
Projected6 Loss of
ABCD Land to Urban
1975-2000
1,043
646
48
45
150
350
53
157
240
Farmland and area from 1971 Agriculture Census projected at 1960-1971
where 1971 area is greater than 1960. For other regions, 1975 area =
annual growth rate for regions
1971 farmland area.
2ABCD land area according to Bureau of Soils Census 1975 less 1975 Urban area.
31975 Farmland - Net ABCD Land Available to Agriculture
4Column (1) - Column (3)
5Column (2) - Column (4)
6Urban land requirements 2000 - urban land 1975
Source: "Natural Resource Base of the Regions," NEDA-UNDP/IBRD Regional Planning Assistance Project.
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Table 34 Climate Type and Typhoon Frequency, By Region
Climate Type
1
34
1
All types
2,4
1,3
3,4
2
3,4
3
4
4
2Typhoon Frequency (%)
20
30-40
10-20
20-30 to 0
20-30
20
10-20
31-40
0
0
0
0
Coroias Classification described as follows:
Type 1 - Two pronounced seasons; dry from November to April; wet during
the rest of the year
Type 2 - No dry season with a very pronounced maximum rainfall from
November to January
Type 3 - Seasons not very pronounced; relatively dry from November to
April and wet during the rest of the year
Type 4 - Rainfall more or less evenly distributed throughout the year
2Refers to percentage of typhoons within the grographical responsibility of
the country that pass through a particular region.
Source: PAGASA
LUZON
II
III
IV
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
X
XI
XII
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Fishponds and Swamplands Available for Development,
By Regions, 1974 (000 Has.)
Region
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Total
706.02
237.33
18.23
16.88
67.94
85.86
48.42
244.17
75.72
35.76
132.74
224.48
79.06
69.94
29.91
45.57
Fishpond Area
176.03
84.08
10.48
.88
30.52
30.68
11.52
58.36
43.23
5.77
9.37
33.55
17.61
5.46
5.40
5.08
Swamplands
529.99
153.25
7.75
16.00
37.42
55.18
36.90
185.81
32.45
29.99
123.37
190.93
61.45
64.48
24.50
40.49
Source: Fisheries Statistics,.1974
Table 35
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Table 36 Distribution of Total Forest Areas, Commercial Forest Area, Area Under License and
By Region, 1975
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Total 1
Forest
(000 has)
17,029.7
8,131.2
1,250.6
2,625.3
810.2
2,889.0
556.7
2,586.7
703.2
690.6
1,192.9
6,311.8
1,010.8
1,834.4
1,635.5
1,831.0
Reg.
Shares
100
48
7
15
5
17
4
15
4
4
7
37
6
11
9
11
Commercial
Forest
(000 has)
8,162.4
3,732.6
417.7
1,375.8
352.6
1,407.6
178.9
902.9
135.8
107.3
659.8
3,626.9
560.5
1,043.4
1,007.9
915.1
Reg.
Shares
100
46
5
17
4
17
3
11
2
1
8
43
7
13
12
Area Under
License
(000 has)
9,627.2
3,297.3
90.6
1,435.4
88.0
1,393.9
287.4
994.7
232.7
155.7
606.3
5,335.2
695.5
1,631.8
1,576.4
1,431.4
Reg.
Shares
100
34
1
15
1
14
3
2
Exploitation
Intensity
1 0 0a
88
22
1 0 0a
25
99
1 0 0 a
1 0 0 a
1 0 0 a
100a
92
100a
100a
100a
100a
100a
lIncludes Classified and Unclassified.
2Area under license as a percent of commercial forest area.
a Area under license can exceed commercial forest area since concessions are expressed in terms of blocks
of land which may include unforested and/or alienable or disposable land.
Source: Bureau of Forest Development
Reserves, Production and Rate of Depletion of Selected Minerals, 1975
Reserves Inventory ( n mll os Ore Mined Per Year ( t milons) Number of Years Until DepletionImetric tons) Ormie e e r i milonsI
Region Copper Nickel Iron Ore Copper Nickel Iron Ore Copper Nickel Iron Ore
(at 1% Cu) (at 1% Ni) (at 50% Fe) (at 1% Cu) (at 1% Ni) (at 50% Cu) (at 1% Cu) (at 1% Ni) (at 50% Cu)
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
x
XI
1,761.92 3,143.60 2,821.33
533.62
321.58
34.09
26.80
132.73
18.41
1,117.01
683.43
421.94
11.63
111.29
4.17
26.41
80.71
744.71
109.38
577.14
58.19
7.44
7.44
160.35
1.62
1.27
3.72
91.80
61.95
12.81
2.02
10.79
2,391.45 2,648.16
11.42
2,020.61 277.13
370.84 2,409.62
Source: Bureau of Mines
n.a.
2,482
3,287
20.73
9.67
5.42
10.44
2.27
7.37
0.80
0.12
0.03
0.09
3.76
1.92
0.95
0.18
0.03
0.76
0.65
0.65
0.12
0.12
0.03
0.03
n.a.
n. a.
750
21
3,356
81
20
17
22,068
10
32
725
107
302
57
15
927
158
855
n.a.
Table 37
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Table 38 Agricultural Employment Potential of Farmland Expansion
Agricultural
Employment,
1975
(1)Region
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
7,454
3,132
619
496
548
827
642
2,045
764
674
607
2,277
467
621
638
551
Projected
Agri Employ-
ment, 2000
(2)
10,840
4,722
924
1,066
594
1,202
936
2,665
1,043
802
820
3,453
769
797
883
1,004
Additional
Employment
in Agricul-
ture2
(3)=(2)-(l)
3,386
1,590
305
570
375
294
620
279
128
213
1,176
302
176
245
453
Labor Force
Entrants
(4)
1.8,487
10,123
1,013
893
1,962
3,095
2,081
1,079
2,841
1,062
1,109
670
5,523
1,099
1,440
1,787
1,197
Additional
Agri Employ-
ment as % of
Labor Force
(5)=(3) +(4)
18.3
15.7
30.1
63.8
2.3
0
18.0
27.2
21.8
26.3
11.5
31.8
21.3
27.5
12.2
13.7
37.8
Non-Agri
Jobs Needed
(6)=(4)-(3)
15,101
8,533
708
323
1,916
3,095
1,706
785
2,221
783
981
457
4,347
797
1,264
1,542
744
1Average of low and high projections of agricultural employment projections shown in Appendix 5.
2This includes additional employment arising from farmland expansion: for some regions, expansion in
fishing may be a significant source.
Source: NEDA RDS Regional Planning Studies Series
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VII. Agriculture and Rural Development.
While industrial dispersal holds promise as a viable strategy for
spatial equity, its impact on the regions will vary depending on the pecu-
liar socio-economic characteristics of each region. As discussed in the
preceding section, industrialization may be inappropriate for some regions
at this point in time, while for others it remains as the only choice. With
the exception of the MMA, the rural sector is still the preponderant seg-
ment of every regional economy. Unless adequate attention is devoted to its
welfare, the regional growth process may never take off. Gains in the in-
dustrial or urban front may be nullified by continuous depression in the
rural sector. Even worse, initial industrialization efforts may not be sus-
tained unless a parallel initiative is mounted for the rural sectos.
Strategies are necessary for the lagging regions and provinces, in
particular their rural areas, where only a massive infusion of capital can
catalyze the currently slow process of growth. These assume greater import-
ance if the prioritization scheme suggested earlier is adopted. The regional
policy making process must design complementary approaches to the industrial
dispersal program for the sake of the non-priority regions in order to avoid
a deterioration in spatial disparities. The Integrated Rural Development
Projects (IRDPs) show enormous potential as the policy response to this need
of the depressed areas of the country. Their multisectoral project compo-
nents appear awesome when one considers the scale of planned investments in
physical construction. Hopefully the synergistic effects of these projects
will propel the regions into a sustained process of growth that would narrow
down spatial disparities.
While the IRDPs augur well for the goal of regional balance, a national
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program with strong spatial implications may offset the potential gains
which could be made towJards this goal. Masagana 99, the rice production
component of the food production program, aims for self-sufficiency. How-
ever the attainment of this objective may be at the expense of spatial
equity. Intraregionally the same observation seems to be valid, with the
program reaching only a selected segment of the farming sector.
In this section we will examine more closely the implications of rural
development programs on the issue of spatial equity. More specifically the
task is to verify whether the target groups affected by these programs be-
long to the rural poor, thereby alleviating poverty. If not, an attempt
will be made to identify- the factors, e.g., search for efficiency, resource
constraints, etc. that lead to such a discrimination.
A. The Integrated Area Development Approach.
At present the Philippines is undertaking a number of integrated rural
development projects (IRDPs) which are at different phases of development.
(Table 39). The IRDPs are basically a response to the slow and ineffective
76/
strategy of implementing specific projects,-- which are often unrelated
and uncoordinated such that their combined potential impact is weak. It is
anticipated that the infusion of capital in a particular area through mu-
tually linked and reinforcing projects. will produce a synergistic effect
of capable of stimulating the local economy into a process of sustained
growth. Organizationally the IRDP approach hopes to build up an effective
Mechanism for interlink among agencies in project planning and implementation.
1, Policy Guidelines.
In the selection of priority projects for the integrated area deve-
lopment approach, the CCC-IRDP (now NCIAD) sets the following policy
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guidleines:
1) areas with high tenancy rates.
2) relatively underdeveloped areas with development potentials in
more than on sector of the economy.
3) areas with a large segment of the population falling under the
lowest income bracket.
4) areas with potentials for acclerated development.
5) areas not covered by ongoing projects.
Essentially this set of criteria is biased towards poor and depressed areas.
Reviewing the list of ongoing projects, the guidelines provided by the
CCC-IRDP appear to have been met satisfactorily so far. Regions II, V, VIII
and XII fall on the lower end of the income spectrum among the regions.
These are also the regions where the poor rural families are concentrated
such that in Regions V and VIII outmigration rates have been high. Further-
,more their underdeveloped state is an indication of the lack of public in-
vestments in these area. As an illustrative example, Samar is the more lag-
ging section of an already underdeveloped area, Region VIII. It has a popu-
lation growth rate of only 1.5 per cent due to outmigration; more than 90
per cent of its population is not covered by electricity, and,to top it
all, it is located within the typhoon belt and always suffers serious damage
inflicted by tropical depressions. Likewise Negros Oriental, Mindoro and
Bohol are backward provinces but belong to relatively developed regions.
,For these depressed regions and provinces where the short term prospects
for industrial location are unattractive, these IRDPs may offer the only
viable alternative for creating employment opprotunities and raising rural
income, thereby pursuing the holding strategy advocated in the Ranis Report
77/
and,inore recently, in the agropolitan approach.- For the Cagayan, Bicol,
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Cotabato and Agusan River Basins, the enormous land and water resource po-
tentials can serve as the focus for accelerating agricultural development
in their respective coverage areas. Another important observation is that
little emphasis is placed on the tenancy criterion since Regions V, VIII
and XII have relatively low tenancy rates while two regions with high te-
nancy rates, Regions III and VI, do not have any IRDP projects. However
the land reform program is being vigorously implemented and these latter
regions are accorded priority.
2. Orientation of Project Investments.
Projects identified for the ongoing IRDP projects are multisectoral
in character. (Table 40). Although the bulk of investments is devoted to
physical construction of roads, irrigation systems and water control struc-
tures in support of agricultural activities, many projects are also related
to such diverse sectors such as health and nutrition, social housing, fishe-
ries, soil and forest resource conservation, and even assistance to cultural
communities. Moreover, in the case of the river basin projects, water re-
sources have multiple uses, e.g., for irrigation, electrification and flood
control. In general the project components of the various IRDPs are intended
to correct basic deficiencies in physical infrastructure supportive of eco-
nomic activities and also to meet specific needs of the project area like
control of schistomiasis which is endemic to Samar and Mindoro provinces
and flood control in typhoon-frequented areas, Regions II, V and VIII.
A expected the thrust of most investments is laid on facilities and
services needed for agricultural development. Agriculture is the main source
of livelihood of the regions' population and, more importantly, farming is
the main source of income of the rural poor. Approximately 90 per cent of
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of the bottom 40 per cent of the national income profile resides in rural
areas. (Table 41). Geographically speaking the rural population in the
bottom 40 per cent is concentrated in Eastern Visayas, Central Mindanao
78/
and Bicol.- Agricultural productivity in these regions is low because of
the inadequacy of supporting agricultural services and the flood damages
due to typhoons. By and large, therefore, investments in irrigation and
flood control and other facilities will benefit the preponderant agricul-
tural sector. This holds true for the other IRDPs as well.
The concentration of the IRDPs on lowland or conventional agriculture
is understandable from the efficiency viewpoint since it is in lowland ag-
riculture where the potential for raising productivity is higher. In addi-
tion lowland farms are the most physically accessible to extension agents
as well as to other government services. Without disputing the present
emphasis of the IRDPs on the conventional agricultural sector, it should
be pointed out that there is another component of the agricultural sector
whose current needs are even greater. These are the small marginal and
landless farmers who constitute what may be collectively termed as the in-
formal agricultural sector. These farmers are marginal in the sense that
they are occupying lands whose productivity is less than that of the river
valley basins; they are marginal in that, very often, their farming systems
derived frm lowland practices are ill-suited to the conditions in the hill-
sides; they are marginal also in that their incomes are low and they rarely
receive the assistance of extension agents or other government services;
they are not marginal however in terms of numbers or in dependence on farm-
ing for their livelihood, as their remote location cuts them off from non-
farm activities. They are already farming land outside the conventionally
11 l l' ' , , I P il l|| i 1|| l I l 1"' | | i |1 ||||| | |1 
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conceived zones of agricultural land and their problems and even existence
79/
are often overlooked in the determination of agricultural policy.---
The reason for highlighting the existence of the informal agricultural
sector is that this sector will grow in relative importance in terms of the
number of people and the land area involved. Even at present, a significant
portion of farmlands in Regions V, VI, VII and XII is already in the hill-
sides, cultivated by those who have been pushed out of the fertile lowlands
by population pressure. In the years to come, it is inevitable that the
regions' land frontier will continue to shift onto hillsides and a major
portion of the regiors' farmlands will be on these lands.
It is to this informal agricultural sector that government policy
should start paying more attention because a large part of the rural poor
is found here. Although by no means are the problems of the conventional
agricultural sector solved, agricultural and rural development policy in
general will require a shift in emphasis at some point in time. This shift
in policy direction may be guided at the national- level byxt the impact on
regional disparities will vary depending on the relative importance of the
informal agricultural sector. The neglect of this sector will widen intra-
regional inequities if the benefits of agricultural programs accrue solely
to the conventional agricultural sector.
In the future, if the IRDPs are to continue playing a leading role
in rural development, project planning must also consider the issues and
problems relevant to the informal agricultural sector to promote a more
balanced regional development pattern. While IRDPs can narrow down inter-
regional disparities, conversely, they may also widen intraregional dispa-
rities if their projects are solely focused on conventional agriculture.
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A case in point is the Bicol River Basin Development Project. Although it
is impossible to alter the natural physical configuration of the basin, it
should be stressed that the beneficiary provinces -Camarines Sur, Camarines
Norte and Albay - are the rich areas of what is overall a depressed region.
Because of the basin, it is in these provinces where fertile farmlands are
found. On the other hand, in the poor provinces of the region - Sorsogon,
Catanduanes and Masbate - agricultural lands are largely marginal and steep-
ly sloping and consequently, have low productivity. It is not difficult to
predict that the IRDP - The Bicol River Basin Development Project -,while
raising the overall regional level of development, is not conducive to an
equitable rural growth pattern within the region unless an effort is made
to assist the informal agricultural sector.
Similarly rural non-agricultural activities will gain in importance
due to the combined effects of population growth and agricultural resource
constraints. With the fragmentation of farms, rural families will have to
look for supplementary sources of income outside agriculture to augment
farm income. Other rural families will'become totally dependent on non-
farm activities. It should be underscored, however, that the growth in non-
farm activities is contingent to a large extent upon the development of the
agricultural sector. In this regard the IRDPs , with their marked agricul-
tural orientation, are crucial to an integrated rural development drive.
Many of their projects serve multiple needs of rural areas and ar laying
the groundwork for the emergence of non-agricultural endeavors,
3. A Recognition of Current Performance.
On the whole, the current performance of the IRDPs speaks well for
regional development in the country since these projects answer the need
-. i- --- '_.1f'_-, _ -JfiW9VAViWHRML_- -1- "' -, - __ _ .11 --- 11 --.1- - -1 wolow"
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for location specific strategies for the lagging regions. The pivotal ele-
ment in their growth path still lies in rural and agricultural development,
due to a lack of comparative advantage for industrial location. Moreover
these regions' resource potentials await intensive exploitation. However
a future shift in direction is required for the IRDPS as well as rural de-
velopment policy to take explicit account of the existence and needs of the
tnformal agricultural sector and to set the stage for non-agricultural
activities.
The efficacy of the integrated approach to rural development is recog-
nized by the national government. In fact the National Development Plan
1978-82 advocates its retention and wider use and even goes to the extent
of identifying additional projects. However this approach may be abused
once regional groups join the "bandwagon" and demand the inclusion of their
provinces as priority areas for IRDPs. If the list currently found in the
National Plan (Table 42) is an indication of things to come, then the go-
vernment may find itself in the not too unfamiliar position of attempting
to satisfy every project proponent. With the additional projects, the total
project cost has already risen to more than P6.0 billion. Again issues re-
lated to national government financial capacity and dilution of resources
may emerge and weaken the IRDPs' impact. If the bad experience of the re-
gional development authorities is to be avoided, more selectivity and
restraint in the use of the IRDP approach must be exercised in order to
prepare a list of projects justifiable on valid grounds and technical cri-
teria. Furthermore the IRDPs should be related to an overall strategy for
*As far as the experience of the author goes, a number of petitions have
been received by NEDA from the regions and the provinces calling for the
inclusion of certain areas in the IRDP priorities.
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spatial equity whereby the sectoral program components are defined and the
priority regions under each program are clearly specified. In view of the
likelihood that the prioritization scheme proposed earlier for the regional
dispersal of industries will exclude poor rural regions, the selection of
areas for IRDPs must give preference to these regions in order to mitigate
the tendency for regional income divergence. These preferences must be for-
mally articulated through the CCC-IRDP policy guidelines in order to have
a firm basis for evaluating proposals which are expected from the regions.
Otherwise political pressures may again intrude excessively in the selection
process.
B. The Food Production Program.
Although a national program, the ongoing food production drive has
strong implications on the spatial equity issue. Started in May 1973, it
is primarily aimed at self-sufficiency because perennial deficits in rice
and corn have necessitated grain importations that have affected the coun-
try's balance of payments. Accordingly maximum production from the country's
rice and corn lands is the basic objective. To attain this objective, prio-
rity is given to irrigated ricelands where double cropping is possible.
Joreover the high yielding varieties (HYV) technology developed by the
International Rice and Research Institute (IRRI) is basically adapted for
trrigated areas.
1. The Rice Production Program.
?4asagana 99, the rice production program, has various components,
namely; seed procurement, agricultural extension services, fertilizer sub-
sidy, credit, grain procurement and price support. It is being implemented
on a nationwide scale; however, due to differences in cropping patterns
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and availability of irrigation service, the importance of the program varies
among regions. For example, in Region III, farms planted to rice account
for about 90 per cent of total number of farms while in Region X, they
comprise only about 15 per cent. In most regions rice farms are generally
80/
small, with at least one-half having an area less than three hectares.-
Irrigation systems are unevenly distributed, with the regions in Luzon
having almost three-fourths of the national irrigated area. (Refer back to
Table 32). Consequently the rice yields in these regions are higher inasmuch
as irrigated areas acount for almost one-half of total riceland area.
(Table 43). On the average, yields in irrigated ricelands are approximately
50 per cent higher than those in rainfed areas. In terms of farm income,
the gross margin for the former ranges from P3100 to P3800, depending on
farm size, while for the latter, gross margin per hectare varies from P1500
to P2500, even if a second crop of rice or corn is planted.--' Obviously
farmers of irrigated ricelands are much better off than most farmers. But
what is more significant is that as the diminution of farm sizes is resorted
to due to population pressure, these farmers need only a small area to at-
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tain a certain amount of income. In a study- made to determine farm sizes
needed for reaching the poverty threshold (assumed at P3000 per family)
using'different classes of land and availability of irrigation as dependent
variables, an irrigated rice farmer needs less than a hectare to pass the
poverty threshold. With the full use of family labor, he can achieve an
income of twice this level. On the other hand, for non-irrigated rice far-
mers, the required farm sizes are definitely larger and,even with the full
employment of family labor, some of them may not be able to overcome poverty
unless productivity increases are attained or alternative sources of income
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generated. (Table 44). Another significantfinding is the precarious situ-
ation of the farmer on M lands, who cannot achieve the target level of
income because the labor available is only sufficient for a farm size of
1.7 hectares, compared to the required farm size of 2.7 hectares to reach
the poverty threshold. In a very real sense, the farmer on marginal lands
is trapped. He cannot through his own efforts, although working very hard,
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rise out of his poverty because of low labor and land productivity.- The
general nature of the problem is illustrated in Figure 1.
2. Impact on Productivity and Income in Rural Areas.
The advent of Masagana 99 further increases the potential for product-
ivity improvements in irrigated areas. Because of its emphasis on irrigated
ricelands, the regions that greatly benefit from the package of services
offerred under the program are naturally those with large irrigated areas,
Regions I, III and IV-A. In some cases as in Region VI, due to its import-
ance as the major rice supplier for the Visayas, large tracts of rainfed
ricelands are covered since irrigation service is still limited in this
region. Essentially the regions that have been able to gain the most from
the program are the traditional rice producers which have previously ex-
hibited high yields. (Table 45).
Inevitably the Masagana 99 program will have favorable implications
on agricultural growth and on the overall level of farm incomes in the
major rice producing regions.. For Regions III, VI and XI the program covers
a substantial portion of total harvested area, but for others, only a small
percentage of farms benefit. Also most of the beneficiaries of the program
*As was shown in the resource analysis, land with quality of this type will
increasingly compose a large part of farmlands.
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Figure 1: Relationships Between Land Quality,
Farm Size and Farm Income and Employment
Farm Farm Area to Achieve
Size Poverty Threshold
Poverty Gap
Maximum
Farm Size
Given Family
Labor Constraint
Underemployment Gap
Declining Land Quality
Source: G. Gwyer. "Agricultural Employment and Farm Incomes in Relation
to Land Classes: A Regional Analysis."
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already belong to the more economically advanced group of regions. With
the further improvement in their agricultural productivity, it is very pos-
sible that a divergence in levels of regional development will occur.
Similarly, within the rice producing sector in a region, we will have
farmers having access to high technology, credit and other services while
the majority receive very little support from government programs. Conse-
quently a dualistic situation may ensue, with a small group of modern far-
mers and a large group of poor traditional farmers existing side by side.
The extension of credit under Masagana 99 is particularly important
for rice farmers who have just become leaseholders or amortizing owners
and may have been cut off from their traditional source of credit - the
*
landowner. Land reform is of little significance without access to markets
84/
and credit.-- Without the necessary production inputs and services, the
potential for raising productivity may not be realized. Land reform does
85/
not by itself lead to productivity increases.- The Masagana 99 program
is also significant for its organization of farmers into cooperatives. Al-
though cooperatives development was conceived and started as part of the
land reform scheme, the formation of cooperatives and small farmer groups
accelerated when membership in such organizations was made a prerequisite
for- inclusion in Masagana 99.
The achievements made by the Masagana 99 program cannot be overempha-
sized. The attainment of self-sufficiency, the provision of numerous ser-
vices to many rice farmers and the formation of cooperatives are by
*P.D. No. 2, issued a few days after the declaration of martial law, declared
the entire country a land reform area. It was followed by P.D. No. 27, eman-
cipating all rice anrd corn farmers from tenancy. Since then the land reform
program has been implemented on a full scale.
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themselves notewor thy accomp lishraents. However the deleterious effects on
spatial disparities of this nationally conceived effort cannot be ignored
in the design of regional policy. In the years ahead, a rationalization of
agricultural production, involving some changes within regions in cropping
86/
patterns and some shifts in production between regions, is expected.-
Interregional shifts in production will occur as regions realize their com-
parative advantages arising from basic climatic factors, location and re-
source endowments. With growing crop specialization among regions, more
location and crop specific agricultural strategies will have to be evolved
inasmuch as any nationally-based policy or program will tend to favor only
a few regions and may adversely impact the goal of regional balance.
Concluding Remarks
In evaluating the success of the Masagana 99 program in attaining
production objectives, several important features related to policy imple-
mentation stand out. Although essentially a national drive, the program
encountered less political complications due to the commitment of the cen-
tral government to an important goal - food self-sufficiency, which could
override other regional aspirations. Hence it was the national government's
decisions regarding the regional distribution of program area coverage,
which in turn was affected largely by natural factors, e.g., presence of
irrigation systems, that determined each region's degree of participation
in the program. Regional pressures could therefore be resisted. In contrast,
the IRDP approach, while currently showing promise as a complementary scheme
to the industrial dispersal policy, is more vulnerable to political intru-
sion by virtue of its being a regional program. When political influence
enters too much the decision-making process, its potential effectiveness
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may be severely weakened, This is especially true. since many resource allo-
cation decisions, which are almost Lalways subjected to political considera-
tions , in support of policy implementation will have to be made.
In both the IRDPs and the Masagana 99 program, an important and large
segment of the regional economy - the informal and traditional agridultural
sectors - are virtually excluded from sharing in the benefits of these ru-
ral development efforts. Its interests are seldom represented in the poli-
tical and planning processes because its poor power base renders it incapable
of exerting pressures on decision-making. The likely outcome is a further
deterioration in the distribution in income unless the political or planning
processes assumes the responsibility of articulating the interests of this
disadvantaged sector. This will be an initial step for the reorientation
of rural development policies towards its needs. Without such an articula-
tion, policies may be considered effective without realizing the adverse
consequences on the informal agricultural sector.
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Table 39 Listing of Integrated Rural Development Projects
Projact Name
Cagayan Integrated Are-4 DevelQpment Project
Mindoro Integrated Rural Development Project
Bicol River Basin Development Project
Sorsogon Integrated Rural Development Project
Southern Negros Integrated Development Project
Bohol Integrated Rural Development Project
Samar Integrated Development Project
Cotabato-Agusan River Basin Development Project
Regional Lodation
Region II
Region IV-A
Region V
Region V
Region VII
Region VII
Region VIII
Regions X, XI &
XII.
Source: Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural Development
Projects ( now National Committee on Integrated Area Development)
I,
2.
3,
4.
5.
6,
7.
8.
Project Components for Selected IRDP's
Bicol River Basin
1. Road Construction
2. Municipal Ports
Development
3. Irrigation
4. Groundwater
Development
5. Flood Control
6. Waterworks
7. On-Farm Water
Management
8. Lake Fisheries
Development
9. Farming Systems
Development
10. Land Transfer
11. Land Classifica-
tion
12. Agri-business & In-
dustrial Project
13. Integrated Health,
Nutrition & Popu-
lation
14. Use of Medicinal
Plant
15. Social Housing
Mindoro
1. Water Control
2. Road Construction
& Improvement
3. Port Rehabilita-
tion
4. Seed Testing
5. Pest Control
6. Schistosomiesis
Control
7. Health Education
8. Margyan Assistance
Cagayan
1. Rural Electrifi-
cation
2. Salinity Protect-
ion
3. Irrigation
4. Flood Control
5. Road Construction
Samar
Irrigation
Flood Control &
Drainage
Road Construction
Port Development
Construction of
Rural Health Units
& Barrio Health
Stations
Health Programs
Rehabilitation &
Construction of
Waterpoints
Catabato-Aguson
1. Irrigation
2. Watershed
Management
3. Soil & Forest
Resource Corin-
servation
4. Small-scale
Electrification
5. Flood Control
Source: Project Documents
WW I lw
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Table 41 Rural Families Classified by Level and Main Source of Income, 1971
Main Source of
Income
Families in
lower 40 percent
thou-
sands percent
Families in
upper 60 percent
thous-
sands percent
Total Families
thous-
ands percent
Farming
Self-employed
Wage labor
Foresty & Fishing
Other Occupations
Self-employed
Wage labor
Other Sources
Agricultural rents
Other
Total Rural Families
Total Urban and Rural
Families
1,756
1,409
347
165
388
190
198
130
54
76
2,439
2,710
64.8
52.0
12.8
6.1
14.3
7.0
7.3
4.8
2.0
2.8
90.0
100.0
1,208
852
356
117
900
231
669
107
31
76
2,332
3,862
31.2
22.1
9.1
3.0
23.4
5.9
17.5
2.9
0.9
2.0
60.5
100.0
2,964
2,261
703
282
1,288
421
867
237
85
152
4,771
6,572
Source: Based on BCS, Survey of Households Bulletin, No. 34 (1971) and No. 22 (1965) and on
Philippine Statistical Survey of Households Bulletin, No. 14 (1961).
45.1
34.4
10.7
4.3
19.6
6.4
13.2
3.6
1.3
2.3
72.6
100.0
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Table 42 Proposed Major Integrated Area Development
Projects' Investment Requirements
Estimated Cost (in million)
Name of Projects Local (r) Forex ($) TOTAL (P)
1. Bohol Integrated Area Development 263.0 27.5 469.25
2. Cagayan Valley Integrated Area
Development
a. Municipal & Barangay Waterworks
System 122.0 18.0 257.0
b. Water Resources, Storage &
Impounding Reservoirs 102.0 14.0 207.0
c. Cagayan Estuary Salinity
Protection 187.0 25.0 374.5
3. Bicol River Basin Development
Program
a. Rinconada Integrated Area
Development 142.0 21.0 299.5
b. Quinali Integrated Area
Development 90.0 13.5 191.25
c. Baliwag/San Vincente Integrated
Area Development 60.0 12.0 150.0
d. Land Consolidation 15.0 3.0 37.5
e. Integrated Health, Nutrition
and Population 15.0 5.0 52.5
f. Naga-Calabanga Integrated Area
Development 68.0 14.0 173.0
g. Upgrading of the Camarines Sur
Agricultural College 33.0 6.0 78.0
h. Bicol River Basin transport
A. Roads 214.0 17.0 341.5
B. Ports 28.0 2.0 43.0
4. Pampanga Delta/Candaba Swamp
Development Reservoir
a. San Antonio Irrigation and Flood
Balancing 27.0 3.0 49.5
b. Partial Reclamation and Irriga-
tion Project in the Candaba Swamp 30.0 5.0 67.5
c. Groundwater Development 37.5 7.0 90.0
5. Samar Integrated Rural Development 439.0 56.0 859.0
6. Palawan Integrated Area
Development 102.0 20.0 252.0
7. Lanao Integrated Development 330.0 36.0 600.0
8. Phil. Rural Infrastructure Project
No. 1 225.0 17.0 352.5
9. Sab-A Basin Integrated Area
Development 105.0 14.0 210.0
10. Ilocos Norte Rural Development 434.4 64.0 914.5
400.0 6,069.033,069.0TOTAL
Palay Harvested Area, Average Yields per Hectare, 1975
(in thousand hectares and metric tons per hectare)
Total Harvested
1975
Area Yield
Lowland Irrigated
1975
Area Yield
Lowland Non-
Irrigated 1975
Area Yield
Upland
1975
Area Yield
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics
Table 43
3,539
2,049
339
414
501
447
348-
706
439
85
182
784
137
142
180
325
1.54
1.62
1.54
1.74
1.97
1.54
1.60
1.33
1.54
1.27
1.22
1.46
1.49
1.35
1.68
1.40
1,412
959
127
220
291
177
144
155
90
26
39
298
50
51
96
101
2.00
2.04
1.78
2.02
2.19
2.03
1.71
1.94
2.01
1.53
1.83
1.97
2.13
1.65
2.10
1.88
1,674
856
201
163
200
157
135
492
314
54
124
326
54
69
76
127
1.40
1.47
1.31
1.53
1.69
1.37
1.40
1.32
1.48
1.15
1.06
1.26
1.51
1.12
1.29
1.21
453
234
11
31
10
113
69
59
35
5
19
160
33
22
8
97
0.89
0.93
0.95
1.06
0.88
1.02
0.71
0.67
0.65
0.68
0.71
0.92
0.75
1.06
0.87
0.93
Land and Labor Productivity for Different Land Qualities
Land
Productivity 3
(Pesos/Hectare)
(1)
3,598
796
1,876
1,200
610
1,118
746
Labor
Land Ratio3
(Manyear/Ha)
(2)
1.003
0.498
0.592
0.620
0.388
0.891
0.665
Labor
Productivity
(Pesos/Man)
(3)
3,587
1,598
3,169
1,935
1,572
1,255
1,122
Full Family
Employment
Income 4 (Pesos)
(4)
5,380
2,397
4,754
2,902
2,358
1,883
1,683
Needed Farm Size For
Reaching Full Employ-
Poverty ment of
Threshold 5 (Ha) Family4 (Ha)
(5) (6)
0.834
3.769
1.599
2.500
4.918
2.683
4.021
1.496
3.012
2.53 4
2.419
3.366
1.684
2.256
11 - is irrigated farmland; AI, BI, CI, DI are non-irrigated areas of these land classes (for definition
of land classes, A, B, C, D and M, refer to Appendix 6); and MC is cultivated M level.
2Land productivity coefficients estimated in G. Gwyer's study, "Agricultural Employment and Farm Incomes in
Relation to Land Classes: A Regional Analysis," adjusted from 1971 to 1975 by cost of living index.
3Labor-land coeffieients estimated in G. Gwyer's study.
4Assuming farm family can provide 1.5 manyears of labor supply.
5Poverty threshold is P3,000 per family
w w 1W
Table 44
Land
Category1
I
AI
BI
CI
DI
M
MC
1w
Masagana 99 Area and Loans Approved for
Phase V (1975) and Phase XI (1978)
Phase V
Area
Area Percent.
(000 Has)
Amount of
Amount
(in Pmillions)
Loans
Percent
Phase XI
Area
Area 'Percent
(000 Has)
Amount of
Amount
(in Pmillions)
PHILIPPINES 1,140 100.0 316.1 100.0
LUZON 767 87.3 191.3 60.5
I 161 14.1 27.3 8.6
II 70 6.1 4.6 1.5
III 336 29.5 105.4 33.3
IV-A 134 11.8 38.7 12.3
V 66 5.8 15.3 4.8
VISAYAS 210 18.4 54.6 17.3
VI 157 13.8 41.6 13.1
VII 17 1.5 5.7 1.8
VIII 36 3.1 7.4 2.3
MINDANAO 163 14.3 70.1 22.2
IX 36 3.1 16.9 5.3
x 29 2.6 11.9 3.8
XI 50 4.4 27.3 8.6
XII 48 4.2 14.1 4.5
Note: Details may not add up to totals because of rounding.
Source: Masagana 99 Program Summaries
Ministry of Agriculture
W MW 1w
Table 45
Region Loans
Percent
996.8
688.2
161.5
89.0
265.6
105.0
67.2
145.2
100.3
9.4
35.5
163.5
21.0
31.1
35.7
65.7
100.0
69.0
16.2
8.9
26.6
10.5
6.7
14.6
10.1
1.0
3.6
16.4
3.1
3.1
3.6
6.6
222.4
141.6
11.8
25.7
61.7
17.9
24.5
25.6
20.8
2.0
2.8
55.2
7.1
11.2
18.7
18.2
100.0
63.7
5.3
11.6
27.7
8.1
11.0
11.5
9.4
0.9
1.2
24.8
3.2
5.0
8.4
8.2
1w
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VIII. The RegionalAlocati~on of Public Expe4ditres.
Together with financial incentives, public investments in infrastruc-
ture have been invariably used in many countries as an instrument for im-
plementing regional policy. In the Philippines, infrastructure expenditures
are borne almost entirely by the government sector. As such the level and
the distribution of the public expenditure program can be utilized by the
government to pursue its regional development objectives.
A. Impact on Regional Disparities.
The past regional distribution of infrastructure expenditures partly
explains the currently existing spatial disparities in income and develop-
ment. This allocation has favored the MMA, its neighboring regions, Regions
III and IV-A, and Regions VI and XI. (Table 46). Perhaps it is not purely
accidental that these regions also rank as the most economically developed.
To a large extent, this pattern shows that the regional distribution of a
country's infrastructure is closely geared to the regional distribution of
economic activities. The concentration of past public investments in these
areas reflects the country's need for rapid industrial growth in the 1950s
and 1960s which, in turn, required the concentration of infrastructure
development in a few regions that possessed the greatest potential for in-
dustrial location. (At that time the diversion of resources to backward
regions might have had adverse effects on the overall growth of the national
economy.) In a study made to determine the factors influencing the re-
gional allocation of public expenditures in the Philippines, population
level, urbanization, industrialization and commercialization were found to
have strong explanatory significance. This finding seems to suggest that
infrastructure expenditures were more a consequence of, rather than a
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stimulus to, a region's economic growth. As the leading regions became more
developed, their demand for more infractructure facilities to meet the re-
quirements and to offset the unfavorable externalities of economic growth
rose correspondingly. And as these facilities were provided, concentration
of economic activities continued, thereby reinforcing their dominance.
B, Role of Infrastructure in Regional Development.
The grave consequences of this past concentration of infrastructure
avestment oi the degree of spatial disparities among regions are very
apparent. Hence the goal of regional development is embodied in the national
plan. As an initial step, we must verify the extent to which the public
expenditure program can be used to promote regional development and narrow
down spatial disparities. It should be stressed at the outset that, since
the bulk of the regional structure of a country is more or less predeter-
mined and a large portion of its marginal growth arises from development
of existing activities, it would seem inevitable that the influence of
infrastructure policy on regional development can only be a slow and long-
term one. Thus it would be pointless at this period to evaluate if there
has been any significant change in the geographical distribution of infra-
structure investment since regional development was incorporated as an aim
of national development and, more so, whether these investments have had
any impact, favorable or otherwise. Nevertheless there are some indications
of the future direction of public investments that are quite alarming inso-
far as the issue of spatial equity is concerned. The planned massive infra-
structure build-up in the MMA largely financed by the national government
(first mentioned in Chapter V) appears to run directly counter to the po-
licy of decentralizing economic activities to the regions. Even in the
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highway and portworks development program 1978-87 (Table 47) the metropo-
litan region will garner a large chunk of investments. Of course it cannot
be claimed categorically that this favorable treatment of the MMA is entirely
unjustified. After all this region, just like any other, is beset with its
own problems. However, in view of the industrial dispersal policy, the need
for restraint systems as a means of controlling the MMA's continued growth
was emphasized in the preceding chapters. Since infrastructure provision
has played a key role in the growth of the MMA, a redirection of infrastruc-
ture investment away from this areas is a primary component of restraint
systems.
Problematic trade-offs between spatial equity and efficiency are in-
volved in determining the role of the public expenditure program in regional
development efforts. A dsipersion of infrastructure resources away from the
IMA may retard, not only its own growth, but possibly that of the whole
economy unless the other regions are able to offset the MMA's probable
losses. Continued concentration, on the other hand, heightens regional
disparities. The resolution of the equity versus efficiency issue sets the
basis for the use of infrastructure in regional policy implementation. Again
the planning and political processes shall pursue different objectives in
this resolution. The former advocates concentrated dispersal in line with
regional priorities for the industrial dispersal strategy and the IRDPs,
while the latter prefers a wider distribution of investments. However, due
to the political power of its present leadership, the MMA may overwhelm any
preferences forwarded by both processes; in fact, this seems to be happening
at present.
Another requirement for determining the role of infrastructure is an
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assessment of existing deficiencies and how these deficiencies affect or
are responsible for the prevailing regional situation which we deem neces-
sary to modify. With such an assessment, the regional allocation of infra-
structure investment can be better substantiated. Very often them is a ten-
dency to use standards or norms, like roads per unit area or schoolrooms
per thousand population,as a measure of regional disparities and subsequently
as a basis for policy guidelines for resource allocation without fully re-
alizing their inherent limitations. Moreover the provision of infrastructure
is considered as a panacea for the underdeveloped regions. It should be
recognized that, while the low level of infrastructure in some regions is
indeed a serious bottleneck in their growth process, no amount of infra-
structure will promote economic growth unless the necessary complementary
89/
preconditions also exist.-- In some cases there are deficiencies that have
to be eliminated first before other things can work. For example, the ina-
dequacy of the transport system and power in Region II and flood control in
Samar(Region VIII) are impediments to any regional effort. It is therefore
$mportant to assess regional infrastructure needs relative to the develop-
Ment thrust of the regions in order to support proposals regarding the role
of infrastructure in regional policy. Subsequently criteria for regional
investment policy can be set.
Since it is not possible to implement all that needs to be done in a
short time, priorities have to be established in order to provide the base
for planned regional development and to reduce regional disparities. Simi-
larly priorities between sectors or kinds of infrastucture as transport,
power or housing are necessary. In no case will priorities between regions
or sectors represent a total selection of one alternative over another but
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rather the identification of a particular thrust in that region or sector
90/
consistent with regional development objectives.-
Concluding Remarks
Undeniably it is clear that infrastructure development policy is only
one, but an important one, of the components of regional policy. After re-
alizing the adverse impact of past regional patterns of public expenditures,
some decentralization of infrastructure investments appears to be warranted
in support of spatial equity objectives. Accordingly there is a need to
modify the criteria for investment decisions in order to take explicit ac-
count of equity objectives, thereby giving lagging regions a fair share of
public investments. The IRDPs are a step towards this direction.
Since the large part (about 75 per cent) of public investments is made
by the national government coupled with the limited revenue raising powers
of local governments, the extent to which the infrastructure expenditure
program is used as an implementing instrument of regional policy is con-
tingent upon the degree of commitment of the central power to the whole
process of regional development. With this commitment the national expen-
diture program can further distributional objectives. This is why the
planned infrastructure expansion in the MMA should raise serious concern.
In addition to national government support, the delegation of substantive
powers to the institutional mechanism at the regional level - the RDCs -
ts a prerequisite to determining the proper role of infrastructure in the
regional development thrust. The RDC must be in a position to influence
national decisions related to resource allocation.
*During the 1960s and early 1970s public investment averaged about 2 per
cent of GNP. About 75 per cent was undertaken by the national government, 91/
15 per cent by public authorities and 10 per cent by the local governments.
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If the regional allocation procedure for the national infrastructure
program ignores equity considerations, this may thwart any attempt at rec-
tifying regional imbalances. This is especially important since the inter-
action between the planning and political processes often results in over-
ambitious collections of programs and projects whose total financial'
requirements usually exceed national government capability. The national
government may eventually decide by itself which regions should receive
priority in the resource allocation process. Input from the regions is
necessary in order to impress upon decision-makers the need for considering
both spatial equity and efficiency objectives.
Regional* Allocation of Infrastructure Expenditure (in percent)
All Infrastructure Portworks Waterworks Irrigation
Flood Control
& Drainage
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 1971- 1959- 1971-
61 73 61 73 61 73 61 73 61 73
Buildings, Schools
and Hospitals
FY
1959-
61
FY
1971-
73
I 4.8
II, 4.4
4.2
6.3
III 7.0 27.8
2.9 2.9
1.1 0.1
0.2 1.1
IV 49.6 28.3 70.2 63.4
V 4.3
VI 7.1
VII 1.9
VIII 5.9
IX 1.6
X 2.3
XI 11.1
7.2
1.8
2.9
8.8
2.2
8.9
1.6
3.7 4.5
2.9 1.8
4.2 2.4
4.6 9.0
3.1 2.9
3.9 7.8
3.1 4.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7.6
2.5
5.4
1.0 6.5
.9 13.8
1.2
4.2
3.9
3.5
6.2
1.8
2.9 15.8 58.0 43.2 37.6
48.4 89.3 10.6
1.5
4.9
2.0
10.1
1.3
3.6
12.2
1.9 19.7
0.4 17.8
0.2
0.6
0.3
2.0
0.5
0.0
6.5
1.7
0.2 5.7
0.7 2.7
1.2 10.9
5.6 18.1 29.5 68.9 49.6
1.2 10.9
2.0
0.0
4.0
3.2
0.1 11.8
7.9
4.6
3.3
0.4
4.7
3.7
1.5
4.8
0 2.7
1.8
8.8 10.1
3.3
3.9
3.5 7.1
- 3.6
0.4 14.4
- 0.4
0.0 0.8
4.3 24.9 0.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*Based on regional classification in 1974. The present Region XII was formed by combining 2 provinces from
Region X and 3 provinces from Region XI.
Region
High-
ways
FY
1971-
73
5.5
18.3
9.3
16.7
13.6
0.3
7.7
16.9
0.9
8.8
2.0
100.0
Table 46
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Regional Distribution of Planned Highway and Portworks
Expenditures, 1978-82
Highways
PHILIPPINES 100.0
30.7
3.4
3.2
1.2
19.7
LUZON
II
III
IV*
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
3.2
16.2
7.8
6.2
2.2
8.1
2.1
1.9
1.2
2.9
Interregional or
Nationwide 45.0
* For highways, Regions IV and IV-A are combined.
Portworks
100.0
27.6
2.2
1.8
1.3
10.6
9.4
2.3
9.9
2.9
2.7
4.3'
16.3
3.2
4.8
4.5
3.8
46.2
Source of Basic Data: Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, 1978-82
Table 47
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PART IV
On the basis of the evaluation exercise, Part IV presents the major
findings and conclusions of this study. It highlights the consequences of
the interaction between the planning and political processes, in terms of
the trade-offs between the spatial equity and efficiency objectives of
regional policies. Recommendations are subsequently advanced for conside-
ration in regional policy making.
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IX. Result-; of the Study.
In the evaluation of policies, the main concern has been focused on
interregional disparities and,to a lesser extent, on intraregional and
personal income inequities. The overall strategy for spatial equity provides
a framework by which the elimination of interregional disparities is achieved
through the formulation of an internally consistent policy mix and the pri-
oritization of the regions under each sectoral component of this package.
While the first task is easily implementable from a technical perspective,
the latter element of this strategy will require the interaction of the
planning and political processes in deciding on regional disparities.
A. Major Findings and Conclusions.
1. We have seen the tendency for equal participation in nationwide
centrally generated programs, since the dominance of the political process
in policy making has been very much in evidence. Hence the selection of
regional priorities for the overall strategy for spatial equity is indeed
a difficult task. The political process attempts to pursue decentralization
and attain spatial equity objectives through equal treatment for all regions.
However, even assuming that these are achieved, a considerable loss in ef-
ficiency is the likely adverse consequence. The planning process, on the
other hand, is making concessions in a bid to gain political acceptability
for its proposed policies and programs. Unfortunately these concessions
often jeopardize effective implementation. These observations are confirmed
in the past experience of the regional development authorities, which were
potentially powerful instruments for regional development because of the
joining of planning to effective power. Regrettably political opportunism
led to the indiscriminate proliferation of these public bodies, leading to
11 1  | | 'l 11 ' , "I ' ' ,lli ', IM ' |1 || 1 ||I 1 11 l l 1' 1 11111ll ll l ll ||||e
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a dilution of resources, corruption and mismanagement, which eventually
incapacitated their operations.
In a similar vein, the nationwide industrial estate program is also
reflective of the concessions of policy makers to political pressures
which call for equal regional participation in practically every program.
The present features of this program offer the least political complica-
tions, disregarding the preference of the planning process for limited
participation on the basis of comparative advantage and other technical
criteria. Because of the ambitious plan of establishing at least one indus-
trial estate in every region, the same problems which haunted the regional
development authorities may be experienced. Moreover, due to the strict
efficiency requirements for industrial promotion in a region, the construc-
tion of an industrial estate in a region with a poor potential for indus-
trial location may just redound to a wasteful and inefficient use of scarce
resources, which is the direct opposite of this approach's stated objective.
The implementation of the industrial dispersal policy can be more effective
by concentrating resources for industrial estate development to a few re-
gions with definite comparative advantage as evidenced from their present
industrial base, a well-developed infrastructure and emerging external
economies. It is also possible that, once resource constraints are met, a
quasi-prioritization process has to be made anyway, but if this is influ-
enced more by political rather than technical factors, then inefficiencies
will not be avoided.
Both the regional development authorities and the nationwide industrial
estate program are centrally generated programs of the national government.
Because of their prospects for enhancing regional growth as well as prestige,
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the opportunities for political intervention look irresistible, not only
during the design of the programs but especially in implementation stages.
These programs are viewed in isolation by the regions, thereby reinforcing
aspirations for extracting maximum share in each program.
2. One of the major causes of the problem of interregional inequity
has been the strict adherence to efficiency requirements when there is an
overriding national objective. This is confirmed in the past regional allo-
cation of public expenditures in resource allocation in view of the country's
need for rapid industrial growth. The concentration of public investments
in these areas contributed to present interregional disparities. (Of course
this should not be misconstrued to mean that the status of the MMA as the
national capital did not also influence decisions.) More recently, in pur-
suit of the national objective of food self-sufficiency, priority in the
Masagana 99 coverage was given to productive ricelands located in more
developed regions. These areas had previously been beneficiaries of irri-
gation investments because of their complementary role to the major urban
cneters, particularly the MMA. In both of these instances, benefitting re-
gions already fall on the upper portion of the regional income spectrum.
Whenever a national objective clearly dominates any regional goal, it
is, relatively easy to overcome poltical pressures originating from the
regions, regardless of the motivations behind such pressures. Besides, the
M4A was and still is the most politically powerful, thus it was naturally
favored in the national decision making set-up. In the rice production pro-
gram, natural factors such as the limited availability of irrigation systems
in effect excluded certain regions, thereby making the task of establishing
regional priorities in program coverage less problematic. In essence,
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therefore, spatial equiLy objectives can be relegated to an oblivious posi-
tion if there is a particular national objective that is based on tight
efficiency conditions.
3. An essential component of the overall strategy for spatial equity
is the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), which appears to be
the exception to the mutual exclusivity between equity and efficiency.
These two objectives are likely to be achieved simultaneously since pre-
ference has been given to depressed regions or provinces. In addition the
diversion of resources to these areas does not sacrifice efficiency in re-
source allocation inasmuch as multisectoral investments are complementary
and designed to create a synergistic impact on the regional growth process.
In most cases, investments are concentrated in resource-rich sections of
the regions, e.g., the river basins.
So far the IRDPs have not been exposed very much to political pressures,
despite their being potentially attractive sources of funds, simply because
policy guidleines specifying the priority to be accorded to poor areas have
been closely followed. Moreover the institutional mechanism for the imple-
mentation of this program has been given considerable decision-amking powers,
ranging from planning to actual physical construction. The program is also
supervised at the national level by a select group of cabinet ministers.
These obvious manifestations of central government support could have dis-
couraged initially political intervention. However, with the apparent suc-
cess of this regional development program, there seems to be a trend
towards widening its coverage, perhaps a reflection of political intrusion
which could eventually dilute its effectiveness.
4. Despite the organizational reforms undertaken to strengthen the
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RDCs, the balance of power is still lopsidadly in favor of a few regions
which enjoy preferential treatment, arising from their strategic political
importance and/or direct access to the central power. Greater delegation
of substantive powers and the allocation of more resources provide the
source of strength to these regions. In contrast, the other regions still
have inadequate executive powers due to the slow pace of the institutional
decentralization program. This deficiency inhibits their ability to influ-
ence national and regional decisions especially those related to resource
allocation, notwithstanding the introduction of the RBS, the RDF and RIP.
For example, if the RDC cannot require compliance to its decisions by line
agencies, then it may be difficult to ensure that agency regional budgets
are directed towards RDC plan priorities. With limited powers, most regions
are further disadvantaged vis-a-vis the special regions.
In view of the unequal status, the tendency for all regions aiming for
participation in every development program grows even stronger in an at-
tempt to improve the chances for acquiring resources from at least some
programs. This however may result in an inefficient allocation of resources,
not only at the interregional scale but also at the intraregional level
since regions fail to specialize in sectors where they have an edge. Like-
wise, due to the limited powers of the regional planning bodies, the in-
fluence of local politicians becomes potentially powerful and capable of
undermining the effectiveness of the policy making process. The technical
component of policy is greatly weakened and its intended impact may never
materialize.
The adverse consequences of an uneven distribution of power among the
regions are magnified during the implementation stage. Public investments
-209-
like the IRDPs and the industrial estates are mere components of the natio-
nal expenditure program. Inasmuch as public expenditure decision-making is
done within a political or institutional context, areas enjoying more sup-
port from the national government are able to extract more resources. On
the other hand, most of the RDCs, even if their claims are validated in
regional plans, may not necessarily receive adequate attention and resources
from the national government.
The essence of a decentralization program is the commitment of the
national government to the development of strong subnational organizations
which are in a position to determine their own set of priorities and iden-
tify alternative courses of action directed towards these priorities. A
prerequisite however is the devolution of decision-making to the regional
level and control over resources given to the RDC as a body and to sectoral
regional agencies. In view of the increased responsibilities of the RDCs
and the regional line offices, the provision of more executive powers com-
mensurate with these new roles and the development of additional technical
capability are necessary. With the formation of strong regional institutions,
the prospects for effectively pursuing economic decntralization become more
attractive.
5. At the intraregional level, almost all policies strive basically
for efficiency in order to facilitate the regional growth process. Dispa-
rities within the regions are likely to worsen unless regional policies
and programs induce more spread effects. At present, due to the stringent
locational demands of industries, a wider dispersion is precluded, with
industrial dispersal measures showing an urban bias. In fact, even the
small industries which are being promoted for the mobilization of the rural
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sector are still found21 in urban areas because of the availability of phy-
si1 cal facilities and services and other inherent advantages of urban loca-
tions. Besides the low level of rural incomes militates against the emergence
of more locally-based manufacturing activities.
The rural development programs, the IRDPs and Masagana 99, attempt to
raise productivity and income levels in rural areas. In general, however,
these programs benefit the more productive segment of the agricultural sec-
tor. A large portion of the porpopulation, the informal and traditional
agricultural sector, is not reached by these development efforts. Conse-
quently the current rural development programs, while capable of raising
overall regional incomes and setting the stage for off-farm-based fields
of endeavor, may fail to uplift the conditions of the rural poor.
D. Recommendations.
1. On the Overall Strategy for Spatial Equity.
In the overall strategy for spatial equity, the industrial dispersal
policy- shall assume the leading role, with the IRDPs providing a comple-
mentary scheme. In view of the continuing convergence of industries towards
the MMA despite some initial decentralization measures, the implementation
of the industrial dispersal policy must be phased so that, in the short
term, it is used not so much as a strategy for accelerating the growth rate
of the lagging regions, but mainly as a strategy for controlling the growth
of the MMA, Accordingly short term priorities need to be established. These
;in turn will affect the nationwide industrial estate program in terms of
scheduling of actual construction and exploring the possibility of indus-
trial areas or zones.
Analysis suggests that an interregional framework, using a region's
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agricultural resource potential and its comparative advantage for industrial
location, is appropriate as a basis for determining regional priorities. The
results of this analysis show that, as an initial step toward the regional
dispersal of industries, the present industrializing regions, Regions I, VI,
VII, X and XI, should be given priority inasmuch as these regions are best
suited to act as countermagnets to the MMA. It is in these regions where
the existing industrial centers are located and where the scope for agri-
cultural expansion is restricted. Therefore these regions already have an
initial advantage for further industrial expansion in the form of a broade-
ning manufacturing and services base, available supporting infrastructure
and a semblance of emerging agglomeration economies. From an efficiency
point of view, the promotion of existing industrial locations in these areas
can counteract the MMA's dominance. Corollarily a key element in industrial
dispersal is the imposition of restraint systems in the MMA to ensure that
industrial growth in the priority regions will be at the expense of the MMA
rather than the non-priority regions. In addition, the diffusion of growth
from the proposed industrial estates to their peripheries should be effected
possibly through the composition of an industrial mix with greater linkages
to the local economy, i.e., labor supply, raw materials, etc. and to other
tudustries in the regions, i.e., through interindustry complementation.
Meanwhile the non-priority regions must be given preference in the
selection of IRDPs since they are poor and predominantly rural areas. This
is being followed at present with most of the identified sites located in
depressed regions. Moreover the marked agricultural orientation of projects
fits into the patterns of sectoral priorities since, in many cases, land
and labor productivities are low largely as a result of inadequate services
212
and facilities. With the elimination of existing deficiencies in basic ru-
ral infrastructure, especially in irrigation and transport, the lagging
regions may subsequently benefit from the package of services offerred under
the national rice production program, which currently favor the more agri-
culturally developed regions with available irrigation service. Present
priorities in Masagana 99 reflect production maximization and efficiency
goals because of the drive for self-sufficiency. However, once the status
of the country's self-sufficiency is relatively stable, spatial equity
objectives can be considered explicitly in program design, with the program
being used as a means of aiding agriculture in lagging regions. As farm
production increases in response to intensification measures, the transport-
ation element of the IRDPs becomes critical in linking production areas to
regional and external markets.
When the regions reach a certain level of agricultural development,
the prospects for industrialization are improved immensely. With the rise
in farm incomes, small rural-based industries may emerge and become viable.
With an expanded transport system, there may even be possibilities for in-
terregional complementation whereby agricultural products of one region are
processed in another region which has been chosen as priority area in the
industrial dispersal program. Complementation can be a way of diffusing
the impact of industrial dispersal to areas than the actual location of
nanufacturing plants and industrial estates. Hence, with the IRDPs sup-
porting industrial dispersal policy, the short-term tendency for regional
income divergence is attenuated. Poor regions are gradually prepared for
eventual industrialization and more active participation in the regional
dispersal of industries.
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Phasing and pritritizatioI constitute attempts at achieving efficiency
and spatial equity objectives simultaneously because they aim for a moderate
degree of equity in the short run in exchange for some efficiency gains.
The significance of prioritizing regions in the industrial dispersal pro-
gram and exploring alternatives to full scale industrial estate development
becomes more evident when the problem of resources is confronted. If an
efficient allocation of resources through infrastructure provision is truly
the main concern, then an implementation strategy that could lead to a dilu-
tion of resources, e.g., establishing one industrial estate in every region,
must be avoided. Furthermore, since selected sites for industrial estates
require different levels of investments for conversion into suitable loca-
tions for industry, planned physical development of the sites must be re-
gulated accordingly.
Phasing seeks to identify areas with the greatest potential for indus-
trial production in the short term. It is likely to encounter much opposition
inasmuch as some regions are necessarily excluded, at least temporarily.
Moreover the industrial dispersal policy is viewed in isolation rather than
as a component of a broader strategy for spatial equity with different sec-
toral components. Therefore it is imperative that the package of sectoral
policies and programs that compose the overall strategy for spatial equity
be presented for evaluation instead of taking each individual component on
its own merit. Clear policy implementation guidelines need to be set at the
national level specifying regional priorities under each sectoral program
in order to attain an efficient allocation of resources, lessen political
pressures for equal participation in each program and allow some form of
regional specialization,
-&sow"
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2. On Further r t Rg a Planning and Lmplementation System.
It has been noted that, due to the pervasive influence of politics in
the formulation and implementation of national and regional policies, the
tendency has been towards equal regional participation in centrally gene-
rated programs. Although the national government has conducted studies or
has set technical criteria to determine the extent of each region's parti-
cipation, these studies or criteria are conveniently ignored or modified
in concession to political pressures. In effect, it is the political pro-
cess that largely decides the regional allocation of a program and its re-
sources. Given such a result, two possibilities exist, viz; 1) equal par-
ticipation of the regions which, if implemented, would usually lead to a
dilution of resources, and 2) if resource constraints are obviously faced
$in implementation, the regions close to the national government power
receive priority. In any event, the probable ultimate outcome is ineffi-
ciency in resource allocation. In addition this type of situation also
impedes regional specialization since every region seeks involvement in
almost every program. Therefore adverse consequences on interregional and
intraregional resource allocation are likely to occur.
The recent institutional improvements like the RBS, the RDF and the
'RIF, aim to provide flexibility and ensure efficiency in resource allocation.
More specifically the purpose is to "appropriate" to the regions some amount
of resources, the use of which is at their discretion according to regional
plan priorities. In this manner, uncertainty is reduced and the region is
expected to be more selective in its choice of programs and projects since
it is aware of the most probable level of resources at its disposal. Moreover
a more efficient allocation is anticipated to be achieved because, even
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assuming that the interregional distribution of national government resour-
ces is determined primarily by the political process, the region can still
direct whatever resources has been allocated to it to uses which are legi-
timized by the planning process. An implicit assumption in this entire
scheme is that the interaction between the technocracy and the political
leadership at the RDC level has reached a compromise set of priorities
reflective of the regional situation's real needs. Therefore the presence
of a strong RDC set-up or regional planning machinery is an essential
requirement.
The main bottleneck that presently lies in the path of this ideal
decentralized resource allocation model is that the requirement for a strong
regional planning set-up is only partially met. While the institutional
improvements have strengthened the RDC, the decentralization of central
government function has proceeded sluggishly and the additional demands
on the regional offices have not been matched with the corresponding tech-
nical expertise.
With the planning exercises behind them, the RDCs are moving towards
plan implementation, hence the recent organizational reforms. However the
ability to influence resource allocation through the new systems h's been
constrained by the lack of substantive and executive powers delegated to
the RDCs which has, in turn, impeded the proper matching of resources to
programs and projects needed by the region. Functions related to implemen-
tation like project planning are still centralized at the national office
and many projects included in regional plans have been identified by the
head offices. On the other hand, the technical capability for these functions
at the regional level has not yet been fully developed simply because these
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implementation-related tasks have just been added to the regional offices'
duties. Therefore, to facilitate decentralization of more national govern-
ment functions, the required capability at the regional level must first
be achieved in order to justify demands for more power and assure a smooth
turnover of responsibilities.
Aside from decentralization and manpower development, the devolution
of greater authority to the RDC asabody must be effected. At present, the
RDC does not have its own financial resources and therefore has to influence
by persuasion the line agencies which have the regional budgets. To be truly
effective, the RDC must have greater authority over these line agencies and,
even over local governments, to ensure compliance with its decisions and
the allocation of resources according to its priorities. In this way, it
can recommend a system of priorities for the allocation of budgetary re-
sources for programs and projects of national government agencies and sub-
sequently monitor compliance.
All these proposals are directed at further strengthening the RDC in
view of additional demands arising from the movement from plan formulation
to plan implementation. Vested with additional powers, the RDC can impose
its own priorities and ascertain that these are adequately reflected and
supported in regional budgets of line agencies. Furthermore an improved
planning and implementation capability in the RDC technical staff and re-
gional line agencies will solidify the technical element of plans and invest-
ment programs. Sectoral thrusts of the regions can be determined on the
basis of more objective criteria as opposed to the present tendency for
involvement in all programs. With the formation of a potent RDC machinery,
it becomes less vulnerable to political pressures and the danger for the
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diversion of funds to "pork barrel" projects -is decreased, A more amicable
relationship between national government agencies and local elective of-
ficials at the regional level may be developed when benefits from programs
and projects truly improve local conditions. Eventually the efficiency at
which resources are used at the regional level will create positive impact
on future allocations from the central government inasmuch as claims on
resources are legitimately supported by actual performace. This resource
allocation scheme is tantamount to actually allocating monies 'on a regional
basis and it provides an essential component to the decentralization
program.
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Appendix 1. Pertinent Excerpts from the Philippine Development Plans.
A. National Development Plan 1Y 1974-77.
1. In view of the glaring growth imbalance among regions, more emphasis
is now being given to regional development and industrialization, thus
in addition to the correction of policies which artificially favor a
few selected areas, the integrated approach to regional development is
-being utilized. This approach calls for an integration of physical de-
velopment with economic, social, administrative and financial aspects
of development into a common plan for a given area...
2. In order to disperse the gains of development and avoid the formation
of enclaves in the Metropolitan Manila area and other urban centers,
regional development efforts are now being intensified...
3. Special attention in this regard will be directed to the development
of the Muslim areas... the recent upsurge of dissidence in Muslim Min-
.danao has underscored the need for intensive implementation of regional
dispersal policies with a view towards spreading the benefits of economic
growth -to the different regions particularly the Muslim areas...
B. National Development Plan FY 1978-82.
The new Plan contains a whole chapter entitled "Regional Development
Framework". In the other chpaters, starting from the national goals and
policies to the economic, social and infrastructure sectors, the regional
dimension is very evident. Some relevant excerpts are:
1. The basic objective of the current thrust in the development of regions
is to effect equity of opportunity for each region to exploit its full
potential with respect to its demographic, economic, social, political
and environmental resources. The intent here is to make the development
of depressed and lagging regions grow at rates faster than the relative-
ly more developed regions in order to lessen regional inequalities with-
out unduly hindering the growth of the latter regions nor slowing total
national development...Regional planning and development should be
viewed both as goals of national development and also as major instru-
ments by which the ultimate aims of promoting social equity, increasing
per capita income and effecting a more equitable income distribution
are being achieved and harmonized.
2. A number of regions in the country lag behind the more developed ones
in terms of growth, employment and provision of basic services to their
growing populations. These depressed regions especially the rural areas
became the seat of discontent in the past.
3. The state will promote regional balance in economic opportunities.
Infrastructure support, appropriate incentives and selective adminis-
trative prescriptions will be provided to encourage the location of
new industries and other development activities in different regions
taking into account resource availability, as well as the existing
and potential size of the market.
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Appendix 2 Salient Features of Letter of Instruction No. 22
A. Functions of the Regional Development Council (RDC)
1. Conduct a comprehensive and detailed survey of the resources and
.potentialities of the region which will serve as the basis for the
preparation of long-range and annual plans for the region within
the guidelines set by NEDA.
2. Translate the national economic goals into more specific regional
objectives which shall be reflected in the plans and programs of.
action prepared for the region.
3. Develop a research program involving continuing studies on the
.ocial, economic and cultural development of the region.
4. Consider and adopt an annual regional economic report for transmittal
to NEDA.
5. Extend planning and other related forms of technical assistance to
local governments, local planning boards, and sectoral departments of
the national government existing in the region and private entities.
6. Coordinate all planning activities of sectoral departments and local
planning boards.
7. Make the necessary changes, amendments and revisions in the regional
plans to improve and update them.
B. Organization
'The Regional Development Council is divided into three basic com-
ponents, viz: 1) the Council Proper, 2) the Executive Committee and
3) the Technical Staff. The RDC Council Proper is composed of the gover-
nors of the provinces and the mayors of the chartered cities comprising
the region, the regional directors of the Bureaus of Agricultural Ext-
ension and Plant Industry of the Department of Agriculture; the regional
directors of the Bureau of Public Highways and Bureau of Public Works
under the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication;
the regional directors of the Departments of Labor, Education and Cul-
ture, Health, Social Welfare, and Local Government and Community Deve-
lopment; the general managers of the regional and sub-regional develop-
ment authorities existing in the region if any, and the NEDA Regional
Executive Director. The Chairman of the Council Proper is elected among
the elective members while the NEDA Regional Executive Director automa-
tically becomes the Vice-Chairman. (Presently the RDC Chairman is appoin-
ted by the President upon the recommendation of the NEDA.)
Since the Philippines adopted the parliamentary system of government in
1978, the government departments have been called ministries.
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The Executive Committee of the RDC is composed of the regional
directors of the Bureau of Ptulic o the Bureau of Agricultural
Extension, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Department of Local Govern-
ment and Community Development, the Lwo representatisies for the elec-
tive members of the Council Proper, the general managers of the regional
or sub-regional development authorities, and the NEDA Regional Executive
Director who shall be the Chairman of the committee.
Among the important functions of the Executive Committee are:
]) review and recommend for adoption of the RDC regional plans, programs,
policies and guidelines, and 2) review a-nual regional economic reports
prepared by the Technical Staff for the consideration of the Council.
The Technical Staff is composed of the NEDA personnel in the region.
It is headed by the NEDA Regional Executive Director. There are two divi-
sions of the NEDA Regional Office, viz: 1) the Plan Formulation Division,
and 2) the Program Coordination Division.
The Plan Formulation Division has the following functions, among
others; 1) the formulation of regional plan, programs and policies, 2)
conduct a comprehensive and detailed survey of the resources and poten-
tialities of the region, and 3) conduct research on social, economic and
cultural development of the region. On the other hand, the following are
some of the functions of the Program Cooordination Division: 1) prepara-
tion of annual regional economic reports for submission to NEDA central
office, 2) coordination for the RDC of all planning and programming
activities of local government, local planning boards and sectoral de-
partments of the national government existing in the region, and 8) ex-
tend planning and other related forms of technical assistance to the
local governments, local planning boards and sectoral departments of the
national government and private entities.
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Appendix 3 Actual Regional Land Disposition, 1975
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV*
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
X
XI
XII
Total
Land
Area
A
30,000
14,139
2,157
3,640
1,828
4,751
1,763
5,660
2,022
1,495
2,143
10,201
1,869
2,833
3,158
2,341
Farmland
1975
Totall
B
8,802
3,599
357
617
539
1,110
954
1,946
783
488
675
3,257
671
788
955
843
Urban
2
Land
1975
C
816
590
42
15
200
300
33
130
56
48
26
96
17
29
25
25
Forest
3
Land
1975
D
12,786
6,121
827
2,093
484
2,398
319
1,603
340
279
984
5,062
778
1,502
1,666
1,116
Residual
4
Openlands
1975
E
7,596
3,829
909
915
605
943
457
1,981
843
680
458
1,786
403
514
512
357
*Includes MMA
1Farmland area from 1971 Agriculture Census projected at 1960-1971 annual
growth rates for regions where 1971 area is greater than 1960 area; other-
wise, 1975 area = 1971 farmland area.
2Human Settlements Commission
3According to Bureau of Forest Development
4 Calculated as E = A - (B + C + D)
Appendix 4
Total
Land
Area
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
iv+IVA
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
Ix
X
XI
XII
Projected Regional Land Disposition, 20001 (Thousand Hectares)
Tot
30,000
14,139
2,157
3,640
1,829
4,751
1,763
5,660
2,022
1,495
2,143
10,201
1,869
2,833
3,158
2,341
Land Available to Agriculture
2 0 0 0
al ABCD Land MX
15,351
7,003
1,039
1,766
807
1,988
1,403
3,111
1,281
775
1,055
5,237
1,144
1,123
1,550
1,420
6,471
2,718
308
857
382
863
308
1,444
336
136
972
2,309
575
610
437
687
Land
8,880
4,285
731
909
425
1,125
1,095
1,667
945
639
83
2,928
569
513
1,113
733
Urban2
Land
2000
1,859
1,236
90
60
350
650
86
287
120
110
57
336
66
120
80
70
Forest
Land
2000
12,790
5,900
1,028
1,814
617
2,113
274
2,262
621
610
1,031
4,628
659
1,590
1,528
851
The methodology used in constructing this Appendix is that land not needed for forest or urban use is
potentially available to agriculture as long as it is of ABCD or M or X quality. It is assumed that urban
land will used up on additional use one million hectares of ABCD land, which will come from present agri-
cultural land. To compensate for this, it is expected that agricultural land area will expand into M
category. Presently, only in Regions II, IV and VIIII are there unutilized ABCD land totalling3285,103
and 320 thousand hectares, erspectively.
2Human Settlements Commission
3According to Natural Resources, Perspective Year 2000, NEDA Sub-committee on Natural Resources, December 14,
1976. Excludes 960,000 hectares for forest range/grazing land. Area totals regionalized using BFD
Necessary Land Balance Rate" which are disaggregated to the provincial level.
Appendix 5 Employment Potential in Agriculture by Region
Employment
in
Agriculture
19751
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
I
II
III
IV-A
V
VISAYAS
VI
VII
VIII
MINDANAO
IX
X
XI
XII
7,454
3,132
619
496
548
827
642
2,045
764
674
607
2,277
467
621
638
551
Additional Employment Opportunities
in Agriculture
Irri-
gation 2 ABCD3
625 (164)
315
46
102
30
87
50
223
28
65
69
(129)
(24)
120
(75)
(124)
(27)
86
(32)
(31)
149
(122)
(25)
(46)
(28)
61 (23)
due to Additional Land
MX (H)4 MX (L)5
3,721
1,703
332
417
106
487
362
688
361
262
65
1,329
378
201
254
496
2,129
1,103
233
279
76
337
180
203
182
22
0
823
223
113
154
333
Agricultural Employ-
Potential
2000
11,636
5,021
973
1,135
609
1,277
1,027
2,906
1,132
922
852
3,707
848
841
933
1,085
10,044
4,421
874
997
578
1,127
845
2,421
953
682
787
3,201
690
753
833
922
Annual Growth
Rate
Percent
H L
1.80 1.20
1.91
1.83
3.37
0.42
1.75
1.90
1.42
1.59
1.26
1.37
1.97
2.41
1.22
1.53
2.75
1.39
1.39
2.83
0.21
1.25
1.11
0.68
0.89
0.05
1.04
1.37
1.57
0.77
1.07
2.08
1Average of February and August 1975, NCSO Household Surveys of Employment.
and above employed in agriculture and at work.
2Calculated on the basis of NIA irrigated area figures adjusted
Includes persons 10 years old
by NEDA-RDS 1975 workshops, assuming
additional employment of one manyear for every two hectares of cultivated land which becomes irrigated
in accordance with estimated labor/land ratios. This is also the ratio used in the 1974 ILO Mission
Report "Sharing in Development," p. 461.
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3 Calculated on the basis of one manyear of employment gained for every
two hectares of non-irrigated ABCD land brought into agriculture, as
per estimated Labor/Land ratios for this category of land. Conversely,
for every hectare of ABCD land lost to urban use it is assumed that 0.5
manyear of employment in agriculture is lost.
4
MX(H) is the additional employment capacity of agriculture due to the
incorporation of non-pasture MX lands on the high assumption regarding
the availability of these lands, i.e. assuming that the 1971 Agriculture
Census Coverage extended to these lands. The non-pasture MX land avail-
ability calculated in proportion to the present .disposition of MX lands
in public forest lands as between pasture leases and permits and culti-
vated. For consistency, the coefficient of 0.8 for M lands as estimated
was applied to calculate the employment potential.
5MX(L) is the additional employment capacity of agriculture due to the
incorporation of non-pasture MX lands on the low assumption regarding
the availability of these lands, i.e. extend to these lands. The non-
pasture MX land availability calculated in proportion to the present
distribution of MX lands in public forest lands as between pasture leases
and permits and cultivated. For consistency, the coefficient of 0.665
for MC lands as estimated was applied to calculate the employment potential.
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Appendix 6 Description of Soil Types
Class A: This contains very good land which can be cultivated quite
safely, requiring only simple but good management practices. It is level
or nearly level. The soils are dep, dark, usually fertile or can be made
fertile under good management. These are usually alluvial soils which
can be silty or sandy. Erosion is no problem, and special conservation
practices are not needed except those to maintain the productive capacity
of the soil. All kinds of crops common in the locality can be grown in
this land class.
Class B. This can be termed as good land which can be cultivated safely
with good farming practices. Some types are located on slopes and need
erosion control measures. Other types belonging to this class are slight-
ly wet and will need organic matter to retain moisture and plant food.
Class C. This land class has more limited uses than the previously
class. It can be described as moderately good land, subject to exacting
cultivation, careful management, and intensive conservation.
Either the land is on slopes up to 15 per cent and the soil is moderate-
ly deep and erosion occurs or will occur if unprotected, or the land is
too sandy and deficient in plant food and soil moisture, so that conser-
vation measures are needed, or the land is too wet for planting, and a
drainage system is called for.
Class D. This land is good enough for occasional cultivation under
careful management, but because of some features it cannot be used for
regular cultivation. A large part is too steep for regular cultivation
and-this may cause soil erosion. The area may be too dry or too sandy,
such that growing crops is possible only at certain times of the year.
The land may be better for grazing, and where rainfall is adequate,
for forest land.
Class L. Class L consists of level to nearly level land but too wet
or stony for cultivation. It is best suited to pasture or forest with
good soil management.
Class M. Class M land is not suited for cultivation of any kind, limi-
ted somewhat to grazing or forestry use by features such as shallow
soil or steep slopes.
Class N. This is steeper and rougher than Class M, and is more suited
for forestry than grazing. It includes rough hills and mountains.
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Class X. This consists of mangrove swamps, fresh marshes, and other
permanently wet areas.
Class Y. This land is fit for wildlife or recreation purposes. These
are either eroded, arid, rough, steep or stony, including rocky foot-
hills, rough mountain lands, bare rocks and coastal sand dunes.
The different soil classifications may also be described according to
purpose, thus:
Soil Type Purpose
A, B, C, D Cropland cultivation
D, L, M, N Pasture or Forestry
X Fishpond
Y Recreation and Wildlife
Source: Bureau of Soils
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